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Abstract 
The Syrian refugee crisis has both highlighted the limitations of, and created 
new possibilities for, burden-sharing in refugee protection. This thesis conceptualises 
burden-sharing as an international norm. The implementation of international norms, 
however, depends upon domestic political processes, actors and structures. The thesis 
therefore conducts a critical discourse analysis of the Norwegian political field, until 
late September 2015. The analysis uncovers three dominant discourses in the political 
field - the humanitarian discourse, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse, and the ‘nation-
state’ discourse. These discourses take part in a ‘discursive battle’ over conflicting 
norms, meanings and values. The outcome of this battle, in turn, shapes the political 
space for burden-sharing. In particular, the hierarchical relationship between the 
different discourses has significant consequences for Norwegian burden-sharing 
initiatives. The thesis argues that the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse maintains 
discursive hegemony in the field. However, it also highlights aspects of discursive 
transformation as well as reproduction. As the humanitarian discourse gradually has 
been accorded a stronger role, actors who are largely identified by this discourse have 
attempted to transform the discursive structure and the political space for burden-
sharing.  
In terms of the Syrian crisis, the thesis argues that the discursive hegemony of 
the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse results in the priority of financial burden-sharing 
over physical burden-sharing initiatives, and a lack of political will to implement and 
develop innovative protection measures. Regarding future refugee crises, the findings 
impliy that the Norwegian commitment to burden-sharing is likely to be greater when 
it comes to European initiatives than global initiatives. This is largely the consequence 
of a friction between the humanitarian discourse, which emphasises global and 
European solidarity alike, and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse, which promotes a 
more cautious approach to burden-sharing. Significantly, they both attach value to 
Norway’s European identity. Finally, the findings highlight the need to develop more 
nuanced theoretical approaches addressing the complex relationship between 
international norms and national politics. 
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1 Introduction  
	
1.1  The Syrian refugee crisis  
In 2011, pro-democracy protesters in Syria were targeted and killed by national 
security forces. The violence caused public outrage in many areas, and the situation 
gradually escalated. Opposition groups eventually took up arms, and after months of 
increasing political tension and violence, the Syrian civil war broke out. According to 
the UN, more than 250,000 people had been killed as of August 2015 (UN, 2015), and 
more than 7.6 million people internally displaced (IDMC, 2015). The situation has 
also had major implications for Syria’s neighbouring countries, as they have 
experienced a continuous mass influx of refugees. As of November 2015, there are 
more than 4 million Syrian refugees located in Syria’s nearby region, mainly in 
Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Egypt (UNHCR, 2015a).  
 
The severity of the crisis has led to a deteriorating situation for the Syrian refugees 
who remain in the region. Most of the refugee population is living in local 
communities, not in refugee camps. Rent is therefore a major expense. The livelihoods 
opportunities available are usually to be found in the informal sector, where the 
conditions are particularly bad. As a consequence, many Syrian refugees are living in 
extreme poverty, lacking access to basic services and health care (Zetter and Ruaudel, 
2014; NRC, 2015; Philips, 2013). Children and young people are disproportionally 
affected, especially due to their lack of access to education both inside and outside the 
refugee camps. The NRC reports that in August 2015, more than three million Syrian 
refugee children were not attending school (Skarstein and Ayad, 2015). Furthermore, 
the refugees in the region are also negatively affected by the increasing financial 
difficulties of the international humanitarian system, which is continuously 
underfunded. These financial issues forced the World Food Programme to cut food 
assistance to 1.6 million Syrian refugees in the first half of 2015. They are still at risk 
of having to make further major cuts (Reuters, 2015). This desperate situation has 
consequently led many Syrian refugees to risk their lives by crossing the 
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Mediterranean on dangerous boat rides, often with the help of human smugglers, in 
search for a better life in Europe (UNHCR, 2015b). Moreover, the protection 
challenge in the region is further enhanced by the fact that few countries in the region 
have ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention (Shiblak 1996: 38). This means that the 
refugees are not sufficiently protected by international judicial frameworks.  
 
The crisis has also had a serious impact on neighbouring countries and regional 
stability. In Lebanon, Syrian refugees amount to a fifth of the entire population. This 
has serious consequences for infrastructure and an already challenging political 
situation (Jones and Shaheen, 2015). The crisis has caused rising unemployment, 
wages have decreased and the cost of food and public services has increased (Zetter 
and Ruaudel, 2014). The negative impact on host countries and local communities has 
led to tensions between the local population and the refugees, and to problems relating 
to the quality of refugee protection. Many Syrian refugees are only provided with a 
limited legal status, as host states are worried about increasingly strained public 
resources and services. For instance, in Jordan, the government has restricted the 
access of Syrian refugees to health care services (European Commission 2015a; Zetter 
and Ruaudel, 2014; Philips, 2013). Both Lebanon and Jordan have recently 
strengthened their border control, and incidents of refoulement and deportation of 
refugees are regularly reported (European Commission, 2015a). The Syrian conflict is 
considered today to be the “largest humanitarian crisis since World War II” (European 
Commission, 2015). It is therefore imperative to find international solutions to the 
immediate protection needs of the people affected, also beyond the region, to ensure 
that their rights and welfare are safeguarded, and at the same time ease the burden and 
prevent the region affected from facing serious destabilisation.  
 
1.1.1 Response: Burden-sharing? 
As a response to these circumstances, burden-sharing has been presented by the 
international community as a necessary part of the solution to the crisis. Syria’s 
neighbouring states are hosting an unsustainable share of the refugee ‘burden’. Other 
states must therefore also contribute. Burden-sharing initiatives including 
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resettlement, humanitarian admissions and financial aid have thus been implemented 
by states, often in cooperation with UNHCR. These initiatives aim to provide some 
relief to the countries in the region as well as to provide more effective protection to 
the refugees, through the support of third countries located outside of the region. 
Notably, burden-sharing has traditionally been a tentative principle in refugee 
protection. Even though scholars note that burden-sharing is an underlying principle 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention, there are still no specific formulae, rules or 
regulations for such burden-sharing initiatives (Feller 2006: 525). However, the 
exceptional circumstances caused by the Syrian refugee crisis have arguably created 
new possibilities for burden-sharing, as these initiatives have been crucial in the 
international response.  
 
The question of burden-sharing in refugee protection also goes beyond the Syrian 
crisis. Overall, the world is experiencing a dramatic increase in displaced persons, 
both within and beyond the borders of their countries, as a consequence of conflict 
and humanitarian disasters. Nearly 60 million people across the world were displaced 
in 2015 (Skarstein, 2015). This number will likely continue to grow in the foreseeable 
future as long as political solutions are nowhere to be found. It is therefore imperative 
to find new and innovative policy solutions in refugee protection. Moreover, the 
Syrian case highlights how the negative consequences of displacement do not affect 
all countries equally. Rather, it is often developing countries that face the greatest 
challenges (Skarstein, 2015), which in turn can lead to further destabilisation and 
conflict. Enhanced burden-sharing between states could thus play an important, and 
necessary, role in the future of refugee protection.  
 
1.2 Research question and objectives  
This thesis will look at the relationship between burden-sharing as an international 
norm, promoted by the UNHCR and other international actors, and domestic policies 
and practice - in this case Norwegian refugee protection politics. More specifically, it 
aims to analyse the ‘downloading’ process of an international norm to a specific 
national context, which is characterised by domestic political contestation, processes 
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and institutions. How burden-sharing is interpreted and implemented is dependent 
upon the outcome of domestic political processes, not simply factors at the inter-state 
level. The thesis therefore addresses these national processes in depth, and analyses 
the domestic political discourses – and the power relations between them - that create 
the political space for burden-sharing in practice. Thus, the research question 
addressed in the thesis is stated as follows:  
 
"What are the dominant discourses addressing burden-sharing in refugee protection 
in Norway following the Syrian crisis? In what ways does the hierarchy between these 
discourses shape the political space - for action on this issue and, in the longer term, 
for burden-sharing in refugee protection?  
 
In response to this research question, the thesis argues that the dominant discourses 
addressing burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway following the Syrian crisis 
are a humanitarian discourse, a ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse, and a ‘nation-state’ 
discourse. It argues that the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse maintains discursive 
hegemony in the field, and thus provides the premises for the political debate on 
burden-sharing. However, as the crisis expanded and reached Europe’s borders in the 
time period up to late September 2015, the humanitarian discourse has been accorded 
a stronger role. In particular, grassroots movements in Norway have supported a 
humanitarian discourse that goes beyond party political divisions, and thus pushes to 
transform the boundaries of the discursive practice. These processes of discursive 
reproduction and transformation, and the power relations between the discourses in 
the field, have significant implications for Norwegian burden-sharing politics.  
 
1.2.1. Scope and clarifications  
Some clarifications must be made in the preface of this thesis. Firstly, as the Syrian 
refugee crisis has become more severe, many comparisons have been made in public 
forums between European countries and how many refugees each country has been 
willing to accept. This has led to many misunderstandings with regard to what type of 
protection measures have been put in place, and what states have and have not agreed 
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to do. These misunderstandings have often occurred because it is common to compare 
the number of asylum seekers arriving in individual countries to the number of places 
that different countries have offered for resettlement, temporary protection and other 
special forms of protection measures. However, the number of asylum seekers 
arriving in each country is to an extent beyond the control of the individual country, 
although different political and social factors make some countries more appealing to 
asylum seekers than others. The special protection measures, on the other hand, are 
completely under the control of the country in question, and represent an explicit form 
of solidarity – with the refugees themselves, with countries that are experiencing a 
larger part of the refugee ‘burden’, or both. These latter forms of protection measures 
are part of what will be conceptualised in the thesis as burden-sharing initiatives. The 
discussions on asylum numbers will, however, still impact political actors in the field. 
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between these categories in order not to 
confuse ‘apples and oranges’ in the political debate.  
 
As the Syrian refugee crisis has grown, in combination with large refugee and migrant 
flows from other countries, Europe has experienced its own crisis. Large influxes of 
refugees have been attempting to cross the borders of Europe for a long time, but the 
situation quickly exacerbated in August 2015. In consequence, European border 
countries such as Greece, Croatia, Hungary and the Balkans have experienced a mass 
arrival of refugees entering their countries. This has resulted in a debate on burden-
sharing within Europe, at least within the EU, in the form of so-called relocation as 
well as burden-sharing between Syria’s neighbouring countries and third countries 
mostly located in Europe and North America. Hence, the discussion about burden-
sharing in Norway is now centred around two different aspects, where one relates to 
global solidarity, and the other relates mainly to European solidarity specifically. 
These aspects of burden-sharing will be addressed in the thesis, as they are both 
essential parts of the Norwegian debate. Yet, they will be separated analytically.  
 
Another research challenge is related to the issue of distinguishing the consequences 
of the Syrian refugee crisis specifically from other situations of conflict, poverty and 
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violence. The emerging refugee ‘crisis’ that the world - and in this context, Europe in 
particular - is not simply the result of large numbers of Syrian refugees. Rather, this is 
a complex composition of refugees and migrants from different countries of origin. 
Most political protection initiatives that are made must be seen in the context of this 
complete picture. This makes the research question posed in this thesis more 
challenging, since it demands an analytical separation between the Syrian refugee 
crisis and other refugee situations that is not always possible in practice. However, the 
Syrian crisis is the largest single refugee crisis in the world. Therefore, this specific 
situation arguably has particularly severe consequences, as well as an effect on actors’ 
perceptions of the crisis, which distinguishes it politically from other situations. 
Moreover, although some burden-sharing measures – notably, the European relocation 
schemes – do not distinguish Syrians from other refugees who are entitled to 
protection, most other initiatives, including resettlement and financial burden-sharing, 
can be directed specifically at the Syrian crisis. In this way it is still possible, at least 
to an extent, to separate the discursive practices and policy initiatives addressing the 
Syrian crisis specifically from more general initiatives.  
 
1.2.1.1. Limitations 
Like all research projects, this thesis has certain limitations. Firstly, it only addresses 
the Norwegian context. The ’downloading’ process of the burden-sharing norm 
specifically, and international norms more generally, may occur very differently – or 
vey similarly - in other national contexts. Hence, the thesis simply aims to show that 
the implementation of burden-sharing in practice is dependent upon specific domestic 
factors, without aiming to provide more specific knowledge relating to these processes 
beyond the Norwegian context. Secondly, due to time and resource constraints, it has 
been necessary to delimit the empirical material with reference to a specific time 
period. I have chosen to limit the empirical focus of the second case, the “European 
crisis”, from mid-August to late September 2015, more specifically until the EU 
meeting in Luxembourg on 14 September. This time period also overlaps with the 
local election campaign in Norway. However, the field has been in constant 
development since the summer of 2015, and is likely to continue doing so after this 
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thesis is finished. In consequence, the thesis has some shortcomings in terms of 
addressing the most recent policy developments in the field. However, it still 
highlights some significant aspects of, and dynamics in, the field that remain relevant 
also as the field is changing.  
 
1.3. Why ask this question?  
The topic of the thesis is important for several reasons. Arguably, this research project 
contributes to the field on the theoretical level as well as the policy level. Firstly, 
despite its great political relevance - especially as a subject of constant political debate 
in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis - the role of burden-sharing in refugee 
protection has not been extensive in academic scholarship. Even though several 
scholars have addressed the issue of burden-sharing in depth (see e.g. Suhrke, 1998; 
Barutsciski and Suhrke 2001; Thielemann, 2003; Thielemann and Dewan, 2006;), I 
would still argue that the size of this literature does not match its political relevance, 
particularly not in the field of political science and international relations. The thesis 
thus aims to address this gap between policy and research by placing burden-sharing 
at the centre of its analytical attention. Furthermore, the case of Norway has not 
previously been addressed in scholarship on burden-sharing in refugee protection in 
this way. The choice of case is therefore a contribution to the literature in itself. In 
general, this thesis is a response to the need to find solutions to a dramatic political 
reality. The world is facing increasing challenges in terms of dealing with large 
refugee flows and providing them with adequate protection. These challenges are 
especially great in the context of the Syrian crisis, due to its massive scale. It is 
therefore imperative to find new and innovative solutions in refugee protection, for 
instance through more extensive burden-sharing initiatives.  
 
1.3.1. Making a theoretical contribution 
The thesis also aims to address what can be perceived as a shortcoming in mainstream 
IR scholarship, namely that it often neglects the role of domestic politics. A central 
analytical focus of the thesis is the complex relationship between international and 
domestic politics. In particular, it looks at how burden-sharing, an arguably tentative 
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norm in international refugee protection, is processed in a specific domestic political 
context. In this domestic context, different actors have differing beliefs, values and 
worldviews. It is therefore not given how such an international norm is interpreted by, 
and implemented in, states. Moreover, the perceptions of domestic political actors are 
not static, but can and will change over time, as a response to changing ideational and 
material factors. This complex relationship is rarely addressed in depth in academic 
literature on international norms. Rather, IR theory tends to characterise states as 
homogenous actors. For instance, structural realism promotes the ‘black box 
assumption’, which treats the sovereign state as a ‘black box’ where domestic actors 
and politics are considered to be largely irrelevant for how the state acts in the 
international system (Mearsheimer 2009: 78). However, a more nuanced approach to 
this international-domestic relationship is addressed in the ‘Europeanization’ literature 
in the study of politics. The Europeanization literature emphasises the ‘downloading 
process’ of ideas and practices developed at the overarching European level to the 
specific domestic contexts of the different member states. The outcomes of this 
process depend upon inherently domestic factors - actors, processes, and institutions. 
Clearly, states also take part in an ‘uploading process’, as the EU is constituted by the 
states themselves. However, each individual state only has limited power to shape 
norms and policies at the international level, as they are the result of contested 
international processes. Therefore, the ‘downloading’ process still involves norms and 
policies that have developed largely outside the individual state’s control, and 
consequently will have differentiated outcomes in different domestic contexts. It is 
this ‘downloading process’ that will be analysed in the thesis.  
 
Similarly, Ted Hopf has criticised constructivist IR theory for its neglect of the 
domestic sphere in foreign policy analysis. He thus develops a theory in which he 
argues that the origins of foreign policy are developed in the domestic sphere. In this 
thesis, Hopf’s approach will be ‘turned on its head’. Instead of focusing on domestic 
factors as the origins of a state’s foreign policy, the thesis will analyse how 
international norms and policy are implemented at the domestic level. The theoretical 
foundations are the same, however – domestic actors are mainly influenced by 
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domestic norms, ideas and practices, also when they develop international policy. 
Hence, domestic actors, institutions and processes must be at the centre of analysis.  
 
The thesis thus provides a theoretical contribution to the field by combining three 
different theoretical strands – constructivist norm theory in IR, ‘Europeanization’ 
theory, and Hopf’s bottom-up constructivism – in order to make sense of the complex 
relationship between international norms, ideas and practices, and the domestic sphere 
in which they are processed and implemented. The thesis aims to show that an in-
depth analysis of domestic discursive structures and domestic actors enables a 
strengthened understanding of the possibilities for the implementation of international 
norms, such as burden-sharing. A constructivist approach that remains at the inter-
state level of analysis is not sufficient. Consequently, in the words of Hopf (2002: 
xiv), the thesis essentially aims to “bring society back into social constructivism”.  
 
1.4. Analytical framework 
The thesis conducts a critical discourse analysis, based on Norman Fairclough’s 
approach, of the competing political discourses in Norway concerning burden-sharing 
in refugee protection. Discourses are clusters of ideas that provide the social world 
with meaning. The thesis defines a discourse as “a particular way of talking about and 
understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 1). 
In the Norwegian political field of refugee protection, competing discourses that 
represent differing worldviews take part in discursive ‘battles’. The outcomes of these 
battles determine the legitimate scope for political action in terms of burden-sharing in 
refugee protection in Norway. Further, CDA emphasises the role of power and 
ideologies in the discursive field. Dominant discourses will always highlight some 
perspectives and marginalise others. It is the dominant discourse that first and 
foremost provides the premises for the political debate and relevant policy outcomes. 
However, the power structures in the discursive field can be transformed by social 
actors or by changing social practice. The power element inherent in discursive 
practice is therefore of central importance in the thesis. 
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There is not one single way to conduct a critical discourse analysis. Therefore I have 
applied an eclectic selection of Fairclough’s analytical tools in the textual analysis, 
consisting of the tools that I have deemed the most appropriate for this specific 
research project. Moreover, I apply Fairclough’s three-dimensional model as the 
overarching analytical framework. This model examines closer the three levels of 
CDA: text, discursive practice, and social practice. These dimensions will be analysed 
in this order for analytical purposes, though it is important to always be aware of the 
‘feedback effects’ of the model. The three dimensions are mutually constitutive. Text 
and discursive practice constitutes social practice, but changes in social practice may 
also constitute changes in text and discursive practice.  
 
1.4.1. Selecting empirical material  
The thesis employs two different types of empirical material: articles, mainly from 
Norwegian national press and political party websites, and interview material from 
interviews with key informants. A major challenge in CDA is to choose and delimit 
the empirical material that will be used for analysis. However, in a discourse analysis 
the material does not need to be representative for the total population of texts and 
actors in the field. Rather, the data selection should be representative for certain 
prominent and differing ideas, meanings and worldviews in the specific context. It is 
therefore most important that the material is large enough to cover different 
perspectives of reality (Bratberg 2014: 40). The texts and interview material that is 
analysed here is thus the result of a careful selection of key ideas presented by key 
actors in the field. Further, since a discourse analytical approach is not claiming to 
cover the full range of actors, ideas and discourses within the field, one cannot expect 
that the empirical selection is made on entirely objective grounds. Instead, it is 
inherently based upon the researcher’s interpretation, and knowledge, of the field 
(Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 78). The two forms of empirical material are employed 
in the thesis for slightly different purposes. The texts constitute the most prominent 
and significant ideas and worldviews in the political field. The empirical material, on 
the other hand, is applied mainly to help develop a greater understanding of the 
political field, and shed light upon the analysis.  
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1.5. Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 provides an empirical backdrop for the analysis, and an attempt to account 
for actual developments ‘on the ground’ in relation to burden-sharing in refugee 
protection. The chapter explains the concept of burden-sharing by drawing upon 
relevant ideational trends as well as policy developments in international refugee 
protection. It also introduces the most significant forms of burden-sharing, and 
addresses how burden-sharing has been part of the response to the Syrian crisis. 
Chapter 3 presents a theoretical and analytical framework for analysing the role of 
international refugee norms in Norwegian politics. The chapter also introduces 
Fairclough’s three-dimensional model to CDA, and explains how this model will be 
applied in the analysis. Finally, it presents the empirical material that is selected for 
analysis. 
 
Chapter 4 and 5 presents the analytical dimensions of the thesis, through which the 
research question will be answered. Chapter 4 presents a brief background of 
Norwegian refugee protection in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, and the 
specific analytical tools that will be applied. It further provides an analysis of text and 
discursive practice. It also addresses the hierarchy between the discourses in the 
political field, and the effects of changing power relations between them. Chapter 5 
presents the analysis of social practice and political implications. It focuses on policy 
implications in relation to two key issues: 1) the implications for Norwegian burden-
sharing policies in relation to the Syrian refugee crisis specifically, and 2) the long-
term implications for burden-sharing in refugee protection more generally. It also 
discusses the implications of social practice in relation to the broader theoretical 
framework addressing the relationship between the international and the domestic 
sphere. Finally, chapter 6 provides the concluding remarks, including a summary of 
the thesis’ main findings and implications for further research.  
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2 Burden-sharing in Refugee Protection 
 
This chapter will provide an introduction to the issue at hand, namely burden-sharing 
in refugee protection. The chapter aims to present an empirical backdrop for the 
analysis, and attempts to account for actual developments ‘on the ground’ in relation 
to burden-sharing in refugee protection. This may cause a somewhat ‘artificial’ and 
impossible distinction between burden-sharing as a normative idea, derived from 
notions of morality and solidarity, and burden-sharing as a policy concept that 
provides a basis for actual and observable policy initiatives and practices. Still, the 
purpose of this chapter is to present, to the furthest possible extent, an empirical 
account of burden-sharing in international refugee protection activities in general, and 
in the international response to the Syrian refugee crisis in particular.  
 
Subchapter 2.1. begins by presenting a brief overview of the international refugee 
protection regime, which provides the framework for norms, policies and practices 
relating to refugee protection initiatives. It also presents burden-sharing as a 
normative principle in this regime. Subchapter 2.2. discusses how burden-sharing 
initiatives are practiced, mainly through financial burden-sharing, resettlement,  
temporary protection, and other complementary forms of protection. Further, 
subchapter 2.3. presents the European framework for burden-sharing, which will be of 
particular importance in this thesis. Subchapter 2.4. presents previous burden-sharing 
initiatives in refugee protection, most notably the response to the Yugoslavian crisis in 
the 1990s and UNHCR’s permanent resettlement schemes. These experiences have 
contributed to shaping international and Norwegian actors’ perceptions of burden-
sharing today. Subchapter 2.5. elaborates upon how the emergence of certain 
ideational and normative trends in international politics has strengthened the call for 
burden-sharing. Subchapter 2.6. explains how burden-sharing has been central in the 
international response to the Syrian refugee crisis, whilst subchapter 2.7. discusses the 
European response to this crisis.   
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2.1. The International Refugee Protection Regime 
In the aftermath of World War II, there was increasing international focus on the 
importance of protecting displaced populations, as a response to the large numbers of 
European refugees. This concern resulted in the establishment of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. The Convention gives host countries and the international community a 
legal obligation to protect refugees when their own states are unable or unwilling to 
do so (Ferris 2011: 1-6). Initially, international refugee law is based on two core 
principles. Firstly, it defines refugees as - and thus provides protection to - persons 
who sought refuge abroad because they were persecuted in their home countries. 
Secondly, it embraces the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits states from 
rejecting or forcibly removing refugees if this act puts the refugees at risk of 
persecution. In addition, states also have a duty to respect and adhere to the basic 
standards of treatment of refugees as provisioned by the Convention (Chetail 2014: 
29; Hammerstad 2014: 72). However, as Chetail (2014: 26) notes, the definition of 
‘refugee’ has expanded as the international refugee protection regime has become 
more interconnected with international human rights law and standards. In essence, 
the aim of international protection is “to fill the gap created by the failure of the 
refugee’s own state to fulfil its obligations towards its citizens” (Hammerstad 2014: 
72). These initial protection ideals embraced by international refugee law lay the 
foundation for what has eventually developed into an international refugee protection 
regime, which Barnett defines as “a structure of laws, rules, and principles and a 
network of states, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations to 
govern those who are forced to flee their homes because of fear for their lives” 
(Barnett 2010: 106).  	
2.1.1. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
The international refugee protection regime consists of a range of international and 
domestic actors. However, the framework for the regime is first and foremost 
developed, upheld and protected by the UNHCR. The UNHCR is responsible for 
promoting and protecting refugee rights, and is considered to be the ”key institutional 
actor in the international refugee regime” (Hammerstad 2014: 9). It was established in 
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1950 and its major task was to aid and protect the 1 million refugees that remained 
displaced after World War II. Gradually, the scope of its responsibilities and activities 
was expanded (Ferris 2011: 23; Loescher 2001: 35; Hammerstad 2014:165). The 
UNHCR’s statute duties are now wide-ranging and include promoting and supervising 
international legal conventions, advocacy activities on behalf of refugees aimed at 
promoting state measures to improve their situation, promoting refugee admission, 
providing assistance, and co-operating with states. Still, protection is ultimately the 
agency’s “raison d’ètre” (Ferris 2011: 28; Hammerstad 2014: 73; 174). This involves 
both physical protection, which is essential for refugees at risk in the short term, and 
legal protection, which is necessary to ensure a long-term solution for the refugee 
(Goodwin-Gil cited in Hammerstad 2014: 73). Hammerstad (2014: 73) thus notes that 
a “solution to the refugee’s problem is found when he or she is again able to enjoy the 
national protection that full citizenship in a state accords. Only when such a solution is 
found does the UNHCR’s obligation to provide protection cease.” In general, it is the 
UNHCR that sets the overarching international standards for refugee protection today, 
in terms of both normative and policy developments.  
 
2.1.2. Burden-sharing in the international refugee protection regime 
Burden-sharing between states is a significant normative principle in the international 
refugee protection regime. The regime is arguably founded upon an implicit 
recognition that states have a common responsibility for displaced populations. Feller 
thus stresses that the 1951 Refugee Convention regime “rests on notions of 
international solidarity and burden and responsibility sharing” (Feller 2006: 525). 
Refugees are considered to be individual rights holders. Whenever the state in 
question fails to protect the rights of its own citizens, this responsibility falls upon the 
international community as a whole. Burden-sharing initiatives may thus be necessary 
to ensure refugee protection in practice, especially in crisis situations where affected 
countries alone are not able to provide the refugees with protection that meets 
international standards. The main rationale for burden-sharing is thus to ensure more 
effective refugee protection, defined here as ‘quality protection’ (Feller 2006: 529). 
Perhaps most importantly, Feller (2006: 533) argues that effective protection must be 
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“understood to involve asylum seekers and refugees being given a genuine and 
realisable prospect for a durable solution”. A durable solution is defined as a solution 
that will allow the refugees to “rebuild their lives in dignity and peace” (UNHCR, 
2015d). The ultimate aim of refugee protection is to find a permanent, and adequate, 
solution to the displaced person’s situation. Burden-sharing can thus be necessary to 
achieve durable solutions in refugee crises when such a solution cannot be provided 
within the current refugee hosting country.  
 
The normative significance of burden-sharing in the international refugee protection 
regime is highlighted by the UNHCR’s strong focus on encouraging increased burden-
sharing in its policy and advocacy activities. It advocates burden-sharing as a key 
protection strategy, and has been the most prominent proponent of burden-sharing 
schemes since the 1990s (Barutciski and Suhrke, 2001; Orchard and Miller, 2014). 
For instance, the UNHCR’ Executive Committee meeting in October 2004 provided a 
conclusion document entitled Conclusion on International Cooperation and Burden 
and Responsibility Sharing in Mass Influx Situations. This document stresses the 
importance of solidarity with host countries of mass influxes and the value of, and 
need for, enhanced burden and responsibility sharing in these situations (UNHCR, 
2004). Hence, it aims to establish burden-sharing as an international refugee norm. In 
2004, the UNHCR Executive Committee consisted of 66 member states, which 
provided this document with significant weight and legitimacy (UNHCR, 2015c). 
 
However, even though burden-sharing is an underlying normative principle in the 
international refugee protection regime, and an important concept in the academic 
debate, it has been a tentative principle in terms of policy developments. Feller (2006: 
525) notes that the 1951 Convention “offers no agreed indicators, much less formulae, 
for such burden and responsibility sharing”. Instead, the specifics concerning state 
responsibility in different refugee situations are often unclear. This has put constraints 
on the scope and conditions for these initiatives, and there has consequently been a 
difference between normative developments and policy implementation with regards 
to burden-sharing in refugee protection. Despite the concept being of normative 
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significance, it is not embedded explicitly in international refugee law. However, as 
this chapter will show, burden-sharing has still been a guiding principle for several 
international and regional protection initiatives. Further, several scholars note that the 
development of a refugee protection system that has burden-sharing at its core, and 
well-established rules, regulations and principles to guide such burden-sharing 
initiatives, could potentially lead to significant improvements in the international 
refugee protection regime (Feller 2006: 533; Barutciski and Suhrke 2001: 99). As the 
Syrian refugee crisis presents an extraordinary situation for the international 
community, it may also create new possibilities for enhanced burden-sharing in 
refugee protection policy.  
 
2.2. Burden-sharing in practice  
Burden-sharing in refugee protection can take several forms. When discussing refugee 
protection it is common, from a Western perspective, to distinguish between 
protection-in-regions-of-origin and so-called ‘physical’ protection. The former entails 
providing humanitarian aid and assistance, most often in financial terms, to displaced 
populations in the areas nearby their country of origin. The latter refers to the actual 
provision of temporary or permanent asylum, or other forms of complimentary 
protection (Betts, 2006). The case for financial burden-sharing and protection-in-
regions-of-origin is often supported by arguments of efficiency. Betts (2006: 167) 
argues that protection-in-regions-of-origin suggests a shift towards specialisation 
based on states’ comparative advantage in terms of physical or financial support for 
protection. Since states located in the Global North normally have greater financial 
capacity, and the provision of physical protection in third countries is viewed as a 
costly and time-consuming process, it is argued that developed states can help more 
refugees more effectively by providing aid to the countries that are already hosting 
them. Protection-in-region-of-origin can also include the provision of humanitarian 
aid. However, financial burden-sharing is arguably also the “easiest” form of burden-
sharing, especially so for wealthy countries. This is not necessarily a problem in itself, 
as financial aid is a crucial contribution to host countries with low capacity. However, 
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it is not necessarily sufficient burden-sharing in the context of a refugee crisis where 
the refugee numbers in the host countries becomes unmanageable.  
 
An important form of burden-sharing in ‘physical’ refugee protection occurs through 
the process of resettlement, often on a mass scale during refugee crises. Resettlement 
is defined by the UNHCR as “the selection and transfer of refugees from a state in 
which they have sought protection to a third country that admits them – as refugees – 
with a permanent residence status” (UNHCR cited in ERN, 2015a). Resettlement 
programmes are therefore a way for countries to express solidarity with (usually 
developing) states that are more severely affected by conflict and that host a large 
number of the world’s displaced population, as well as with the refugees themselves. 
Resettlement is also considered by the UNHCR to be a ‘durable solution’ to the 
refugee situation, alongside voluntary repatriation and local integration (ERN, 2015a). 
Hence, resettlement is a valuable ‘physical’ burden-sharing tool because it can 
provide effective protection.  
 
In situations of mass influx of refugees, burden-sharing schemes can also provide 
various forms of temporary protection, which involves providing temporary asylum 
and potentially limited protection to displaced persons at risk (Thorburn, 1995). It 
offers security to a larger number of refugees in need of immediate protection than 
would otherwise be the case, because the provision of temporary asylum is less 
resource demanding than permanent asylum. Temporary protection schemes usually 
fall under the category “complementary protection”, which is defined by UNHCR 
(2014) as “formal permission, under national law or practice, to reside in a country 
extended by that country to persons who are in need of international protection even 
though they do not qualify for 1951 Convention refugee status”. This can include 
several forms of protection statuses, such as “subsidiary protection” and 
“humanitarian protection” (UNHCR, 2014). Thorburn (1995) argues that temporary 
protection policies and programmes are not – and should not – be perceived as 
representing a solution to the refugee situation in itself, but as an important stepping-
stone towards a durable solution. Temporary protection policies ensure the fulfilment 
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of basic human rights on the one hand, whilst allowing states to maintain control of 
their asylum admissions on the other. However, they must be included in a 
comprehensive protection system based on burden-sharing principles. This involves 
extensive cooperation between all actors involved, in order to find appropriate 
solutions. Temporary protection is therefore an important, but insufficient, burden-
sharing tool, which needs to be accompanied by a more comprehensive approach to 
refugee protection. It is important, however, to distinguish between temporary 
protection defined as providing protection to collective groups harmed by a particular 
humanitarian crisis through special schemes, and temporary protection in national 
regulations that involve a certain time period before regular asylum seekers can apply 
for permanent stay in a country. It is the first category that will be addressed here, as 
only this represents actual burden-sharing.  
 
2.3. The European framework for burden-sharing 
The EU is a significant actor in the international refugee regime generally, and in the 
area of burden-sharing specifically. As the EU has become gradually more integrated 
in several policy areas, the question of sharing burdens and benefits on a range of 
issues has become a political priority. This also includes the field of refugee and 
asylum issues. Accordingly, the EU has gradually developed institutions and 
regulations that enable burden-sharing in refugee protection. These regulations also 
have consequences for some European states that are not members of the EU, 
including Norway. Hence, the European framework for burden-sharing will be of 
particular significance in this thesis. Norway is strongly influenced by EU practice – 
including by regulations it is not bound by.  
 
2.3.1. The Common European Asylum System 
“Solidarity” is a central foundational principle of the EU (Vevstad, 2015b 
[interview]). This puts certain demands on the member states when it comes to 
sharing the burdens as well as the typical free trade benefits that are commonly 
associated with membership. In particular, the principle of solidarity – in terms of 
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solidarity within the Union, not global solidarity - is expressed in Article 80 of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which reads:  
 
The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between 
the Member States. Whenever necessary, the acts of the Union adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall 
contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle. 
 
The Lisbon treaty thus expects the EU to implement certain measures to address the 
issue of responsibility-sharing in situations where this is deemed necessary. The issue 
of EU burden-sharing in the context of refugee and asylum politics was rendered 
particularly relevant during the Balkan crisis in the 1990s, when the European 
continent was faced with a large inflow of refugees (Thielemann 2003: 259-260). 
Since 1999, the EU has therefore been working to establish and implement a Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS). The aim of CEAS is to harmonise the refugee and 
asylum practices within the EU. For instance, CEAS includes an Asylum Procedures 
Directive, which “safeguards and guarantees access to a fair and efficient asylum 
procedure” (EC, 2015b), and a Reception Directive, which aims to “ensure better as 
well as more harmonised standards of reception conditions throughout the Union” 
(EC, 2015b). An explicit burden-sharing tool in CEAS is the 2001 Temporary 
Protection Directive, which is “an exceptional measure to provide displaced persons 
from non-EU countries and unable to return to their country of origin, with immediate 
and temporary protection” (EC, 2015c). The Temporary Protection Directive is to be 
implemented in situations of mass influx where the standard asylum system is unable 
to cope with the situation (EC, 2015c). It has not yet, however, been put into use.  
 
2.3.2. The Dublin Regulations 
The Dublin Regulations address the issue of refugee rights, and is a particularly 
important burden-sharing initiative in the EU context. Norway, Switzerland, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein are also part of the Dublin system (UDI, 2015). Specifically, the 
regulations establish a system that determines which country within the EU is 
responsible for examining a particular asylum application. They are founded upon the 
country of first asylum-principle, which entails that an asylum seeker can be sent back 
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to the first EU country he was registered in, if certain criteria are met. One important 
purpose of the Dublin regulations is to ensure equal treatment and predictability for 
the asylum seekers coming to Europe (Ekeløve-Slydal, 2015 [interview]). It is further 
aiming to prevent so-called “asylum shopping”, where the applicant is “lodging 
multiple applications in an effort to seek asylum in the country offering the most 
attractive regime of protection” (Mouzourakis 2015: 20). However, it is important to 
note that the Dublin-Regulations also contains certain exemption rules that enable 
countries to waive the principle of return to first country of asylum, for instance if the 
first country of return does not meet certain reception standards. In addition, the 
Dublin III Regulations that were put into force in January 2014 aim to strengthen 
measures of responsibility-sharing and equal treatment, and enhance protection 
(Vevstad, 2015b [interview]).  
 
2.4. Previous burden-sharing initiatives  
This section briefly addresses how burden-sharing has been applied as a practical 
policy concept in specific refugee protection initiatives, in particular during the 
Balkan crisis in the 1990s, as well as in UNHCR’s permanent resettlement scheme. 
These experiences have contributed to shaping the perceptions of international and 
Norwegian actors when it comes to possibilities and challenges created by burden-
sharing in refugee protection.  
 
2.4.1. Historical burden-sharing schemes 
Two major historical burden-sharing initiatives have been particularly successful. The 
first was a response to the situation of the more than 1 million people who were 
displaced after World War II, which resulted in a massive resettlement process. The 
second was a large-scale resettlement scheme established to provide protection to 
Vietnamese refugees after 1975 (Suhrke, 1998). The most prominent case of a large-
scale burden-sharing scheme in recent times, however, took place in Europe in the 
1990s as a response to the crisis in Yugoslavia. This represents one of the few cases in 
which European countries have provided temporary protection to displaced persons 
through such a scheme, even though to some extent “the lines became blurred 
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between the concepts of resettlement, humanitarian evacuation and temporary 
protection” (Koser and Black 1999: 523; Barutscki and Suhrke 2001: 102). The 
burden-sharing scheme was established to ensure that Macedonia would accept the 
large refugee flow from its neighbouring countries, which it had initially refused. 
Macedonia was at risk of severe national destabilisation due to the mass influx. The 
scheme therefore aimed to transfer refugees from Macedonia to third countries. 
Overall, the programme was quite successful (Barutscki and Suhrke 2001: 105-106). 
Yet, it also highlighted some of the challenges related to temporary protection 
schemes. For instance, a majority of Bosnian refugees that received protection in 
Norway chose not to return to Bosnia when the conflict was over (Solberg, 2015). In 
the analysis, it becomes apparent that this experience with burden-sharing in physical 
refugee protection has contributed significantly to shaping the perceptions of 
Norwegian actors today, in particular with regards to temporary protection. The 
Bosnian refugees became rooted in Norwegian society, which created a range of 
dilemmas for the Norwegian field.  
 
2.4.2. UNHCR’s permanent resettlement scheme 
There have also been several attempts to establish more permanent and stable 
regulations for burden-sharing initiatives during the past decades, yet with limited 
success. Around the new millennium, the UNHCR started several new processes 
aimed at strengthening the international refugee protection regime, in which burden-
sharing was an essential aspect. These initiatives included Global Consultations, the 
Agenda for Protection, and the Consultation Plus Initiative (Feller 2006: 528; 
Hammerstad 2014: 156). The Agenda for Protection presented six goals that aim to 
strengthen the Convention regime. One of these goals was to “share burdens and 
responsibilities more equitably and build capacities of host States to receive and 
protect refugees” (Feller 2006: 527). Similarly, the agency’s Convention Plus 
Initiative created a Framework for Durable Solutions, aiming to ”create new norms on 
burden-sharing in three areas: the strategic use of resettlement, ’irregular’ secondary 
movements from South to North, and targeted development assistance in refugee-and 
refugee-hosting regions” (Hammerstad 2014: 156). However, Hammerstad (2014: 
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156) notes that in reality, the area of resettlement was largely ignored in this process. 
Still, the UNHCR has been successful in creating a permanent small-scale 
resettlement system. In this system, the countries that participate in the scheme, which 
are all located in the global North, resettle a certain quota of vulnerable refugees each 
year with the help of UNHCR. However, only a small number of states, 28 in total (as 
of 2015), take part in the programme. Norway is one of them (UNHCR, 2015e; 
Suhrke 1998: 397).  
 
2.5. Explaining the ideational foundations of burden-
sharing  
The development of burden-sharing as a concept in international refugee protection, 
and the evolution of the international refugee protection regime itself, has not taken 
place in a vacuum. Rather, it has emerged in relation with broader ideational trends, 
which have had concrete impact on policy and practice in the international as well as 
in different domestic spheres. This subchapter will elaborate upon some of these 
ideational developments and discuss the normative foundations for burden-sharing in 
refugee protection. Firstly, it will address the notion of ‘solidarity’, which relates to 
burden-sharing specifically. Secondly, it will address the human rights regime and 
other, broader ideational trends in IR that have contributed to strengthening the call 
for burden-sharing.  
 
2.5.1. The call for solidarity 
The call for burden-sharing in refugee protection is derived from an understanding of 
rights and responsibilities in international politics. Solidarity is the primary motivation 
for this particular form of political organisation. With regards to burden-sharing, 
solidarity can be directed at two different sets of actors. Firstly, burden-sharing in 
refugee protection can be driven by solidarity for the refugees themselves. The 
UNHCR defines international solidarity as “a fundamental principle according to 
which States shall respond to the needs of refugees in a spirit of humanitarianism” 
(UNHCR, 2014). This view promotes burden-sharing in order to ensure the rights of 
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refugees. However, this solidarity can also refer to states responding to the needs of 
other states that are disproportionally affected by heavy refugee flows. In this regard, 
Thielemann (2003: 257) argues that solidarity as a motivation for burden-sharing can 
represent a “recognition of specific obligations between members of a group”, based 
on commitment to, or concern for, other members of the group. Regional or 
international groups of states can recognise, and act upon, such solidarity with other 
states by accepting a part of the refugee ‘burden’.  
 
2.5.2. Human rights and other influential ideas and concepts  
The development of the human rights regime has been particularly important in 
framing why effective refugee protection is important and how it can occur. The 
international human rights regime and the refugee protection regime have both 
emerged from the liberalist idea that the state has a responsibility towards each 
individual, and that all persons have certain inalienable rights. Over time, although 
international human rights law and refugee law initially were considered to be two 
distinctive strains of international law, these have become increasingly interlinked and 
overlapping. Humanitarian action in general, and refugee protection in particular, has 
increasingly been viewed through the language of rights (Chetail 2014: 19; Ferris 
2011: 40; Feller, 2006). This has in turn increased the number of ways in which actors 
deal with refugee protection, and contributed to conceptualising certain standards for 
effective protection. As Hammerstad (2014: 83) notes, embedding refugee rights “into 
the universal language of human rights norms” has created a “scope for the widening 
of the international community’s will and ability to deal with refugee problems in 
more ways than asylum”. Moreover, the interpretation of refugee rights in the light of 
human rights norms also involves certain assumptions regarding what constitutes a 
durable solution to the refugee situation. Feller (2006: 518) argues that when a person 
seeks refuge because she is unable to exercise her fundamental human rights, “this is, 
in legal terms, the realisation of human rights”. Consequently, effective refugee 
protection leading to a durable solution must ensure that the refugee regains her ability 
to exercise these fundamental rights.  
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Other key principles in IR have also contributed to the call for strengthened refugee 
protection and burden-sharing. These include Protection of Civilians, the 
Responsibility to Protect, and human security. PoC has gradually become an umbrella 
concept guiding humanitarian policy and practice, as well as providing the 
overarching framework for UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. Following 
this trend, PoC has also become a central principle of refugee management. Today, 
there is a strong focus on creating a “culture of protection” in all aspects of the 
humanitarian field (Lie and De Carvalho 2008:1). Hence, the increased international 
focus on PoC stresses the need to ensure protection for civilians affected by conflict 
through innovative protection and policy measures, which can include burden-sharing 
initiatives. Further, the concept of human security emerged in IR in the 1990s. 
According to Gasper (2005: 222), this concept “highlights the distinction between the 
security of states and the security of persons, and re-visions the latter as not merely 
the physical safety of individuals but their ability to hold and secure basic goods”. 
Similarly, the R2P agenda rests on the notion that the international community must 
protect the rights and security of individuals if their own sovereign state is unable or 
unwilling to do so. This responsibility thus legitimises, and in fact calls for, 
humanitarian invention by international actors if the sovereign state fails its 
responsibility and, arguably, if the criteria proposed by just war theory are met (Evans 
and Sahnoun, 2002). The R2P agenda has been highly challenged and contested, 
especially due to its interventionist nature and the implications for state sovereignty 
and security. However, both R2P and human security are concepts in IR that put the 
needs of individuals at the centre of political attention and which emphasises the 
international community’s responsibility for them. In general, the development of 
concepts, policy and practice in IR that emphasise the rights of individuals and the 
responsibilities of states to protect them contribute to explaining why burden-sharing 
has become an increasingly important concept in refugee protection. 
 
2.5.3. Normative developments vs. implementation 
Burden-sharing has become a concept of refugee and asylum governance that can 
contribute to providing durable solutions to the refugee situation, solutions that 
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adequately protect the refugees’ rights. For instance, resettlement is a burden-sharing 
mechanism that constitutes a durable solution. However, it is important to note that 
the developments in rights-based refugee protection have been much stronger at the 
normative level than at the level of implementation. Moreover, the 1951 Convention 
promotes a very strict and Eurocentric view of refugees when it conceptualises the 
refugee as a person who fears persecution because of her political or civil status 
(Hathaway 1991: 6,7). This implies that in practice, collective groups of refugees 
fleeing from war and crisis, such as the Syrian refugees, are not automatically entitled 
to international protection purely on the basis of the 1951 Convention, because they 
do not necessarily fear individual prosecution as such. To address this protection gap, 
national policies often enables the de facto protection of these refugees groups, for 
instance on a humanitarian basis (Hathaway, 1991). Further, some regional 
conventions, including the OAU’s Convention governing the specific aspects of 
refugee problems in Africa, are also created to be much more liberal on this issue 
(Hathaway 1991: 16). Still, there is no international legal mechanism as such 
providing collective protection in these situations.  
 
2.6. Burden-sharing in response to the Syrian Crisis  
The UNHCR has together with more than 150 partners been in charge of coordinating 
the humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee crisis (UNHCR, 2015b). The response 
has consisted of a diverse set of protection initiatives in the region and beyond. A 
major part of UNHCR’s operations in this regard is focused on emergency 
humanitarian assistance in the region. However, the agency has also facilitated several 
burden-sharing initiatives. In 2013, when it was clear that the humanitarian situation 
was deteriorating rapidly, the UNHCR stressed that “enhanced solidarity measures 
from European countries are now required as a matter of urgency”, and encouraged 
states in particular to “show further solidarity with countries hosting Syrian refugees 
in the Middle East region” (UNHCR, 2013). Burden-sharing has remained at the core 
of UNHCR’s approach to protection as the crisis has continued. In the UNHCR’s 
Global Appeal 2015 Update (2015f: 134), it is stated that “special attention will be 
devoted to the resettlement and humanitarian admission of Syrian refugees” in order 
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to secure durable solutions. Hence, international burden-sharing initiatives are 
considered to be imperative for the effective protection of Syrian refugees.  
 
Of course, the UNHCR can only facilitate such burden-sharing measures, and must do 
so in close cooperation with relevant states. With regard to the Syrian crisis, the 
agency has promoted both permanent and temporary protection schemes. The two 
main burden-sharing initiatives facilitated in response to the crisis have been 
resettlement and humanitarian admissions. In addition, the agency has also 
encouraged states to generally show flexibility in their asylum processes and provide 
complementary forms of protection “when persons are found not to meet the 1951 
Convention criteria” (UNHCR, 2013). UNHCR has highlighted that all such flexible 
admissions programmes must be based on certain core principles of refugee 
protection. This includes respecting the principle on non-refoulement; providing 
access to basic services available as well as medical and psychosocial support; and the 
establishment of funding schemes to cover travel costs associated with resettlement 
(UNHCR, 2014). In the physical protection initiatives, the agency is particularly 
concerned with ensuring the protection of the most vulnerable refugee groups, 
including persons with disabilities, members of the LGBTI-community, survivors of 
sexual and gender-based violence and torture and elderly refugees (ERN, 2015b). 
Below is an overview of the primary forms of burden-sharing initiatives to provide 
protection for Syrian refugees.  
 
2.6.1. Financial burden-sharing and protection-in-regions-of-origin 
Financial burden-sharing, and other forms of protection-in-regions-of-origin, has been 
the most extensive form for burden-sharing in the response to the Syrian refugee 
crisis. The EU is the largest aid donor to date (as of August 2015), having contributed 
€3.9 billion in humanitarian, stabilisation, economic and development assistance to 
Syria and neighbouring countries since the crisis commenced. This funding provides 
vital services, including emergency food supplies, shelter and cash and rent assistance, 
clean water, emergency medical supplies and protection, provisioned in cooperation 
with local and international humanitarian partners (European Commission, 2015a) 
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The UK is one of the largest individual contributors of humanitarian aid, having 
donated £900 million for humanitarian support within and around Syria as of 2015 
(DFID, 2015).  
 
2.6.2 Resettlement  
In addition to the regular resettlement programmes that several European states have 
already implemented, the UNHCR has also initiated an enhanced resettlement strategy 
aimed at Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2013). This is to ensure that vulnerable Syrian 
refugees receive sufficient, much-needed protection, and at the same time prevent that 
refugees from other countries lose their opportunity for resettlement. Norway and 
Sweden currently have the largest resettlement programmes for Syrian refugees in 
Europe (Orchard and Miller 2014: 59-61; UNHCR, 2015g). The UNHCR is also 
coordinating a Resettlement Working Group, where refugee host states from the wider 
region participate to discuss and give feedback on resettlement and temporary 
protection programmes for Syrian refugees (ERN, 2015b).  
 
 
2.6.3. Humanitarian Admissions  
In response to the crisis, the UNHCR has facilitated a Humanitarian Admissions 
Programme to ensure more effective protection. They provide temporary protection to 
Syrians who have sought refuge in Lebanon and other neighbouring countries, by 
granting them temporary residence in Europe or North America. Humanitarian 
admissions is an expedited asylum process that gives an opportunity to “secure the 
immediate protection and rapid departure of refugees with urgent and compelling 
needs while UNHCR is in the process of up-scaling its resettlement programme in the 
region” (UNHCR, 2013; ERN, 2015a). HAP thus has two main aims; to provide 
protection to especially vulnerable Syrian refugees, and to support the countries most 
heavily affected by this mass refugee influx by encouraging burden-sharing between 
states (Philips, 2013). Germany has the largest humanitarian admissions programme 
among the European countries, aiming to provide temporary protection to 10,000 
Syrian refugees from Lebanon in the years 2013-2014 (Orchard and Miller 2014: 55-
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57; UNHCR, 2013). Austria and Ireland are also among the countries that have 
established a humanitarian admissions programme in response to the crisis.  
 
2.6.4. Other forms of complementary protection   
Several countries have also established various forms of flexible admission schemes 
for Syrian refugees in order to make protection and asylum procedures more 
accessible. This includes the provision of emergency educational scholarships for 
Syrian students who were forced to quit their studies, enhanced possibilities for family 
reunification, medical evacuation, and private or individual sponsorships. Further, 
other innovative, complementary protection measures have also been implemented. 
For instance, France and Brazil have started issuing different forms of humanitarian 
and asylum visas that enable Syrian refugees to access the countries temporarily and 
apply for normal asylum during their stay (UNHCR, 2015g).  
 
To facilitate these different burden-sharing schemes, UNHCR has organised two 
major international conferences on the resettlement of Syrian refugees, where states 
were encouraged to make pledges for resettlement and other forms of admissions. The 
first conference was the High Level Segment on Solidarity and Burden-sharing with 
Countries Hosting Syrian Refugees, held in October 2013. In this early stage of the 
crisis, the UNHCR was aiming for pledges for a total of 30,000 places of temporary or 
permanent protection places. In the aftermath of this conference, a Core Group on 
Resettlement was established. This group is chaired by Sweden and consists of 23 
resettlement/admission states, the EU, IOM, and UNHCR, and aims to “further 
coordinate efforts and mobilise support” for additional pledges (ERN, 2015c). As the 
crisis has continued and escalated, the UNHCR has had to encourage states to 
additionally increase their pledges. During the International Conference on the 
Resettlement of Syrian Refugees in December 2014, states were therefore encouraged 
to provide another 100,000 places for Syrian refugees in 2015-2016 (ERN, 2015b). In 
total, the UNHCR reported that, including resettlement places and visas granted under 
all other forms of admission schemes, 130,408 places had been made available for 
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third-country protection for Syrian refugees as of 7 October 2015 (UNHCR, 2015g). 
However, major protection challenges still remain. 
 
2.7. The European response: hesitant burden-sharing  
A majority of the places made available for Syrian refugees are in European countries. 
(UNHCR, 2015g). However, as Eui and Fargues (2014: 2) point out, “European 
nations have responded to the refugee crisis in an uneven fashion”. Looking at the 
numbers of resettlement pledges and other forms of admissions provided by states, a 
few countries have been much more generous than others, also within the EU. For a 
long time, there was no coordinated European response in terms of the provision of 
physical protection to Syrian refugees. Instead, Orchard and Miller argue that 
collective European efforts have focused on “containing the crisis, and strengthening 
European borders” (Orchard and Miller 2014: 34). They have mostly been concerned 
with providing humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance to 
Syria and neighbouring countries. The type and extent of physical protection, and who 
qualifies as beneficiaries of the protection schemes, has mainly been decided at the 
domestic level and has therefore varied greatly between the different states. For 
instance, Germany and Sweden have been particularly generous in terms of both 
temporary protection and resettlement, as well as in providing asylum more generally 
(Eui and Fargues, 2014: 2; UNHCR, 2014).  
 
As a response to this situation, in addition to the more general, deteriorating refugee- 
and migrant situation at Europe’s borders, the European Commission developed a 
European Agenda for Migration in May 2015. This agenda has been followed by two 
implementation packages that include guidance on European solidarity and 
responsibility-sharing in general, and on relocation and resettlement in particular. The 
agenda addresses both sides of the European burden-sharing debate. It includes 
regulations for burden-sharing between the EU and the region affected, through 
resettlement, and burden-sharing between European countries – through relocation. It 
also contains a range of criteria, including population, GDP and unemployment rate, 
to ensure a fair procedure between the different countries. The Commission proposed 
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in this regard to relocate 40,000 persons “in clear need of international protection” 
from Greece and Italy to other countries in the Schengen area, whilst also resettling 
20, 000 people from outside of the EU over a two year period (EC, 2015d). At the EU 
ministerial meeting on 14 September 2015, the states agreed to relocate the proposed 
40,000 people, but did not manage to agree upon relocating an additional 120, 000 
refugees from Greece, Italy and Hungary within the Schengen area. The European 
Commission proposed this additional relocation scheme on 9 September because of 
the quickly exacerbating European refugee crisis (EC, 2015c). However, EU countries 
could not agree on whether relocation schemes should be voluntary or compulsory 
(Vevstad, 2015a). Moreover, since Denmark, Ireland and the UK have certain special 
treaty agreements, they have chosen not to be part of the relocation schemes. In 
addition, the Dublin regulations have been put under increasing pressure as the crisis 
has evolved. For instance, Germany has decided to waive the Dublin-return of all 
Syrian refugees in solidarity with EU border countries such as Italy and Greece 
(EurActiv, 2015).  
 
In general, the divisive debate on whether the relocation schemes should be 
compulsory or not highlights some of the challenges for burden-sharing in refugee 
protection. Also within the European community, states are hesitant to implement 
burden-sharing mechanisms that demand certain capacities and resources from their 
national systems, even in a time of crisis. Simultaneously, however, the recent 
international and European policy developments also highlight some of the 
possibilities the Syrian refugee crisis has created for burden-sharing in refugee 
protection. Special resettlement schemes, humanitarian admissions programmes and a 
new relocation scheme for increased burden-sharing within Europe, have enabled 
enhanced burden-sharing in refugee protection. 				
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3 Analytical Framework 
 
This chapter will provide an analytical framework for the analysis. Critical discourse 
analysis presents a set of theoretical and methodological assumptions about the social 
and political world. These assumptions are in many ways a natural extension of 
constructivist theory. Thus, in this chapter I will draw upon three different theoretical 
strands within an overarching social constructivist framework: 1) the norms literature 
in international relations, which focuses on states’ adherence to international norms at 
the inter-state level of analysis; 2) the ‘bottom-up’ approach to constructivism 
presented in the work of Ted Hopf (2002) and others, which locates the origins of a 
state’s foreign policy choices in the domestic social structure; and 3) the so-called 
“Europeanization literature” in the study of politics, which analyses how international 
policies and ideas are “downloaded” and processed in a domestic political context. 
The purpose of combining these three theoretical approaches is to create an analytical 
framework that highlights the complex relationship between the international and the 
domestic sphere in norm processes, and which emphasises the importance of domestic 
actors, ideas and practices in the implementation of international norms and 
principles. In order to analyse this domestic process in depth, I will apply critical 
discourse analysis as the methodological framework. CDA stresses the role of 
discourses in constituting the social and political reality of actors. Dominant political 
discourses define the space for legitimate political action within a certain field. 
Consequently, I argue that discursive practice in the political field determine how the 
international norm of burden-sharing is interpreted and implemented in Norwegian 
politics.   
 
Subchapter 3.1. briefly discusses the interpretivist foundations of constructivism. 
Subchapter 3.2. addresses the dynamics between international norms and national 
politics. Subchapter 3.3. introduces the theoretical foundations of discourse analysis. 
Subchapter 4.4. addresses burden-sharing in refugee protection as grasped through a 
constructivist lens. Burden-sharing is conceptualised as an international norm that is 
processed and implemented in the Norwegian political sphere. The domestic political 
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sphere is characterised by discursive ‘battles’. Subchapter 3.4. then approaches CDA 
more closely as a research method. Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional model is 
presented as the overarching model for the analysis. Finally, subchapter 3.5. discusses 
some research challenges that face CDA.  
 
3.1. The interpretivist foundations of constructivism 
The main constructivist assumption is that the world is socially constructed. Idealism 
thus lies at the core of this theory (Wendt cited in Barnett 2011: 155). We cannot 
neglect the role of ideas in politics and IR. In particular, the notion of widely shared 
ideas, that is, intersubjective beliefs and understandings, is important. These 
intersubjective beliefs constitute people’s knowledge and perceptions about the social 
world and their own role within it (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001:392) This emphasis 
on ideational factors reflects a deeper ontological and epistemological distinction 
between positivism and interpretivism in the study of social sciences. Constructivism 
is founded upon an interpretive epistemological approach. Interpretivism has as its 
staring point that all knowledge of the social world is dependent on human 
interpretation and on particular representations of reality, within a specific social and 
historical context. It thus rejects the possibility of attaining objective knowledge in the 
social sciences (Bratberg 2014: 32-34). In consequence, interpretivism stands in stark 
contrast to the positivist epistemology underlying rationalist theories, which 
emphasises the possibility of discovering objective, scientific truths about the social 
world.  
 
3.2. Dynamics: international norms, national politics 
Mainstream constructivism does not sufficiently acknowledge the role of the domestic 
sphere in determining the concrete outcomes of international ideas and norms. To 
address this shortcoming, I draw upon theoretical insights from the ‘Europeanization 
literature’, which discusses the relationship between the politics and policies of the 
EU and its individual member states. In particular, it emphasises the “downloading” 
of ideas and practices from the EU level to different national contexts. 
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Europeanization scholars point to the fact that member states are affected differently 
by EU politics. One explanation for the varied results of EU policies in different states 
is the different national characteristics, “which mediate the pressures coming down 
from the EU” (Bache and Jordan 2008: 14). Member states do not respond equally to 
the Europeanization process because of inherently different national institutions and 
processes. In essence, “external changes are interpreted and responded to through 
existing institutional frameworks, including existing causal and normative beliefs” 
(Olsen cited in Bache and George 2006: 62). Still, European policies, values and ideas 
significantly impact the national sphere, and contribute to shaping domestic 
discourses, identities and practices (Olsen cited in Bache and Jordan 2008: 25). The 
EU provides the premises upon which specific policy discussions are founded, 
policies are decided, and institutions are shaped. However, their specific outcomes 
depend on national factors. Hence, the Europeanization literature highlights the highly 
complex relationship between the international and the domestic sphere.  
 
This thesis does not address the relationship between EU ideas and practices and its 
member states. However, the ‘Europeanization’ literature provides theoretical insights 
regarding the dynamics between the international and domestic sphere that can be 
transferred to other relevant research areas. The EU represents an external sphere 
beyond the state, in which states interact with other states. In this community, norms, 
principles and policies that are to guide state behaviour are developed. Similarly, this 
same process occurs in the broader international community, although this community 
is not as deeply politically integrated. Also in the UN and other international forums, 
norms and principles are developed for states to follow. These ideas and practices are 
‘downloaded’ to different national contexts. Burden-sharing in refugee protection 
constitutes such an idea. It is therefore necessary to dive into the “black box of the 
state” to address in depth the role and impact of domestic agency, political 
contestation, and discursive interpretations to understand the premises for the 
implementation of this principle on the ground (Bache and Jordan 2008: 23).  
 
3.2.1. Hopf: “Bringing society back into social constructivism” 
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On a similar note, in his work Social Construction of International Politics: identities 
and foreign policies, Moscow 1955 & 1999 (2002), Ted Hopf criticises mainstream 
constructivism for focusing only on the inter-state level of analysis. In particular, he 
criticises constructivist norm literature because it “pays insufficient attention to the 
domestic context within which any international norm is embedded, especially the 
domestic discursive practice” (Hopf 2002: 278). Hopf argues that the origins of states’ 
foreign policy are to be found at the domestic, not the international, level. Each 
domestic society has a certain social structure, which is constituted by specific 
discursive formations that interact and compete with one another. All foreign policy 
makers are part of this discursive structure, which shapes their understanding of social 
and political reality. Consequently, it is not only factors at the international level that 
matter in shaping foreign policy. It is first and foremost domestic ideas, values and 
practices that constitute their perception of themselves, of the world, and of their own 
state’s role within it.  
 
Hopf therefore argues that we need to “bring society back into social constructivism” 
(2002: xiv). This is partly what this thesis aims to do. Hopf begins his analysis at the 
domestic level, and observes how different collective identities at the domestic level 
create a specific social structure. This social structure “establishes the boundaries of 
discourse within a society” (Hopf 2002: 6). In turn, it creates the foundations for a 
state’s foreign policy. In this thesis, I begin the analysis at the international level and 
then take a step down to the domestic sphere. However, the theoretical argument is 
much of the same. The purpose is to bring the analytical focus to the domestic sphere, 
because it is at the domestic level that states’ policies, both foreign and domestic, are 
constituted and implemented. Hence, the analytical focus must be concerned with 
domestic actors. Further, Hopf’s criticism also highlights the usefulness of applying a 
discourse analytical approach to the study of the domestic sphere. He argues that “at 
best, normative constructivists describe the politics surrounding the contestation of a 
norm”, but do so “without delving into the social construction of the meanings of the 
discursive instruments being used in these struggles” (Hopf 2002: 279). A discourse 
analytical approach enables the researcher to delve into these processes. Moreover, a 
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bottom-up constructivist approach also addresses the critique often directed at the 
norms literature, which argues that this literature is unable to explain why some norms 
are supported and institutionalised whilst other are rejected (Hopf 2002: 281). As the 
Europeanization literature has noted, different factors relating to national politics 
matter in the ‘downloading’ of international ideas and practices. We are likely to find 
explanations for the empirical operationalization of norms at least partly at the 
domestic level. Hence, this thesis will aim to address these national political factors in 
depth, in particular the domestic discursive structure.  
 
3.2.1.1. Constituting interests and identities 
Constructivism conceptualises interests as socially constructed – constituted by actors’ 
ideas, beliefs and desires (Blyth 2003:697). As Hay puts it, actors’ “desires, 
preferences and motivations are not a contextually given fact – a reflection of material 
or even social circumstance – but are irredeemably ideational, reflecting a normative 
(indeed, moral, ethical, and political) orientation toward the context in which they will 
have to be realised” (Hay 2011:67). This view of political interests is particularly 
relevant in the refugee protection debate, which is heavily concerned with values. In 
the refugee protection debate, domestic actors in Norway perceive their own interests, 
and their country’s interests, in terms of what is good and bad, right and wrong, 
desirable and undesirable. These perceived interests, in turn, generate given forms of 
behaviour, or specific policy decisions. The question of increasing resettlement quotas 
for Syrian refugees, for instance, cannot simply be reduced to an economic question, 
although some political actors may frame it in mainly economic terms. For others, this 
question will mainly be about morality, solidarity and helping those in need, 
independent of economic costs. For others again, it is about preserving Norwegian 
culture from foreign influence. In essence, debates on burden-sharing in refugee 
protection between Norwegian political actors are about ideas and values – also when 
they are phrased in a way that implies that they are about material interests.  
 
The constitution of interests is closely related to the social construction of identities. 
Rather than accepting the identities of actors as pre-given, actors construct their own 
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self-identity based on their understanding of Self in direct relation to how they 
perceive the identities of Others (Hansen 2006: 5-7). Hence, identities are 
intersubjective. How actors understand their own identity has a decisive impact on 
how they interpret world around them and their own role within it. Therefore, actors 
also understand their interests in terms of their socially constructed identity’s 
characteristics. In constructivist IR theory, the actors in question are states, which 
construct their own identity in direct relationship with other states. In turn, they act in 
accordance with the perceived interests of this particular identity. However, Hopf 
argues that state identity is in fact constructed at the domestic level. Different 
collectively constructed identities at the domestic level take part in constituting the 
discursive formations that in turn create a specific social structure in society. Hence, 
different domestic actors have different perceptions of what the identity of their state 
is, and should be. This has more to do with national factors such as religion and class 
than with factors in the international system (Hopf 2002: 10). The discussion about 
burden-sharing in refugee protection is partly about what kind of state different 
national actors believe that Norway is and should be, and how they want Norway to 
be perceived by other actors in the international community – for instance, as a great 
humanitarian power, or a nation of peace. On the basis of these theoretical insights, 
discourse analysis is deemed the most appropriate analytical framework to address the 
issue of burden-sharing, because discourse analysis enables an in-depth analysis of the 
domestic social structure, and the perceived interests and identities of national actors. 
It thus enables a thorough analysis of how international norms are processed, 
contested, and implemented in a national context.  
 
3.3. Discourse analysis 
The domestic social structure is constituted by interacting and competing discourses. 
Discourses are clusters of ideas that construct the social world by providing it with 
meaning. Specifically, they give us a certain perspective on the world around us 
(Bratberg 2014: 30). Although there is no single agreement on what defines a 
discourse, Philips and Jørgensen (2002: 1) provide a preliminary definition as “a 
particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the 
	 37	
world)”. Dominant discourses constitute some ideas – and consequently, actions – as 
illegitimate and unthinkable, and others as legitimate and desirable (Yee 1996: 96). 
Hence, actors can never act completely independent of these discourses, which 
together constitute a specific social structure. Our own individual ideas are to some 
extent products of existing discursive structures, dependent on a specific social and 
historical context (Bratberg 2014: 30). However, this structure is also shaped by 
political agency. Actors may still challenge, and transform, the current social structure 
with new ideas. As Philips and Jørgensen (2002: 1) phrase it, “our ways of talking do 
not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather, play an active 
role in creating and changing them”.  
 
Discourse analysis  “explores how the socially produced ideas and objects that 
populate the world were created and are held in place” and ultimately aims to 
“uncover the way in which reality was produced” (Hardy et. al. 2004: 19). More 
specifically, Bratberg (2014: 37) notes that discourse analysis has two important 
purposes. Firstly, it aims to analyse how a discourse is put together. Secondly, it aims 
to identify how different discourses relate to each other and are in conflict with each 
other. Importantly, discourse analysis highlights the role of language and 
communication in constructing social reality. Language represents the arena through 
which meaning is created and assigned to particular elements of the material world. 
Moreover, language takes part in shaping what is possible and not possible in the 
social world, by defining what can and cannot adequately be expressed in linguistic 
terms regarding specific areas of social and political life (Bratberg 2014; 32; 33; 
Burnham et.al 2008: 250; Fairclough 2003; 24).  
 
3.4. A discourse analytical approach to burden-sharing 
This subchapter aims to take the empirical knowledge about burden-sharing in refugee 
protection as presented in chapter 2, and approach it through a social constructivist 
lens. First, burden-sharing is conceptualised as an international norm, drawing upon 
constructivist theory on norms in IR. The subchapter then addresses how international 
norms shape the behaviour of states in international politics. International 
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organisations like the UNHCR play a crucial role in norm promotion. The second part 
will apply a ‘bottom-up’ approach to social constructivism. Here, I argue that the 
outcome of the domestic processes in which competing discourses ‘battle’ over 
different understandings of social reality, creates the discursive boundaries that 
delimit the domestic political space for action with regards to burden-sharing in 
refugee protection.  
 
3.4.1. Burden-sharing as an international norm 
Astrid Suhrke (1998: 398) argues that in the context of refugee protection, “the logic 
of burden-sharing starts from the premise that helping refugees is a jointly held moral 
duty and obligation under international law”. Hence, the call for burden-sharing in 
refugee protection is derived from a normative understanding of rights and 
responsibilities in international relations. Accordingly, burden-sharing will be 
conceptualised here as a norm in the international refugee protection regime. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) define a norm as a  “standard of appropriate 
behaviour for actors with a given identity”. On the international level, a norm is 
therefore a specific set of ideas defining appropriate or desirable behaviour, which are 
seen as constitutive of states’ interests and identities (Checkel 1998: 327, 238; 
Finnemore, 1996a). Constructivist norm theory stresses that state action is driven 
largely by a so-called ‘logic of appropriateness’. This means that state behaviour is 
guided by social constructions such as “notions of duty, responsibility, identity, and 
obligation” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 913). In this view, states are primarily 
concerned with legitimacy when determining the appropriate forms of action, aiming 
to follow the social ‘rules’ guiding international society (Barnett 2011: 155)  
 
This conceptualisation of the ‘logic of appropriateness’ also relates to the issue of 
identity. States often choose to comply with norms because they are concerned with 
how others view them, or how they view themselves (Fearon cited in Risse and 
Sikkink 1999: 8). Since identities are inherently intersubjective, they are dependent 
upon collective understandings of which normative characteristics and preferences a 
given identity possesses. Certain established norms in a particular social context will 
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therefore be constitutive elements of the collective identity belonging to a community 
of actors. Accordingly, states that see themselves as belonging to this community, and 
this collective identity, will feel a need to comply with these norms (Risse and Sikkink 
1999: 8,9; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 902). For instance, established norms can 
decide appropriate behaviour for a given identity such as “state”, or for a particular 
group of states such as “Western state” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 902). 
International norms thus shape the behaviour of states by defining their view of what 
is legitimate, desirable, and morally appropriate. In this view, if burden-sharing is 
constituted as an international norm, it is likely to shape Norway’s behaviour in the 
field of refugee protection in a certain way. In the ‘downloading process’, 
international norms and ideas contribute to shaping domestic discourses and practices.  
 
3.4.1.1. The role of UNHCR in norm promotion 
Finnemore (1996: 5) emphasises the important role that international organisations 
play in the promotion of international norms. She argues that “states are socialised to 
accept new norms, values, and perceptions of interests by international organisations”. 
This highlights the importance of UNHCR’s role in promoting burden-sharing in 
refugee protection. Scholars have emphasised the UNHCR’s difficult position, caught 
between being heavily dependent on state interest on the one hand, and its 
responsibility as a humanitarian organisation to promote and protect humanitarian 
principles and refugee rights unhinged, on the other (Ferris 2011: 23). State interests 
undeniably have a strong influence on UNHCR’s policy and activities. The UNHCR 
does not have an independent funding base and therefore relies completely on funding 
from donor states for all its activities and operations. Consequently, critics have 
argued that the UNHCR first and foremost is an instrument of state power, largely or 
even fully driven by states’ interests (see Loescher 2001: 34; Barnett and Finnemore, 
1999). However, this is arguably not the case. By tracing the evolution of the 
organisation in the period 1950-2000, Loescher finds that “UNHCR policy and 
practice have been driven both by state interests and by the office acting 
independently or evolving in ways not expected nor necessarily sanctioned by states” 
(Loescher 2001: 33). Similarly, Michael Barnett (2010: 107) emphasises that the 
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UNHCR has significant “moral and expert authority”. The agency’s expert authority 
is clearly derived from its specialised knowledge and experience as the largest 
international refugee protection agency. It has also gained increasing moral authority 
because it is perceived to be “speaking and acting” on behalf of the refugee population 
and is “defending the lives of the weak and vulnerable” (Barnett 2010: 111). Such 
moral and expert authority gives the organisation the necessary weight and legitimacy 
to become involved in global politics whilst at least to an extent promoting its own 
agenda.  
 
The UNHCR plays a leading role in facilitating, developing and changing norms, 
policies and practices regarding refugee protection at the international level. As 
mentioned, the agency has been the most decisive and prominent proponent of 
burden-sharing schemes since the 1990s (Barutciski and Suhrke, 2001; Orchard and 
Miller, 2014). This has also been the case during the Syrian refugee crisis, where the 
UNHCR has emphasised that burden-sharing is a key solution to the situation. In 
doing so, it has exercised moral pressure towards states, stressing the need for 
solidarity (UNHCR, 2013; Philips, 2013). It has also praised states that have 
implemented burden-sharing mechanisms, thereby appealing to ‘the good nature’ of 
states that see themselves as supporters of humanitarian values and human rights. In 
this way, especially due to its authority in international politics, the UNHCR has 
contributed to shaping states’ perception of what is legitimate and morally appropriate 
behaviour as a response to the Syria refugee crisis. This should accordingly have 
strengthened the role and implementation of burden-sharing initiatives in refugee 
protection, at the domestic as well as the international level.  
 
3.4.2. Processing international norms in the Norwegian political field 
Still, international norms are not usually congruent, and can be interpreted in different 
ways. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 893) note, “international norms must always 
work their influence through the filter of domestic structures and domestic norms, 
which can produce important variations in compliance and interpretation of these 
norms”. In the context of burden-sharing, different interpretations of what such 
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burden-sharing should, and does, entail can result in very different state policies with 
regards to protection. It can, for instance, help explain why some states emphasise 
economic aid and as sufficient contributions to protection, whilst other states focus on 
providing asylum. Moreover, certain actors in the domestic sphere can be driven by 
domestic norms and ideas that even contest and oppose international norms. In this 
situation, it is not obvious that states will act in accordance with the norms and ideas 
promoted by external, ‘moral’ actors like the UNHCR. For instance, the increasing 
resistance and hostility in many European countries towards refugees, migrants and 
asylum seekers during the last few decades has developed alongside, and in 
contradiction to, the evolvement of the international refugee protection regime. These 
emerging political ideational trends have had a negative impact on European states’ 
willingness to provide asylum and protection (Hammerstad 2014: 57-63). They will 
also likely affect these states’ response to the Syrian refugee crisis and the call for 
burden-sharing. Agents and structures are mutually constitutive, and states have room 
for shaping the international structure whilst simultaneously being shaped by it. 
However, how these different norm interpretations come to be, and the ways in which 
individual states respond to international norms, is inherently dependent upon 
domestic political factors, and the complex relationship between the international and 
the domestic sphere. I thus argue that it is impossible to understand the premises of an 
international norm without thoroughly analysing the domestic contexts in which they 
are processed and implemented.  
 
3.4.2.1. Politics as discursive ‘battles’ 
Each domestic political sphere is characterised by heterogeneous actors with different 
ideas, beliefs and worldviews. These actors take part in constant discursive ‘battles’ 
where competing discourses that are reflective of different interpretations of the world 
challenge and are in conflict with each other (Hansen 2006: 31, 32; Bratberg 2014: 
29). Finlayson (2007: 549) argues that “politics is the place or moment where 
traditions and narratives can no longer be taken for granted, where the ‘web of belief’ 
is ruptured because rival traditions and narratives have clashed”. In this view, politics 
becomes a discursive process in which different actors are engaged in attempts to 
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establish fixed meanings of the social world that are compatible with their own world 
views (Barnett 2011: 157). Thus, “it is clear that what is distinct in politics is not the 
presence of beliefs but the presence of beliefs in contradiction with each other” 
(Finlayson 2007: 552). Contradicting beliefs in the political field regarding refugee 
protection also have implications for burden-sharing on the ground. It is the outcome 
of these discursive battles that determine the legitimate scope of action within a 
particular political field, especially because political discourses generate more specific 
policy suggestions (Hansen 2006: 21; Mahl, 2011). Thus, in order to address the 
question of implications for burden-sharing in practice, we must understand the 
discursive boundaries that shape the political space for burden-sharing. 
 
Competing political discourses are expressed, and interact with each other, first and 
foremost through the use of language. It is through language these discourses are 
“generated, debated, adopted and changed” by different actors, such as political 
leaders, civil society, and the public throughout the political process (Schmidt 2011: 
57). This discursive battle in the political sphere will either reproduce or eventually 
transform the current discursive structure. In the case of transformation, it can set new 
standards for appropriate political behaviour within this particular social arena. 
Importantly, however, politics does not only represent an arena for competition 
between discourses, but also for fractures belonging to the same discourse. A 
discourse only defines a particular framework for meaning and action, and there are 
several choices still to be made within these boundaries. Hence, there are often 
tensions and contradictions within a particular political discourse (Bratberg 2014: 31; 
Mahl, 2011). For instance, this has been the case in Norway, where different Progress 
Party politicians have, at least to an extent, expressed differing perceptions regarding 
the appropriate response to the Syrian refugee crisis. 
 
3.5. Critical Discourse Analysis as Method 
This subchapter will present Fairclough’s approach to critical discourse analysis, and 
his concepts of power and ideological affects. It will also introduce some key concepts 
of CDA. Further, the subchapter will present Fairclough’s three-dimensional model 
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for CDA, which approaches analytically the relationship between text, discursive 
practice and social practice. This analytical framework combines detailed linguistic 
analysis and social analysis (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 66). The subchapter will also 
explain how this model will be applied to the particular analysis at hand. Finally, the 
subchapter addresses some key research challenges facing CDA.   
 
3.5.1. Fairclough’s approach to CDA 
In the thesis I apply Norman Fairclough’s approach to critical discourse analysis, 
because this is the most developed approach of CDA in terms of theoretical and 
methodological tools (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 60). What distinguishes 
Fairclough’s approach to CDA from other discourse analytical approaches is its 
distinctive focus on the mutually constitutive relationship between text, discourses, 
and social practices. It thus combines “detailed linguistic analysis” with social and 
political theory (Bratberg 2014: 43). Fairclough (2003: 2) argues that CDA is “based 
upon the assumption that language is an irreducible part of social life (…) so that 
social analysis and research always has to take account of language.” However, social 
reality is also constituted by material reality and the non-discursive practices within it. 
Fairclough’s critical approach thus differs from Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist 
discourse analytical approach because it makes an explicit distinction between the 
discursive and the non-discursive elements of the world. CDA consequently enables 
the researcher to analyse the relationship between dominant discourses and actual, 
observable practices in the material world (Bratberg 2014: 43; 44).  
 
3.5.1.1. Discourses and power 
CDA pays particular attention to the way in which discourses contribute to creating 
and reproducing specific relations of power and hegemony in society. Some 
discourses are dominant within a particular field whilst other are suppressed. 
Dominant discourses will always, though often unintentionally and unknowingly, 
represent the interests of certain actors, whilst marginalising others. In particular, 
these discourses can determine who are legitimate representatives of a particular 
political discourse, or legitimate spokespersons on a specific political issue, because 
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they take part in constituting the social identities of different actors (Burnham et.al. 
2008: 250; 258; Bratberg 2014: 46). In consequence, they ultimately contribute to 
decide “who is allowed to contribute to the debates and whose views are excluded and 
suppressed” (Burnham et.al. 2008: 258). This can have significant consequences for 
the people who are potentially negatively affected by the policies supported by a 
discourse, as they perhaps simultaneously have limited possibilities for shaping and 
changing the political agenda (Burnham et.al. 2008: 258). Hence, actors do not have 
equal access to discursive influence in political processes. Moreover, dominant 
discourses provide legitimacy to specific policies and practices. They frame certain 
forms of political organisation as legitimate and desirable, whilst presenting 
alternative forms of such organisation as illegitimate. It is the dominant discourses in 
a particular social or political field that determine the political space for legitimate 
action. Fairclough refers to discourses that create, maintain and transform power 
relations in societies as ideologies (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 75). CDA aims 
specifically to uncover these underlying structures of power inherent in dominant 
discourses. Indeed, this is what makes this approach critical – it is committed to 
reveal who benefits from, and who is marginalised by, particular discourses in order to 
make social change possible (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 63; 64; Burnham et.al. 
2008: 258).  
 
3.5.2. Key concepts 
A central notion in the analysis is that of different fields within the political world. 
These are characterised by different discursive practices. In the thesis, the field in 
question is the Norwegian political field on refugee-and asylum issues, in which 
relevant national actors in refugee protection operate. Further, CDA’s emphasis on 
language implies that texts are important elements of the analysis. “Texts” in this 
instance are defined broadly as “any actual instance of language in use”, and refer to 
both written and spoken forms of language use. An instance of language use is 
conceptualised as a communicative event (Fairclough 2003: 3, 67). This definition will 
be applied here. Philips and Jørgensen (2002: 71) note that “communicate events not 
only reproduce orders of discourse, but can also change them through creative 
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language use”. In this way, agents in the political field constitute and maintain, but 
can also transform, the discursive boundaries that determine the political space for 
burden-sharing.  
 
3.5.3. Fairclough’s three-dimensional model 
CDA emphasises the relationship between text, discourse and social practice. These 
three analytical levels all have a constitutive impact on each other, where dominant 
discourses as expressed in texts and language are constitutive of social practices. 
However, these discourses are simultaneously shaped by material, non-discursive 
elements inherent in the very social practices they create. Hence, there is a mutually 
dependent, dialectical relationship between text, discursive practice and social 
practice, which together with non-discursive elements constitute our understanding of 
reality (Bratberg 2014: 44). Discourses are therefore both constitutive and constituted. 
The complex relationship between these levels of analysis is expressed in Fairclough’s 
three-dimensional model: 
 				
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for CDA adapted from Philips and Jørgensen (2002: 
68) 
 
This three-dimensional model shows that every communicative event includes three 
dimensions. Any communicative event is: 
Social practice (wider social and political practice) 
Discursive practice 
Text 
Text production 
Text consumption 
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1) A text  
2) A discursive practice  (text production and consumption)  
3) A social practice  
 
Every communicative event should be analysed with reference to these three different 
levels. Firstly, the text itself should be analysed in linguistic terms. Secondly, the 
analysis must look towards the discursive practice. This includes two perspectives – 
the production of the text and the consumption of the text. More specifically, it refers 
to how the author of a text have drawn upon existing discourses and genres in her 
production of the text, and how those who receive the text use existing discourses 
when they consume, understand and interpret the text. Thirdly, the analysis must look 
towards social practice, which refers to the wider social and political practices that the 
particular communicative event belongs to. However, since Fairclough’s approach to 
CDA emphasises that social practice consists of both discursive and non-discursive 
practices, social and cultural theory is also needed for sufficiently analysing the wider 
social practice, in addition to discourse analysis (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 68-69). 
It is the discursive practice that mediates the relationship between text and social 
practice, because it is in the active language production and consumption that “texts 
shape and are shaped by social practice” (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 69).  
 
3.5.4. Applying Fairclough’s model 
The analysis will be conducted over the course of two chapters, whereas chapter 4 will 
discuss texts and discursive practice, and chapter 5 will look into social practice and 
political implications. Fairclough’s three-dimensional model will be applied in the 
analysis as presented below:  
 
I Textual Analysis  
The textual analysis relies on texts and interview material that express the views of 
prominent actors in the political field. It will centre around some core ideas that 
characterise the Norwegian political debate on burden-sharing in refugee protection 
after the Syrian crisis, in the context of two important political events: 1) The ‘Syria 
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agreement’ between a majority of Norwegian political parties represented in 
government on resettlement of Syrian refugees; and 2) the “European Refugee Crisis” 
in the time period August- September 2015.  
 
II Discursive Practice 
The discursive practice will be analysed on the basis of the core ideas derived from 
the textual analysis, and will focus on the production and consumption of the texts. 
This section will identify the dominant discourses in the field that compete, and are in 
conflict, with each other. In particular, the analysis will address the hierarchy between 
these discourses in order to understand how the power relations between the 
discourses shape the political space for burden-sharing in refugee protection. 
Consequently, it will enable an analysis of social practice that takes into account the 
hierarchy between these discourses.  
 
III Social Practice 
The social practice dimension will be discussed in chapter 5. This dimension will be 
discussed in relation to the discursive impact on two policy factors: 1) the implications 
of the discursive field for Norwegian policy regarding the Syrian refugee crisis; and 2) 
the long-term consequences for burden-sharing in refugee protection, from a 
Norwegian policy perspective. It will also address the implications of the analysis for 
the wider relationship between international norms and domestic spheres, the 
theoretical starting point of the thesis. 
 
3.5.4.1. Intertextuality 
In order to conduct a meaningful textual analysis, it is necessary to always see the text 
as part of a broader context. CDA also looks beyond the particular text in question, 
towards other texts and the intersubjective understandings that give them meaning 
(Bratberg 2014: 33). Fairclough thus emphasises the concept of intertextuality, which 
refers to “the condition whereby all communicative events draw on earlier events” 
(Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 73). All texts relate to what has been expressed in other 
texts previously, for instance by using the same phrases and expressions. 
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Intertextuality will therefore be an important element in the analysis, because it 
explicitly addresses the relationship between individual texts, the discursive practice it 
is part of, and the broader social and political context (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 73; 
Bratberg 2014: 46).  
 
3.5.4.2. Agents and Structures 
Fairclough conceptualises the relationship between agency and structure as dialectical. 
All texts, discursive practices and social events “need to be seen as the outcome of a 
tension between structures and agency” (Fairclough 2003: 225). Discursive structures 
limit and define action to an extent, whilst agents simultaneously have ‘causal 
powers’, that is, a possibility to produce new texts, events and actions “in potentially 
creative and new ways” (Fairclough 2003: 224). An essential question in CDA is 
therefore whether the competing discourses within a particular political field 
contribute to reproducing or challenging the existing discursive structure. The 
ideological effects of hegemonic discourses are important factors in this regard, as 
they largely define the space for legitimate action. However, agents also have a 
possibility to challenge this discursive structure. This dialectical relationship between 
agents and structures will therefore be an important element in the analysis.  
 
3.5.4.3. Non-discursive factors 
Fairclough’s approach emphasises the role of both discursive and non-discursive 
elements in constituting social reality. The impact of non-discursive elements plays an 
important role in this particular case. The Syrian refugee crisis has enormous negative 
social and material consequences. People are killed, tortured, and drown on their way 
to safety. They lack food, housing and medical aid. These are non-discursive elements 
that have a clear impact on the discursive practices within the political field. In 
particular, they matter in the way in which they affect the agents who take part in 
creating and reproducing relevant texts, discourses and social practices. The 
discursive dimensions create the space for political action on refugee protection, but 
they are simultaneously affected by wider non-discursive elements. For instance, the 
refugee crisis that hit Europe in August 2015 was likely to change at least some 
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agents’ perception of the situation and consequently what needs to be done about it. In 
turn, these agents were more likely to challenge the existing discursive structure and 
enable new practices within the field of refugee protection.  
 
3.5.5. Selecting empirical material 
Two forms of empirical material will be analysed. Firstly, the thesis will employ texts 
derived from the Norwegian national press and political party websites. Secondly, it 
will employ material from semi-structured interviews conducted in conversation with 
key informants in the political field. It is important to note that these forms of 
empirical material are different, and employed for different reasons. Whilst the texts 
constitute the most prominent and significant views and perceptions that characterise 
the political field, the interview material is employed first and foremost to shed light 
upon the analysis and to help develop a greater understanding of the political field, as 
well as a better grasp of relevant factual information. Since CDA considers both 
written and spoken language as constituting ‘texts’, both types of material will be 
analysed with the help of the same analytical tools selected from Fairclough’s list. 
 
3.5.5.1. Choosing texts  
The main empirical material that will be employed in the analysis is textual material, 
first and foremost news articles and opinion pieces. Importantly, a discourse analytical 
approach does not include the criterion of representativeness. A discourse analytical 
approach is not claiming to cover the full range of actors, ideas and discourses within 
the field. This is especially important when addressing an issue that has received 
enormous media attention and political focus, such as the Syrian refugee crisis. The 
texts that have been chosen for analysis in this thesis are thus not a representative 
selection of the whole population of actors and discourses related to burden-sharing in 
refugee protection. Instead, the texts have been selected on the basis of two criteria: 
firstly, they are derived from a set of key actors in the discursive field that have been 
particularly prominent during one or both of the political events that the analysis is 
tied to; secondly, they are chosen because they represent certain prominent differing 
ideas, meanings and discourses regarding burden-sharing. Addressing and analysing 
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competing discourses in the political field is a central part of the research question 
addressed in this thesis. It is therefore most important, as in discourse analysis more 
generally, that the material is large enough to cover different perspectives of reality 
(Bratberg 2014: 40).  
 
3.5.5.2 Semi-structured interviews 
The semi-structured interview is placed in “the grey area” between standardised and 
non-standardised interview forms (Burnham et.al. 2008: 240). They involve the 
researcher’s clear theoretical understanding of the research project when entering the 
interview setting, but at the same time is open for the respondents own interpretations 
and understandings, as well as allowing the respondent to approach new areas that can 
provide additional insights and new understandings (Burnham et.al 2008: 241). In an 
interview setting with persons that have such specific in-depth knowledge and 
expertise, the researcher is able to grasp particular insights that are useful for the 
research project, and which cannot easily be obtained from more general media 
sources. The purpose of my interview process was to gain a deeper understanding of 
the political field that could supplement the textual material, and to obtain in-depth 
knowledge that would help me when conducting the analysis. I was also aiming to 
attain factual knowledge of the issue at hand. Asylum policies in general can often be 
complex and difficult to grasp for a non-expert. This is especially difficult in the case 
of the Syrian crisis because the situation is escalating quickly, often changing on a 
day-to-day basis, and often causing the media and other institutions to make mistakes 
and report wrongful information. Since enhanced knowledge and understanding of the 
field was my main purpose, I chose to interview key informants that operate in 
institutions and organisations that are central in the Norwegian refugee protection 
field. 
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3.5.5.3. Overview of selected texts and interview material  	
Table 4.1: Overview of selected texts for analysis. Case I: The Syria agreement.  
Actor Text Topic Format 
Political Parties 
Per Sandberg – Progress 
Party (FrP) 
 
”Immigration threatens the 
welfare society”  
- Fremskrittspartiet 2 May 
2015 
 
Sandberg claims 
that Norway 
cannot afford high 
levels of non-
Western 
immigration if we 
are to preserve the 
welfare state as 
we know it. 
Party website 
article.  
Harald Tom Nesvik – 
Progress Party (FrP) 
”That is why we broke off the 
negotiations on Syrian 
refugees”  
- Aftenposten 5 June 2015 
Nesvik explains 
why the Progress 
Party could not be 
part of the Syria 
agreement. 
Op-ed.  
Erna Solberg – 
Conservative Party 
(Høyre) 
”- We will not receive refugees 
if we do not have houses for 
them”  - Dagbladet 10 June 
2015 
Erna Solberg 
argues that the 
actual number of 
refugees that will 
be resettled 
depends upon the 
housing situation 
on the local level.  
Newspaper article. 
 
Jonas Gahr Støre – 
Labour Party (Ap) 
 
”A good response from 
Norway in an extraordinary 
situation” 
Arbeiderpartiet, 10 June 2015 
Støre argues that 
the Syria 
agreement 
represents an 
important political 
compromise in 
such a serious 
situation. 
Party website 
article.  
Audun Lysbakken – 
Socialist Left Party 
(SV) 
”That is why the Socialist Left 
Party broke off the Syria-
negotiations” (”Derfor brøt SV 
Syria-forhandlingene) 
- SV, 10 June 2015 
Lysbakken 
explains why the 
party could not 
support the final 
Syria-agreement.  
Party website 
article. 
Civil Society 
The Syria Platform: 
John Peder Egenæs 
(Amnesty), Liv Tørres 
(Norwegian People’s 
Aid), Gry Larsen 
(CARE), Anne-Marie 
Helland (Norwegian 
Church Aid), Ann-
Magrit Austenå 
(NOAS), Åsne Havnelid 
(Norwegian Red Cross), 
Tove R. Wang (Save the 
Children) 
”Op-ed.: National voluntary 
work for Syrian refugees”  
- VG, 11 March 2015 
 
Norwegian civil 
society 
organisations 
encourages 
increased financial 
support to 
Lebanon and the 
resettlement of 
10.000 Syrian 
refugees in 
Norway. 
 
Op-ed. The views 
of eight actors are 
represented in the 
text.  
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Table 4.2: Overview of selected texts for analysis. Case II: ”The European Crisis” 
 
Actor Text Topic Format 
Political Parties 
Audun Lysbakken – 
Socialist Left Party 
 
 
”It is completely true that the 
refugees must be helped where 
they are. And now they are in  
Europe”.  
- Aftenposten, 01.09.15 
Lysbakken writes 
about his own 
experiences during 
his visit to Lesvos, 
Greece.  
Op-ed.  
Audun Lysbakken - 
Socialist Left Party 
 
”Solberg is hesitant to the EUs 
refugee dugnad”  (Solberg 
avventende til EUs 
flykntingedugnad)  - Vårt Land 07.09.15 
Lysbakken argues 
that the Syria-
agreement has 
expired.  
Newpaper article. 
Four actors’ 
perspectives are 
included. 
 
Carl I. Hagen – Progress 
Party  
 
”Carl I. Hagen wants to send all 
the boat refugees in return” (Carl 
I. Hagen vil sende alle 
båtflyktningene i retur) - Aftenposten 20.08.15 
Hagen believes that 
Europe will 
collapse under the 
pressure of too 
many refugees.  
Newspaper article.  
Siv Jensen - Progress 
Party  
 
”- Convinced that it is better to 
help in the nearby areas”  - Dagens Næringsliv 
06.09.15 
Siv Jensen sticks 
with her 
recommendation to 
the municipalities 
to say no to settling 
more refugees.  
Newspaper article.  
Trine Skei Grande – 
Liberal Party (Venstre) 
”The Liberal Party wants an 
emergency meeting about the 
refugee situation” (Venstre vil ha 
hastemøte om 
flyktningesituasjonen) 
- Venstre 07.09.15 
Skei Grande wants 
Solberg to organise 
an extraordinary 
parliamentary 
meeting on the 
refugee crisis.  
Party website 
article.  
Trine Skei Grande – 
Liberal Party  
 
Erna Solberg – 
Conservative Party  
”The Liberal Party demands a 
new look at the Syria agreement” - NRK 04.09.15 
 
Skei Grande 
believes that the 
Syria-agreement 
already has 
expired. 
Newspaper article. 
The perspectives of 
four actors are 
included.  
Erna Solberg – 
Conservative Party 
 
Jonas Gahr Støre – 
Labour Party  
”Solberg is hesitant to the EUs 
refugee dugnad”  - Vårt Land 07.09.15 Solberg holds off the decision as to whether Norway 
will take part in the 
new European 
relocation 
mechanism.  
Newspaper article. 
The perspectives of 
four actors are 
included.  
 
Knut Arild Hareide, The 
Christian Democrats 
(KrF) 
 
”The Krf-leader: Norway must 
waive the Dublin agreement for 
the Syria-refugees”  
- Aftenposten 30.08.15 
 
Hareide wants Erna 
Solberg to do like 
Angela Merkel and 
stop Dublin-returns 
of Syrians.  
Newspaper article.  
Civil Society 
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The Syria Platform - 
Amnesty International, 
Norwegian People’s Aid, 
CARE, Norwegian 
Church Aid, NOAS, 
Norwegian Red Cross, 
Save the Children, Atlas-
alliance, Caritas, The 
Norwegian Church, 
Norwegian Refugee 
Council 
”Actors: This should be done”  - Dagsavisen 10.09.15 
 
The organisations 
present a set of 
local, national and 
international 
measures they 
believe must be 
implemented as a 
response to the 
crisis.  
 
Newspaper article.  
The views of 11 
actors are 
presented.  
 
 
 
Table 4.3: List of key informants 
 
Person Role  Institution 
Civil Society 
Pål Nesse Senior advisor 
 
Norwegian Refugee 
Council 
Ann-Magrit Austenå 
 
Secretary-general 
 
Norwegian Organisation 
for Asylum Seekers 
(NOAS) 
Beate Ekeløve-Slydal Political advisor Amnesty International 
Norway 
Solveig Igesund Political advisor Norwegian People’s Aid 
 
Bureaucracy 
Johan Meyer   Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Official 
 
 Ministry of Justice and 
Public Security 
Research Community 
Vigdis Vevstad  Son Consulting 
 
 
3.6. Research Challenges  
Discourse analytical approaches have generally received much criticism from 
positivist social scientists that are concerned with methodological questions regarding 
causality, generalisation, validity and reliability. This subchapter discusses some of 
these challenges, and how CDA can address them.  
 
Interpretivism rejects the possibility of making scientific, law-like generalisations 
about human action or the social world, because all social knowledge of the world is 
dependent on human interpretation. These interpretations are inherently unstable and 
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ambiguous, and are always in flux (Yee 1996: 100). Consequently, constructivism has 
often been criticised for its inability to draw causal inferences. For instance, King, 
Keohane and Verba (1994) argue that rationalist epistemologies are superior in 
explaining causal effects. However, social constructivists reject this criticism, and 
instead promote a broader view of causality. They highlight the ability of 
interpretivism to reveal partial and contingent causal explanations that take the 
subjective and dynamic nature of all social science explanations into account  
(Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 394; Yee 1996: 103). Notably, Fairclough (2003: 8) 
stresses the ability of CDA to draw such contingent causal inferences. He refers to a 
form of causality in which the interpretations of certain texts can have certain causal 
effects in particular situations. However, since all social knowledge is dependent on 
interpretation, consumers can understand the same text in different ways. The 
researcher can therefore not hope to uncover an objective and eternal truth, because 
such ‘truths’ only represent alternative interpretations. Consequently, the 
establishment of linear causality is neither possible nor desirable. 
 
Fairclough’s three-dimensional model also highlights another crucial point related to 
the issue of causality, namely the recursive dynamics of discourse. Text and 
discursive practice constitute social practice, but social practice is simultaneously 
constitutive of text and discursive practice. Hence, new texts can create changes in 
social practice, but changes in social practice may also constitute new texts. These 
dynamics make it impossible to establish straightforward causality claims, because 
causality goes both ways simultaneously. There is no ‘beginning’ or ‘end’ to the 
causal chain.  
 
Interpretivism further rejects the notion that a researcher can be completely objective 
in her research. Instead, due to the subjective and interpretive nature of all social 
science research, they “expect each observer to produce her own effect on the 
evidence" (Hopf 2002:30). For instance, Fairclough (2003: 14) notes that all textual 
analysis is somewhat inherently selective, because the researcher always has personal 
motivations for asking specific questions about specific texts. These interpretivist 
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assumptions make it difficult for knowledge claims made by constructivist 
methodology to be either reliable or replicable according to positivist standards. They 
also imply that there is little possibility for generalisation. However, the study of 
particular cases can still provide a general theoretical understanding that to some 
extent can be applied to other cases (Hopf 2002: 30; 31). For instance, the particular 
discursive processes taking place in Norway on refugee protection, and the causal 
effects they have, will only be valid in these specific domestic contexts. Still, by 
understanding these processes, we can still develop some theoretical understanding of 
how the norm of burden-sharing can be promoted and challenged in different 
domestic contexts, and consequently also draw some tentative conclusions about the 
implications of different discursive structures for the implementation of this norm in 
general.  
 
Overall, the methodological criticisms highlighted by positivist political scientists are 
generally not that problematic for discourse analytical scholars, as they “do not wish 
to be limited by the by the straitjacket of the traditional scientific approach to 
research” (Burnham et.al. 2008: 256). Discourse analytical research simply cannot be 
assessed by the same criteria as non-interpretive forms of analysis, because their 
epistemological foundations are inherently different. Instead, the foundations for 
validity lie in clear justifications of specific interpretations, as well as a clear 
definition of which documents are used for analysis and why, and the specific tools 
that are used in the analysis. The thesis will address these criteria specifically in the 
later chapters. The investigative nature of discourse analysis allows us to question 
widely accepted knowledge, meaning, and action. In turn, it provides a hypothesis-
generating starting point for further research (Bratberg 2014: 54-56). CDA therefore 
largely represents an inductive form of social science research. However, the recursive 
aspect of Fairclough’s model also means that his approach to CDA includes a slightly 
deductive element. Pre-existing discursive structures take part in constituting all social 
and political activity. Thus, a research project applying CDA should address these 
pre-existing structures.  
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4 Constituting Burden-sharing in Norway: 
Text and Discursive Practice 
 
This chapter will present an analysis of relevant texts and discursive practices that 
take part in constituting burden-sharing in the Norwegian political field. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to identify the dominant discourses in the political field, and 
the hierarchical relationship between them. This discursive structure, in turn, 
determines the scope for political action regarding burden-sharing in refugee 
protection. However, the chapter will also address the changing power relations 
between the discourses as the situation has developed until late September 2015, and 
how the dialectical relationship between agency and structure has resulted in 
processes of both discursive reproduction and transformation.  
 
Subchapter 4.1. provides a brief background of Norwegian refugee politics in the 
context of the Syrian crisis. Subchapter 4.2. presents a selection of Fairclough’s 
analytical tools that will be applied in the textual analysis, whilst subchapter 4.3. 
discusses some analytical challenges. The textual analysis is presented in subchapters 
4.4.- 4.6. It focuses on texts that express the opinions of central actors in the political 
field. The analysis is organised around two important events that have shaped the 
political debate in Norway on this issue – the so-called “Syria agreement” and the 
‘European refugee crisis’. Analytically they will be treated separately, because - 
despite the short amount of time between them - the context was very different due to 
the quick escalation of the situation at Europe’s borders. This enables the analysis to 
identify and discuss factors of both continuity and change. Finally, subchapter 4.7. 
and 4.8. provide an analysis of discursive practice. They identify the competing 
discourses on burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway. Ideological effects and 
power relations will be central in this part of the analysis.  
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4.1. Norwegian politics of refugee protection following the 
Syrian crisis 
Norway has been an important actor in the international response to the Syrian 
conflict. The country is the sixth’ largest humanitarian donor in this regard, directing 
the aid mainly towards the Syrian refugee population in Syria’s neighbouring 
countries, Lebanon in particular. Norway has also been actively involved in 
transporting chemical weapons from Syria for destruction (Orchard and Miller 2014: 
47; Norad, 2015). Further, Norway is a prominent actor in terms of providing physical 
protection to Syrian refugees, especially in terms of resettlement. Norway has the 
second largest regular resettlement programme in Europe, in collaboration with the 
UNHCR. A significant share of the regular quotas has been used to provide protection 
for Syrian refugees. In addition to the regular scheme, the Norwegian government has 
established a specific resettlement quota for Syrians. In this regard, the scheme 
prioritises the resettlement of Syrian families with children (Justis- og 
beredskapsdepartementet, 2013; Orchard and Miller 2014: 62). As of August 2015, 
Norway had pledged 9,000 resettlement places for Syrians, one of the largest 
resettlement pledges made by any Western country (UNHCR, 2015e).  
 
A range of key political actors are involved in the Norwegian refugee protection field. 
These include political parties and individuals within them, civil society, public 
institutions, and the research community. The government parties – the Conservative 
Party and the Progress Party – clearly have the greatest political power in the field. 
However, as a minority government, they are particularly sensitive to competing 
discourses within the field. The Labour Party is the country’s largest political party, 
and is thus another powerful political actor. Further, the government-supporting 
parties, the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party, have been active in the current 
debate, along with the Socialist Left Party. Also, a large group of civil society actors 
have been prominent in the political debate on the Syrian refugee crisis. Notably, 11 
large organisations, including the Norwegian Refugee Council, Norwegian People’s 
Aid, Amnesty, Save the Children, Norwegian Church Aid, CARE and NOAS have 
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created “The Syria Platform”, through which they have coordinated their national 
political advocacy activities. There has also been a growing grassroots movement 
among the Norwegian public as the crisis has evolved. In particular, the grassroots 
organisation Refugees Welcome to Norway experienced a huge increase in support and 
engagement only during the few weeks when the crisis at the European borders 
escalated. 
 
4.2. Analytical tools  
In Analysing Discourse (2003), Fairclough presents a range of varied tools for textual 
analysis. These are not all supposed to be applied to the same analytical project – 
rather, as Philips and Jørgensen (2002: 76) notes, the researcher must choose the tools 
that are most appropriate for her specific research project. There is no set “recipe” for 
how CDA is conducted in practice. Fairclough’s approach thus enables a highly 
eclectic form of analysis. The purpose of this detailed textual analysis is, however, to 
address the “social effects of texts” (Fairclough 2003: 11). Hence, it does not simply 
include linguistic analysis but also ‘interdiscursive analysis’, ”that is, seeing texts in 
terms of the different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and articulate 
together” (Fairclough 2003: 4). In consequence, Fairlough’s analytical tools aim 
specifically to reveal the discursive processes inherent in texts. They enable a dynamic 
textual analysis that uncovers “how social agents make or ‘texture’ texts by setting up 
relations between their elements” (Fairclough 2003: 12). Moreover, since texts entail 
discursive processes, they also express underlying structures of power and hegemony. 
Thus, an important function of Fairclough’s analytical tools is to reveal these power 
structures. Below I present the analytical tools that I deem most appropriate for this 
thesis. In the analysis itself, however, not all these tools will be discussed explicitly in 
the analysis of every text. Some tools have also been removed over the course of the 
analysis.  
 
Table 4.4: Selection of analytical tools for textual analysis, adapted from Fairclough (2003: 191-194; 
1992: 108-109)  
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Analytical tool Related questions 
Metaphors  
 
- How are metaphors used in the text to construct 
a particular view of social reality? 
Difference 
 
Which (combination) of the following scenarios 
characterise the orientation to difference in the 
text? 
a) an openness to, acceptance of, 
recognition of difference; an exploration 
of difference 
b) an accentuation of difference, conflict, 
polemic, a struggle over meaning, norms, 
power 
c) an attempt to resolve or overcome 
difference 
d) a bracketing of difference, a focus of 
commonality, solidarity 
e) consensus, a normalisation  and 
acceptance of differences of power 
which brackets or suppresses differences 
over meaning and over norms 
Intertextuality 
 
- Of relevant other texts/voices, which are 
included, which are significantly excluded? 
- Where other voices are included, are they 
attributed, and if so, specifically or non-
specifically?  
- Are attributed voices directly reported (quoted), 
or indirectly reported? How are other voices 
textured in relation to the authorial voice, and in 
relation to each other? 
Assumptions  - What existential, propositional, or value 
assumptions are made? Is there a case for seeing 
any assumptions as ideological?  
Discourses 
 
- What discourses are drawn upon in the text, and 
how are they textured together? Is there a 
significant mixing of discourses? 
Evaluation - To what values (in terms of what is desirable or 
undesirable) do authors commit themselves? 
 
4.3. Analytical challenges 
As mentioned above, CDA faces several challenges with regards to validity and 
reliability. To an extent, discourse analysts counter this criticism because of their 
inherently different approach to the study of social sciences. However, a critical 
discourse analysis must still clearly account for what underlies a particular analytical 
interpretation and the implications that follow. This involves including a sufficient 
amount of quotes from texts and interviews throughout the analysis, so that these 
findings are well documented and exemplified for its readers (Bratberg 2014: 54). I 
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will therefore include a substantive number of quotes in the analysis. The text are also 
easily accessible online, so that the readers can consider my interpretations of the 
texts. In the case of interviews however, exemplifying quotes will hopefully be 
enough. This will strengthen the reliability of the results, because it enables the reader 
to understand my interpretations, and for him or her to investigate whether they make 
the same interpretations from the same material.  
 
Another challenge in the empirical analysis is related to the use of language. All texts 
and interviews are in Norwegian, and must be translated into English. Because CDA 
relies upon on a detailed analysis of language, some linguistic nuances risk being ‘lost 
in translation’. To address this issue, I include certain linguistic terms also in their 
original form. Since the texts are easily accessible, readers can also judge if they deem 
my translations to be appropriate.  
 
Despite the acknowledgment that discourse analysis does not have to be representative 
in terms of data selection, some will argue that the challenge of bias remains. Not all 
actors are equally represented in the political field. Some make more noise, and some 
just get more attention. Hence, there will be more material related to some actors than 
others. Arguably, from a critical discourse analytical perspective, this is in itself a 
finding. A crucial aspect of CDA is to address the inherent power relations in the 
discursive field. The representatives for the dominant discourses within a particular 
political field will more likely be heard, because they are dominant. Hence, the 
uneven relationship between actors that becomes visible in the imbalance of the 
empirical material is not necessarily a shortcoming, but a discovery. In general, not all 
actors and all ideas must be covered to the same extent, if at all, in CDA. 
 
4.4. Textual Analysis 
During the initial analysis of the empirical material, I identified three dominant 
discourses in the political field of burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway. I 
have labelled these discourses the humanitarian discourse, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ 
discourse, and the ‘nation-state’ discourse. The humanitarian discourse is constituted 
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largely by international humanitarian and refugee protection norms, and stresses the 
need for global solidarity. The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse is heavily influenced by 
market liberalist economic ideas, and emphasises the importance of carefully 
balancing international demands with national concerns, especially with regards to 
economy and resources. Finally, the ‘nation-state’ discourse encompasses a view of 
Norway as an independent nation-state, which must act on the basis of its own 
domestic interests. In this way, the nation-state discourse constitutes a form of 
‘protest’ against the humanitarian discourse and the prominent role of international 
norms in national politics. These three discourses take part in ‘discursive battles’ in 
the political field. The outcome of this battle shapes the political field for action in 
terms of burden-sharing. The power hierarchy between them, I argue, therefore has 
significant consequences for Norwegian burden-sharing initiatives in practice.  
 
Before conducting the textual analysis, I developed a ‘guiding assumption’ about 
which of the political actors represented in the empirical material are likely to belong 
to each of these discourses. This ‘guiding assumption’ is based upon my knowledge of 
the political field, and the explicit political affiliations of the different actors. The 
purpose of this assumption is to provide an ‘analytical lens’ that highlights the 
mutually constitutive relationship between agency and structure in CDA, where the 
ideas and perspectives of agents are partly constituted by pre-existing discursive 
structures in the field. This 'analytical lens' thus enables us to recognize that the ideas 
expressed in the textual analysis do not appear from 'nowhere'. In this way, the 
guiding assumption also gives the analysis a loosely deductive point of departure.  
 
It is reasonable to believe that relevant civil society is identified by the humanitarian 
discourse. In terms of political parties, it is likely that the left-wing Socialist Left 
Party also is largely identified by the humanitarian discourse due to its strong 
emphasis on international solidarity. The centre-left Labour Party is more difficult to 
place, and is likely to have fractions constituted by both the humanitarian discourse 
and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse. The market liberalist foundations of the 
Conservative Party imply that they are strongly identified by the ‘cost-and-capacity’ 
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discourse. The Progress Party, on the other hand, is most explicitly critical to 
immigration, and it is thus reasonable to assume that it is mainly identified by the 
‘nation-state’ discourse. The Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party are support 
parties to the government, but also traditionally have a stronger emphasis on 
international solidarity. I therefore assume that they are constituted by the ‘cost-and-
capacity’ discourse, but with significant fractions from the humanitarian discourse. It 
is important to note, however, that this assumption is only guiding, and subject to 
revision.  
 
In the following analysis of the different cases, I will present the key findings from the 
analysis of the textual material. More specifically, I will highlight some core ideas that 
characterise the debate in the political field. These ideas do not in themselves 
constitute a discourse. However, when they come together in so-called ‘clusters’ of 
ideas that together form a particular view of the social world, then they represent a 
discourse. In this way, the core ideas presented in the textual analysis take part in 
constituting, and separating, the different discourses on burden-sharing in the political 
field. Still, there is a difference between the general notion of the role of ideas in 
politics, and the specific notion of ‘discourses’. In the analysis of discursive practice, I 
will show how the core ideas that characterise the political debate also take part in 
constituting broader discursive practice in the field. This will be exemplified through 
an analysis of texts and interview material. The textual analysis as it is presented here 
does not constitute the full analysis, but a summary of the most important findings 
derived from a more comprehensive, initial analysis of the entire empirical material.  
 	
4.5. Case I: the Syria Agreement  
 
4.5.1. Background: the Syria Agreement  
In spring 2015, the political parties represented in the Norwegian parliament entered 
negotiations on a special resettlement quota for Syrian refugees. Before the 
negotiations began, eight of Norway’s largest civil society organisations had joined 
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together and formed the “Syria Platform”, through which they strongly encouraged 
Norway to accept 10, 000 Syrian refugees from Syria’s neighbouring countries for 
resettlement over a period of two years. They also called for a strengthening of 
Norway’s financial contribution to humanitarian aid in Syria and the region (Egenæs 
et.al. 2015). Along the same line, the opposition parties and the government-
supporting parties were also in favour of accepting an additional 10, 000 Syrian quota 
refugees. However, the government parties were opposed to this suggestion. In 
consequence, the final agreement between the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, 
the Greens, the Christian Democrats, and the Liberals included the resettlement of 
8000 Syrian refugees in Norway over a period of three years. The Progress Party left 
the negotiations early, despite being a member of the government coalition, because 
they were principally against increasing the total number of resettlement places for 
refugees in Norway. Instead, they wished to concentrate on providing aid in nearby 
areas (Nesvik, 2015). The Socialist Left Party also decided to break off the 
negotiations, because they did not find the agreement ambitious enough and could 
thus not support it (SV, 2015).  
 
4.5.2. Identifying core ideas 
In the initial analysis of the textual material from the Syria Agreement, I was able to 
derive certain core ideas that characterised and defined the debate. These core ideas 
are thus particularly significant in the discursive practice - both because they are 
partly constituted by the different discourses, and because they take part in 
constituting the different discourses themselves. In particular, I found conflict along 
the following ideational positions:  
 
• “Helping them here or helping them where they are?” – how to prioritise 
different forms of burden-sharing initiatives.  
 
• Level of commitment to international values and normative obligations.   
 
• Different perceptions of what ‘morality’ among political actors entails in this 
context.  
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These core ideas are addressed individually below, supported by selected examples 
from the empirical material.  
 
4.5.3. ‘Helping them here or helping them where they are?’ 
The Syria Agreement deals explicitly with Norway’s contribution to international 
burden-sharing initiatives. In this regard, the different actors in the political field have 
expressed conflicting perspectives regarding what forms of burden-sharing are most 
appropriate and desirable, as well as the extent to which Norway should contribute to 
international burden-sharing generally.  
 
Civil society has been prominent in advocating extensive burden-sharing. In the op-ed 
“National dugnad for Syrian refugees” (emphasis added), eight of the largest 
humanitarian and/or rights organisations in Norway emphasise the need for combining 
burden-sharing measures in the response to the crisis. They argue that Norway must 
accept 10, 000 Syrian refugees directly from Syria’s neighbouring countries over the 
next two years, as well as provide more financial resources for humanitarian aid to the 
region. They note that the capacity of Syria’s neighbouring countries, especially 
Lebanon’s, is “stretched to the breaking point”. Consequently, they argue that: 
 
Norway, like other countries, must therefore increase the support to Lebanon significantly – also as a 
thank you for helping. In addition we must contribute by taking a larger share of those refugees that 
with difficulty can be protected in the nearby area.  
 
They also suggest ensuring the provision of temporary protection:  
 
This can be a combination of regular quota refugees – and that we provide temporary protection to 
more, like the Immigration Act has provisioned for, exactly in situations like this. 
 
In this way, civil society emphasises the importance of combining financial burden-
sharing and physical burden-sharing, in order to help as many as possible in the 
nearby region. At the same time, they insist on upholding the humanitarian value of 
protecting the most vulnerable by resettling those who cannot be adequately protected 
in the region. Hence, civil society draws heavily upon a humanitarian discourse in 
advocating a combination of burden-sharing initiatives.  
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However, some political parties take a very different approach to the issue. The 
Progress Party argues against physical burden-sharing – and resettlement specifically - 
because financial burden-sharing is more efficient. In an op-ed in Aftenposten, 
parliamentary leader Harald Tom Nesvik argues that the Progressive Party could not 
justify the agreement because it is politically irresponsible: 
 
(…) To receive 10, 000 refugees in Norway, is the absolute least efficient way to remedy the refugee 
situation in Syria (…) We show political responsibility by using the resources to help where the help 
matters the most.  
 
Nesvik thus draws upon a humanitarian discourse, by emphasising how important it is 
that Norway contributes to helping Syrian refugees in such an extraordinary situation. 
However, this discourse is mixed with a ‘rationality’ discourse that emphasises 
efficiency and effectiveness. Rationality, not emotion, must drive Norway’s response 
to the crisis, because we have a commitment to helping these refugees in the most 
‘sensible’ way. The rationalist perspective is further emphasised by the use of certain 
metaphors. In particular, Nesvik refers to the Syria agreement as “symbolic policies”. 
This metaphor implies that the Syria agreement simply is an expression of good 
intentions that has no real substance or impact. It is only ‘for show’ and will not truly 
improve the situation of Syrian refugees. The Progress Party’s solution stands in 
contrast to this, as a “politically responsible” solution. Further, Nesvik refers to a 
resettlement pledge as a “golden ticket”. This phrasing implies that resettlement is a 
disproportional form of protection for the very few compared to the desperate 
situation of the many. Hence, resettlement is framed to be morally unjust:  
 
The Progress Party wants to give fewer people the golden ticket – but give more the possibility to get 
their basic needs covered.  
 
Further, by referring to the potential negative consequences of quota refugees for 
Norwegian municipalities, Nesvik implies that providing help in the nearby region is 
also a better solution for Norwegian society. Hence, Nesvik’s arguments underpin a 
cost and benefit-perspective. Similarly, Prime Minister Erna Solberg from the 
Conservative Party also expresses a preference for financial burden-sharing. The 
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article “We will not receive refugees if we do not have homes for them” contains an 
interview with Solberg shortly after the Syria agreement was made public. Here, she 
expresses satisfaction with the agreement:  
 
The starting point from the Conservative Party’s and the government’s view was something else, but 
in the face of a parliamentary majority that could have agreed to receive a much higher number, then 
I think this agreement was good.  
 
This is an evaluative statement implying that receiving a high number of quota 
refugees is undesirable. In addition, Solberg states that the agreement to provide more 
help in Syria’s nearby areas is “incredibly important”. This implies that she prefers 
financial aid to resettlement in terms of burden-sharing measures. However, the 
statement is also seemingly an effort to resolve or overcome difference between the 
government and the parliamentary majority on this issue, as she still chooses to 
characterise the agreement as “good”. Regarding intertextuality, Solberg implicitly 
draws upon the civil society text when she uses the metaphor “national dugnad” 
(emphasis added) in reference to the efforts needed in terms of local settlement and 
integration of the refugees. “Dugnad” is a Norwegian concept that refers to a common 
voluntary effort for the good of all. In this text, however, Solberg uses the term to 
emphasise the challenge that comes with the resettlement process, rather than as 
simply a positive effort for the common good:  
 
This demands a large national “dugnad” to achieve settlement and a good integration programme.  
 
This statement expresses a value assumption implying that the resettlement of 8000 
Syrians will be a great cost for Norway that will demand much from society. Hence, it 
can be characterised as an assumption with ideological effects, as it supports a ‘cost-
and-capacity’ discourse which emphasises national considerations, and economic and 
resources constraints.  
 
However, some political parties also see the value in combining burden-sharing 
measures. When Labour Party leader Jonas Gahr Støre expresses his satisfaction on 
the day the agreement is announced, he is particularly pleased that the agreement 
involves both resettlement and financial burden-sharing in the nearby areas:  
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Both have been important to the Labour Party.  
 
Hence, he does not prioritise between these burden-sharing measures, or put one up 
against the other, like Nesvik and Solberg have done. By referring to the UNHCR’s 
call for physical burden-sharing in order to protect the most vulnerable, Støre 
acknowledges that both forms of burden-sharing are necessary components of an 
adequate protection strategy. In doing so, he draws upon a humanitarian discourse. In 
consequence, there is a distinction in the political field between those who stress the 
need to combine burden-sharing measures to provide sufficient protection, and those 
who view financial burden-sharing as preferable.  
 
4.5.4. Commitment to international values and obligations  
Actors in the field differ significantly in terms of their level of commitment to 
international values and obligations, in particular related to humanitarian and refugee 
norms. Unsurprisingly, civil society commits strongly to international principles. 
Throughout the Syria Platform’s opinion piece, the authors are continuously referring 
to humanitarian values, including the right to protection and the mandate of the High 
Commissioner. The text explicitly states that Norway has a normative international 
obligation to contribute to burden-sharing: 
 
Given the dramatic situation, it is our humanitarian duty to contribute more and better.  
 
This statement expresses a strong belief that international society has a common 
responsibility for the protection of Syrian refugees, and that this must be followed by 
concrete policies. Similarly, leader of the Socialist Left Party Audun Lysbakken also 
expresses a strong commitment to international humanitarian values. In the text where 
Lysbakken explains why the party left the negotiations, he highlights Norway’s 
obligation to take not just a share of the burden, but a large enough share. In general, 
Lysbakken and SV strongly commit to the principle of solidarity, with the refugees as 
well as the affected region, to the extent that they cannot compromise this position:  
 
(…) the final agreement involves an effort that is too small, and that comes too late. (…)  
 
	68	
International solidarity and responsibility should in this view be the primary driver of 
political action. However, there are disagreements in the political field about whether 
the Syria agreement adequately fulfils Norway’s international responsibilities. Unlike 
Lysbakken, who justifies his party’s exit from the negotiations because the agreement 
does not meet the standards of Norway’s international normative obligations, Støre 
applauds the agreement exactly because it reflects a commitment to these obligations:  
 
The UN High Commissioner has long said that there are about 10 per cent of the refugees in the 
nearby areas that cannot be given help or protection there. They have repeatedly asked the 
international society to receive more of these.  
 
In this quote, Støre emphasises the shared responsibility of the international 
community as a whole to respond to this humanitarian crisis. He thus highlights how 
important it is that Norway “take(s) our share of the responsibility” and help the most 
vulnerable. Hence, the text is underlined by a commitment to international principles 
and an appreciation of the Syria Agreement exactly because it enables Norway to 
fulfil its international responsibilities.  
 
In striking contrast to these views, Per Sandberg on behalf of the Progress Party 
promotes a value-explicit perspective that is in conflict with the humanitarian 
perspective. The article “Immigration threatens the welfare society” refers to his 
speech at the Progress Party congress in spring 2015, which is partly a reaction to the 
Labour Party’s decision to resettle 10 000 Syrian refugees. Here, Sandberg draws 
heavily upon a sovereign nation-state discourse that stresses the superiority of national 
values and concerns over international normative commitments. This is expressed in 
particular through the intertextuality element in the text. The only other ‘voice’ 
included in the text is that of the Labour Party. However, there is no inclusion of other 
important actors or texts in the debate, such as international actors or civil society 
claims. References to international commitments are completely excluded from the 
text, which implies that Sandberg finds these arguments somewhat insignificant. 
 
There is also a form of ‘middle ground’ in the political field between these two 
conflicting perspectives. Notably, Solberg expresses a more balanced view in terms of 
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prioritising a commitment to international normative obligations or focusing on 
national considerations. The text that addresses Solberg’s comments on the agreement 
contains some of her propositional assumptions of what can happen in terms of the 
agreement, when she refers to the decision that the quota scheme shall be evaluated in 
2017:  
 
This entails that there are some preconditions (…) we shall look at the results of settlement and the 
results of asylum arrivals.  
 
Arguably, this statement contains an evaluation of values. By emphasising the need to 
consider these results, Solberg implicitly states that she is not unconditionally 
committed to the humanitarian values and the need to provide protection to vulnerable 
refugees who needs it. Rather, she considers this aspect in relation to, and perhaps 
even subordinated to, her consideration of the importance of maintaining orderly 
conditions in the Norwegian asylum system. In addition, she does not want to strain 
the municipalities and local communities. This way of thinking draws upon notions of 
rationality, capacity and costs.  
 
4.5.5. Conceptualising ‘political’ morality  
Another significant ideational distinction in the field is related to the perception of 
‘morality’ among the political actors in the field, and what constitute ‘moral’ political 
acts in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis. This notion of morality is closely tied 
to the issue of commitment to international values or to national concerns. Firstly, the 
civil society text strongly expresses a perception of morality that embraces 
international solidarity, compassion and protecting those in need. Notably, one 
particular metaphor is often repeated in the text, namely “dugnad”. In this text, the use 
of this metaphor can be interpreted as an attempt to bracketing difference by focusing 
on commonality and solidarity, because the concept is deeply embedded in Norwegian 
national identity. Especially the formulation “national dugnad” (emphasis added) 
implies that the whole nation can and should come together in this common effort. To 
refer to the reception of 10, 000 Syrian refugees for resettlement and/or temporary 
protection as a dugnad, implies that this act is assumed to represent something 
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morally good and desirable. Hence, the metaphor is applied differently by civil society 
than by Solberg. 
 
The Labour Party takes a similar approach, as Støre emphasises the need for solidarity 
and community in the face of such an extraordinary situation. He is particularly 
pleased that the parties managed to achieve a broad majority agreement that included 
the support from the government (at least from the largest government party). The text 
thus expresses a clear focus on commonality and solidarity between the political 
parties that came together to support the agreement. In this way, Støre lifts the 
agreement, and the extraordinary humanitarian situation itself, ‘above’ the conflicts 
and deliberations of ordinary national politics:  
 
This case highlights some of the finest about the Norwegian political system: that we stand together 
across political lines when the seriousness of the situation requires an extraordinary effort to help 
other people.  
 
When emphasising this political solidarity, he does not include a reference to the 
parties that broke off the negotiations for one reason or another. This can be 
interpreted as a possible attempt to suppress domestic political difference in the desire 
to perceive and present Norway as united in its common efforts to undertake its 
international responsibility. Hence, in terms of evaluation, Støre encompasses a view 
of political morality that results in cooperation across party lines that embraces 
international norms and values.  
 
In contrast, political fractions within the Progress Party express a very different 
conception of political morality in this context, which mainly concerns the 
consequences for Norwegian society. Sandberg claims that a high level of non-
Western immigration is incompatible with the welfare society Norway has today. The 
text is characterised by the heavy inclusion of existential and value assumptions:  
 
Norway simply cannot afford to maintain a high non-Western immigration if we are to preserve the 
safe and good welfare state we have today.  
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Firstly, this statement is an explicit value assumption as it deems the welfare state as 
‘safe’ and ‘good’. Secondly, it is also an existential assumption as it factually states 
that the welfare state and high levels of non-Western immigration is incompatible. 
These assumptions can arguably be seen as ideological. They support the assumptions 
embedded in a political anti-immigration discourse that aims to universalise the 
perception of non-Western immigration as an inherently negative phenomenon. In the 
text, Sandberg draws upon two political discourses, namely the welfare discourse and 
the anti-immigration discourse, in a way that makes one (welfare) dependent upon the 
other (low levels of immigration). This form of discursive argumentation is also in 
line with an anti-immigration discourse, which emphasises the harm such immigration 
will do to Norwegian society. Furthermore, in terms of intertextuality, Sandberg 
emphasises an accentuation of difference between the Labour Party and his own:  
 
I think the voters now are beginning to realise that the Labour Party wishes to implement totally 
irresponsible immigration policies that in practice will abolish today’s welfare state…(ref: the 
agreement) shows how important it is that the Progress Party holds government and pulls the 
immigration politics in a responsible and restrictive direction.  
 
This polemic statement reflects a conflict between the Progress Party and the Labour 
Party as it contrasts a “totally irresponsible” liberal immigration policy with a 
“responsible and restrictive” policy. Hence, a restrictive immigration policy is deemed 
morally good, even in a situation such as the Syrian crisis. This accentuation of 
difference also implies a conflict between the Progress Party and other political actors 
in the field that are supportive of the decision to accept more refugees. Moreover, this 
conflict is seemingly deeply embedded in norms, values and meanings. In Sandberg’s 
view, this is not simply about 10, 000 refugees, this is about what kind of Norway one 
wants for one’s children. In this regard, it is the Progress Party that stands for 
preserving the resources and the welfare state that benefits the Norwegian population. 
Hence, in this view, ‘political morality’ means taking a stand against international 
demands that have perceived negative effects on Norwegian society, and prevent 
burden-sharing initiatives that negatively affect Norwegian welfare.  
  
4.6. Case II: The ‘European Crisis’ 
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To say that the refugee crisis at Europe’s borders began in the late summer of 2015 is 
arguably not quite correct. Thousands of refugees have approached European borders 
for safety over the past few years, whereas many have drowned as a result of 
dangerous boat rides organised by people smugglers. As the Syrian conflict 
developed, an increasing share of these refugees was Syrians. Moreover, it is 
debatable whether the situation can be characterised as a ‘crisis’ for Europe, compared 
to the situation in Syria’s nearby region and for the refugees themselves. Still, the 
situation escalated rapidly in August 2015. On 19 August alone, 2,500 refugees, many 
of them Syrians, entered the island of Thessaloniki in Greece. Greek authorities 
received much criticism for their degrading treatment of the refugees (NRK, 2015b), 
and the situation exploded across international media. As a consequence, the refugee 
situation at the borders of Europe was placed at the top of the political agenda. In 
particular, the picture of the three year-old Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi lying dead on a 
beach in Turkey after his family’s boat sunk, caused a public outcry across Europe 
(Hustadnes, 2015). This put further pressure on European politicians to act 
immediately. In Norway, the rapid escalation of the crisis also occurred in parallel 
with the final weeks of the local election campaigns. Since resettlement and 
integration policies are first and foremost implemented at the local level, refugee 
protection became a crucial issue in the election debates (Fredriksen, 2015). The 
analysis is based upon empirical material addressing the time period between late 
August until the EU meeting on the relocation scheme in Luxembourg on 14 
September 2015.  
 
4.6.1. Identifying core ideas  
In the initial textual analysis, I was able to derive some key ideas from the empirical 
material addressing the ‘European crisis’, even though this case is admittedly much 
more comprehensive and encompasses a greater range of actors and issues. The 
analysis of this case highlights aspects of both discursive reproduction and change in 
the political field since the Syria Agreement. This is also reflected in the core ideas. In 
the context of the ‘European crisis’, I found division and conflict along the following 
ideational positions:  
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• Norway’s role in Europe, and the importance of European solidarity. 
 
• Continued tension between international solidarity and national interests.  
 
• The extent to which actors have been influenced by actual political and 
humanitarian developments. 
 
• The desire to develop innovative solutions versus focusing on existing 
problems and constraints. 
 
4.6.2. Norway’s role in Europe 
One of the most striking developments from the Syria agreement to the ‘European 
crisis’ evident the empirical material is the increased focus on Norway’s role in 
Europe. Some actors strongly emphasise the need for enhanced European solidarity, 
and embrace a view of Norway in which it should take a pro-active role in Europe. 
Audun Lysbakken’ opinion piece exemplifies this perspective. He writes about his 
visit to Lesvos, where he went to “see the European refugee crisis with own eyes”. 
The text is a response to the escalating crisis and limited political action. Lysbakken 
refers explicitly to the moral responsibility of European states to share the burden, a 
responsibility they have towards the refugees themselves and towards fellow states 
that are more heavily affected:  
 
We must also have the debate about achieving an agreement to share the responsibility between 
European countries (…) Now each country acts for itself, and most are only concerned with one 
thing: to keep the refugees away from themselves.  
 
In the text, he also compares most of Europe to Germany and Sweden, and implicitly 
presents these two countries as role models for the rest of Europe because they have 
showed the political will to accept large numbers of refugees. In terms of evaluation, 
this signifies that Lysbakken believes that Norway should take after these pro-active 
European countries. Similarly, in the article “The Krf-leader: Norway must waive the 
Dublin regulations for the Syria-refugees”, leader of the Christian Democrats Knut 
Arild Hareide draws heavily upon a European solidarity discourse and emphasises the 
responsibility Norway has as a European state. He also compares Norwegian 
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leadership to German Prime Minister Angela Merkel, who has been acclaimed for 
showing political leadership and solidarity in Europe:  
 
We have a common European responsibility. That is why I am asking Erna Solberg to look towards 
Angela Merkel and the leadership she has shown. Norway must also participate.  
 
This reference implies that Norway should not simply measure its efforts against the 
majority of European states, but against the European ‘frontrunners’. The statement is 
thus also underlined by a value assumption that it is desirable for Norway to propose 
an asylum policy that is more heavily guided by humanitarian values. Further, Trine 
Skei Grande, leader of the Liberal Party, also draws upon a European discourse. She 
calls for a more active European role for Norway, especially during the process of 
developing new European burden-sharing mechanisms:  
 
We must immediately inform that we are part of the dugnad that the EU now should have (…) we 
have a responsibility, both formally, but also morally to be a part of this.  
 
Norway’s European identity is thus clearly important to the Liberal party. Norway has 
a particular responsibility as a European country, despite not being a member of the 
EU. As a result, Lysbakken, Hareide and Skei Grande all want Norway to take a 
leading role in the development of European burden-sharing initiatives. Further, 
several civil society actors also embrace the notion of enhanced European solidarity. 
For instance, Pål Nesse (2015, [interview]) from the NRC puts great emphasis on the 
need to find lasting, joint European solutions, standards and practices in the field. 
These join solutions would constitute “a public good” according to Nesse. Similarly, 
researcher Vigdis Vevstad (2015b, [interview]) notes that solidarity is a “basic 
concept” in the European context, which is now “being tested”. In this regard, 
Vevstad emphasises Norway’s identity as a European state, and that we could 
undertake a more proactive role in Europe as well as internationally.  
 
However, not all the actors in the political field are fully convinced about Norway’s 
inherent European responsibility. Erna Solberg takes a more pragmatic approach to 
the question of European solidarity. In the article “Solberg hesitant to the EU’s 
refugee dugnad”, she responds to the on going EU process to relocate 160, 000 
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refugees internally on the continent in solidarity with the southern EU countries, 
which receive the largest numbers of refugees, Italy and Greece in particular: 
 
We must look at the composition of and the details in the programme that now shall be adopted in the 
EU before we draw a final conclusion (…) It is not certain that we want to accept anyone for re-
localisation with the high asylum influx we are experiencing now.  
 
Here, Solberg expresses a propositional assumption of what will, and can be, the case 
in term of Norway’s role in the European relocation initiative. The argument that 
Norway’s relocation participation depends upon the number of asylum seekers implies 
that the government still believes that a high level of refugees in Norway is something 
that should be avoided. Further, it also implies that the government does not consider 
it sufficiently valuable to be part of a common European initiative simply on the basis 
of shared responsibility and solidarity. Rather, they approach the matter from a 
cost/benefit perspective, in which the specific conditions of the initiative must be 
considered as ‘good enough’ for Norway before the government can make a decision. 
Hence, Solberg does not necessarily believe that Norway should take a pro-active role 
in Europe. Instead, she prioritises what she believes will be best for Norway in terms 
of concrete policies and consequences.  
 
The commitment to stronger European solidarity is not necessarily connected to a 
general commitment to international principles as it was expressed in the Syria 
negotiations. This is exemplified through the views of the Labour Party, where Støre 
in fact takes a similar pragmatic approach to Solberg when he comments on the 
European relocation initiative. In the text, Støre’s voice is textured in direct relation to 
Solberg:  
 
I agree with Erna Solberg. (…) Norway should be part of a European burden-sharing, but we have 
received more per capita than most countries in Europe. That must also count for something.  
 
This is a bracketing of difference between the government and the largest opposition 
party. Støre also rejects the need for Norway to play a pro-active role in Europe. 
Instead of comparing Norway to countries like Sweden and Germany, he simply refers 
to the majority of the European nations. As long as Norway is not worse than most, 
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there is no need to take the lead. Thus, in terms of evaluation, Støre values the need 
for good national integration to be prioritised ahead the need to show solidarity with 
Europe. This implies that the Labour Party has made a gradual move towards a more 
explicit cost-and-benefits perspective during the ‘European crisis’.  
 
4.6.3. International solidarity or national interests?  
The issue of prioritising international normative commitments and solidarity versus 
protecting (perceived) national interests, including ensuring welfare and good 
integration, remains a significant issue also during the height of the ‘European crisis’. 
In this regard, the Progress Party continues to emphasise the moral responsibility to 
protect national welfare. For instance, on the current situation, party leader Siv Jensen 
states that:  
 
(…) it is obvious that this will demand a lot from Norway. The influx of asylum seekers will create 
problems and put our reception apparatus under considerable pressure. 
 
This is a propositional assumption that can be considered ideological. Jensen’s 
assumption that the number of asylum seekers undoubtedly will create problems for 
Norway is a particular assumption that not all actors necessarily will share. However, 
Jensen phrases it in a way that universalises this particular meaning. Universalization 
is an important part of discursive hegemony (Fairclough 2003: 58). This propositional 
assumption is arguably part of an anti-immigration - or at least an immigration 
‘sceptical’ - discourse, as it supports the broader world view of non-Western 
immigration as difficult, negative and undesirable for Norwegian society. 
 
There is an accentuated difference in the political field between this nation-centric 
perspective and the humanitarian perspective. For instance, Lysbakken places himself 
in direct opposition to the nation-centric perspectives of the Progress Party in his op-
ed. Intertextuality is an important dimension in the text, and Lysbakken includes an 
explicit reference to Progress Party politicians:  
 
In every single country there is a Siv Jensen or Per Sandberg who meets people in need with a cold 
shoulder: “We must help them where they are. Somewhere else, just not here”.  
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The voices of Sandberg and Jensen are attributed as oppositional to Lysbakken’s own 
worldviews. This represents a conflict over values. The use of the metaphor “cold 
shoulder” to characterise Jensen and Sandberg’s argumentation implies that he 
perceives their views as inhumane. This difference is further emphasised as 
Lysbakken himself proposes to “reach out a hand” instead. Hence, Lysbakken remains 
strongly committed to international solidarity.  
 
Progress Party politician Carl I. Hagen expresses similar concerns as Jensen, though 
arguably in a more controversial manner. Hagen has eventually played a prominent 
role in the debate on the ‘European crisis’ and in the article “Carl I. Hagen wants to 
send all boat refugees in return”, he reacts to the crisis and the Norwegian debate. In 
this regard, he expresses great scepticism to the provision of physical burden-sharing 
in general as he “says no to both Syrian quota refugees and boat refugees”. In 
particular, Hagen argues that:  
 
Norway must do like Australia and say that the boat refugees cannot stay under any circumstances 
(…) This goes wrong for Europe. If the pressure gets too big, much will collapse.  
 
This is a propositional assumption that has clear ideological implications. That Europe 
will ‘collapse’ under the pressure of non-Western boat refugees is not a given fact, but 
a particular assumption that supports an anti-immigration discourse. Hagen draws 
upon a significant mix of discourses in the text. He draws heavily upon an anti-
immigration discourse, and combines this with an efficiency discourse that refers to 
costs and benefits. For instance, he argues that Norway can help 25 refugees in the 
nearby areas for the same sum that we can help one refugee in Norway. The inclusion 
of this efficiency discourse contributes to ‘toning down’ the anti-immigration 
arguments. Moreover, Hagen also includes a welfare discourse:  
 
(…) to achieve a sensible societal development instead of, in the long term, social unrest, less welfare 
and large integration problems, yes, that is an extremely important issue for the Progress Party.  
 
In this way, the inclusion of the welfare discourse further strengthens the anti-
immigration discourse. Since welfare implicitly is evaluated as a common good, 
especially in the social democracy that Norway is, the assumption that more refugees 
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will cause less welfare makes a higher number of refugees undesirable, perhaps even 
frightening, to Norwegians. Hagen’s significant mixing of discourses thus contributes 
to a strengthened anti-immigration discourse that applies elements from different 
discourses and political ‘camps’ to support his worldview. Hagen commits himself to 
national values of preserving national welfare and togetherness for the Norwegian 
population. In order to preserve these values, he believes it is necessary, and even 
desirable, to reject international normative commitments.  
 
Some political actors propose more of a ‘middle ground’ between these two 
conflicting perspectives. For instance, Jonas Gahr Støre takes a more pragmatic 
approach, in which he attempts to balance a commitment to international solidarity 
with national concerns. He responds to an indirect quote from Lysbakken regarding 
the expiration of the Syria-agreement in the following way:  
 
The agreement has not expired. It is not right to jump on a higher number before we are ensured that 
the integration can happen in a good way.  
 
The use of the phrase “jump” in this context implies that deciding upon a higher 
number of quota refugees in this situation of increasing asylum numbers would be 
impulsive and thus irresponsible. Støre therefore advocates a more responsible 
handling of the agreement and the refugee process, which ensures “good” integration. 
The contrast embedded in the statement also implies that a good integration process 
cannot occur alongside a high influx of refugees. To ensure the successful integration 
of the refugees Norway receives is seemingly a more important concern than simply 
providing protection to as many displaced persons as possible. Hence, the text is 
underlined by a ‘rationalist’ cost and benefits-perspective.  
 
Finally, the question what principles should be guiding in refugee politics also relates 
to more concrete priorities in physical burden-sharing processes. Regarding quota 
refugees, Ekeløve-Slydal (2015, [interview]) emphasises the difference between 
Amnesty and the current government in terms of who should be selected. She notes 
that previous governments have selected refugees for the permanent quota programme 
	 79	
on the basis of the most vulnerable-principle. However, the current government 
instead chooses quota refugees based on who is “most easily integrated”, and thus 
present less of a ‘challenge’ for Norwegian society. This implies an accentuation of 
difference over the meaning of the right to protection, including who should be 
prioritised and why, in the political field.  
 
4.6.3.1 The legitimacy of the UN  
A specific issue related to the relationship between the international and the national is 
the question of the legitimacy of the UN, and the appropriate role of UN policies and 
principles in domestic politics. Even though the UN traditionally is perceived in 
Norway as having great legitimacy, the debate on the Syrian refugee crisis has 
highlighted ideational conflict on this issue. This accentuation of difference over the 
normative value of international institutions in the domestic sphere is important, 
because it clearly matters in the implementation process of an international norm such 
as burden-sharing.  
 
Hagen’s text expresses a particularly negative view of the UN. When the reporter 
confronts him with the fact that Australia has been criticised by the UN for their return 
policies, he says:  
 
It is obvious that if the UN can push the problem onto European countries, then they will. The UN is 
controlled by the countries that are dictatorships and the senders of refugees. What the UN says does 
not hold much weight for me.  
 
This statement presents a controversial view of the UN in a way that aims to 
universalise this particular meaning. It can therefore be defined as an assumption with 
ideological effects. This existential assumption thus supports a discourse that 
deprioritises and de-legitimises the UN as a significant reference point for national 
political action. However, actors with a humanitarian orientation have reacted to this 
attempted de-legitimation of the UN by certain groups in the political field. In 
particular, Vevstad  (2015b, [interview]) criticises this political development, 
especially by stressing that it conflicts with Norway’s humanitarian tradition:  
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In my view, Norway could manage its humanitarian legacy better. We have contributed to 
undermining the UN’s role over time, for example by not acting in accordance with the UNHCR’s 
recommendations (…).  
 
This statement expresses the value assumption that Norway should be a significant 
humanitarian actor, and that emphasises the legitimacy of UN principles in guiding 
domestic politics. In general, there is an accentuated difference over norms and 
meanings in the political field concerning what role and power the UN – and the 
international sphere more broadly - can and should have in the Norwegian context. 
 
4.6.4. Influence by political and humanitarian developments  
The dramatic development in the refugee situation has affected several of the political 
actors in the field, but to different extents. Arguably, this can be characterised as a 
distinct form of ideational influence and can thus be regarded as an ideational factor in 
the same way as the other core ideas, which addresses the aspect of ‘change’ 
specifically. Notably, some actors have been drawing more heavily upon a 
humanitarian perspective as they increasingly have felt the need to contribute more. 
For instance, the Liberal Party called for a renegotiation of the Syria agreement 
already in early September, because the refugee crisis expanded more than expected. 
This change of perspective is significant as the Liberal Party initially was a keen 
supporter of the original agreement:  
 
We have a joint agreement (…) and that shall be renegotiated. Norwegian politics relies upon having 
a broad agreement to support such big efforts.  
 
This statement implies that the change in actual events has had a significant impact on 
the perspectives of political actors. What was previously perceived as responsible and 
even commendable political action is now inadequate. Similarly, in the article “The 
Liberal Party wants an emergency meeting on the refugee situation”, the Party calls 
for an extraordinary parliamentary meeting to enable formal decisions concerning 
increased efforts and financial priorities. In particular, Skei Grande embraces the 
growing voice of grassroots movements as a reason for political action:  
 
Luckily we see strong civic engagement in Norway to contribute. This engagement should also be 
strengthened with a joint effort from the political Norway.  
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This statement implies that Skei Grande believes that “political Norway” – defined as 
the political leadership – and its will to act, is not matching public opinion. The 
political leadership is seemingly no longer representing the majority of the Norwegian 
people on this issue. The emerging grassroots engagement has thus contributed to 
discursive change in the political field. However, Solberg’s voice - on behalf of the 
government - is also included in the article. She responds directly to Skei Grande’s 
statement: 
 
I believe there is no basis for saying it should be renegotiated. We will handle the asylum crisis and 
those questions independently of the context in that agreement. 
 
Solberg does not seemingly perceive the changing context of the crisis, or the 
increased civic engagement, as significant reasons for renegotiating the agreement and 
increase resettlement.  Further, the Progress Party also remains largely committed to 
their previous discursive orientation. In the article “-Convinced that it is best to help in 
the nearby areas”, Siv Jensen is confronted with the recommendation to say no to 
settling more refugees, which she gave to all Norwegian municipalities a few weeks 
previously. The text is produced after Norwegian media has been full of pictures and 
stories of the escalating refugee crisis. Jensen is thus in a position where she must 
defend a strict asylum and immigration policy at a time when the public is becoming 
increasingly positive to Norway providing protection to refugees. However, she still 
maintains her position and reiterates the Progress Party’s stance from the Syria 
negotiations:  
 
I am convinced that it is best to help in the nearby areas.  
 
This is an evaluative statement, in which Jensen still commits to a particular set of 
judgments about how Norway best can respond to the refugee crisis. The text refers 
explicitly to the Syria-agreement, where Jensen argues that the Progress Party’s 
objections to the agreement have “become even more relevant” following the 
European crisis. Her perspectives on burden-sharing have thus not notably changed 
since the Syria-agreement despite the deteriorating situation. In sum, the ideational 
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perspectives of different actors have been influenced to different extents by political 
and humanitarian developments.  
 
4.6.5. Developing innovative solutions  
A significant difference between the various actors, which also has important 
implications for social practice, is the way in which they perceive the current policy 
challenges and possible solutions. In particular, there is a notable distinction between 
those who believe that ‘we can do this’ and who want to ‘use all the tools in the 
toolbox’, and those who focus on current problems, systemic limitations and resource 
constraints. This issue is thus related to the issue raised in 4.6.3 regarding influence of 
political and humanitarian developments, and whether the recognition of the evolving 
crisis initiates a desire to think new. More specifically, humanitarian actors have 
tended to emphasise the possibilities the Syrian refugee crisis has created for 
international refugee protection, and consequently highlighted the need to develop 
new solutions and systems, nationally and internationally. For instance, Ekeløve-
Slydal (2015 [interview]) argues that the international refugee protection regime is 
now being tested, as the crisis has changed the premises for refugee protection:  
 
(...) this has created a situation where we see that Angela Merkel has shown political leadership by 
trying to establish a model for international responsibility-sharing within the EU when the 
international community needs to handle a situation of mass influx (...) (ref: a political leadership) of 
a dimension that we have not experienced before. 
 
She further argues that the international refugee protection regime so far has “failed”, 
and has highlighted the need for change in terms of burden-sharing – or responsibility-
sharing, which is Amnesty’s official term - in refugee protection:  
 
The international community must reinvigorate the system for responsibility-sharing amongst states 
(…) 
 
However, several humanitarian actors who are concerned with developing innovative 
solutions experience a substantial gap between their approach and that of political 
leadership. Ann-Magrit Austenå from NOAS (2015 [interview]) emphasises the lack 
of political will to find solutions to the current challenges. The political leadership 
frames the situation as an isolated problem for Norway, rather than a consequence of 
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an international challenge that we must find joint solutions to. Consequently, they 
focus on how to remove the “problem” from Norway, instead of, for instance, finding 
new measures for improved and more effective integration. This is also evident in the 
texts addressing the views of government politicians, which to a large extent focus on 
existing resource and financial constrains, and on the possible problems increased 
refugee numbers will create for Norwegian society.  
 
4.6.5.1. Consequences for the Dublin regulations  
The Dublin regulations are an essential tool for European burden-sharing in the 
refugee and asylum field. The implications of the Syrian crisis for these regulations 
are therefore an important aspect of the burden-sharing debate. During the course of 
the European crisis, there have been differing views among political actors about 
whether the crisis has been the end of the Dublin regulations as we know it, or if the 
system is still viable. Knut Arild Hareide has been one of the politicians arguing that 
Norway must stop the return of Syrian refugees to the European country of first 
asylum, which the Dublin regulations open up for. Specifically, the text is a response 
to Angela Merkel’s decision to stop Dublin-returns of Syrians from Germany. Hareide 
expresses openness to, or an exploration of, difference between himself and the 
government on this issue:  
 
I am challenging the government to put the Dublin agreement aside.  
 
Hareide also argues that the Dublin regulations in reality have “collapsed”. This is a 
propositional assumption that has concrete policy effects, because such a collapse 
would significantly change Europe’s refugee and asylum regime, and could 
potentially demand the development of new and improved burden-sharing measures. 
Moreover, Hareide highlights Merkel’s humanitarian engagement as he supports her 
decision to stop the Dublin-returns of Syrians. This implies that Hareide perceives this 
application of the Dublin regulations as inhumane, and as an obstacle for the safe 
treatment of Syrian asylum seekers. He thus draws upon a humanitarian discourse. 
Along the same line, civil society strongly encourages Norway to stop Dublin-returns. 
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Secretary-general John Peder Egenæs in Amnesty criticises the continued practice of 
Dublin-returns:  
 
It is not behaving in a manner of solidarity (“direkte usolidarisk”) to send Syria-refugees back to 
countries in the South (ref: of Europe).  
 
The statement implies that the Dublin regulations as they are currently practiced are 
not viable as a burden-sharing instrument for a humane and acceptable European 
refugee and asylum policy framework. Moreover, some humanitarian actors argue that 
the Dublin-regulations have not succeeded in creating real burden-sharing in Europe. 
Otherwise, we would not be experiencing the current situation (Igesund 2015, 
[interview]). This implies that humanitarian actors commit to a new and improved 
burden-sharing system in Europe, possibly also to replace Dublin. This commitment 
has, however, not been expressed by the government parties or the Labour Party. In 
sum, the Syrian refugee crisis has for some actors highlighted the need to develop new 
refugee protection and burden-sharing measures, nationally and internationally, whilst 
others largely reject this need.  
 
4.7. Discursive Practice  
This subchapter will focus on discursive practice, the second dimension of 
Fairclough’s model, which modifies the relationship between text and social practice. 
As aforementioned, discursive practice consists of two main elements – the 
production and the consumption of texts. The three discourses that are presented here 
are derived from the core ideas identified in the textual analysis. These discourses can 
be considered as dominant in the Norwegian political field, and thus consequently as 
determining the political space for action regarding burden-sharing in refugee 
protection. The subchapter will begin by explaining the relationship between the core 
ideas in the field, and broader discursive practice. It will then present the three 
dominant discourses: the humanitarian discourse; the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse, 
and the ‘nation-state’ discourse. It will discuss the clusters of ideas that constitute 
them, as well as the internal fractions within them. Further, the sub-chapter will 
discuss the hierarchy between these discourses, specifically related to Fairclough’s 
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concepts of hegemony and power. The dialectical role of agents and structures in the 
reproduction and transformation of discourses will also be central. In particular, 
changes in discursive structures from the Syria agreement to the “European crisis” 
will be of interests in this regard.  
 
4.7.1. The relationship between ideational positions and discursive practice 
Subchapters 4.5. and 4.6. have presented some core ideas, against which actors in the 
political field have positioned themselves differently. This has resulted in ideational 
disagreement and conflict over several issues regarding refugee protection and 
burden-sharing. However, these conflicts at the ideational level also relate to broader 
discursive conflicts. Discursive processes are expressed in texts. One of the main 
purposes of detailed textual analysis in CDA is thus to uncover and analyse these 
discursive processes. A discourse consists of a cluster of collectively shared ideas 
about the social and political world, which are internally coherent, and which together 
represent a particular worldview. By addressing the different ideas and ideational 
conflicts that are expressed across a range of texts, it is also possible to identify how 
certain ideas cluster together in a way that constitutes different discourses in the field. 
In this way, ideational conflicts expressed in texts can also be reflective of conflicts in 
broader discursive practice. In order to identify the dominant discourses in the field, 
and analyse discursive conflict and power structures between them, it is therefore 
necessary to look at the clusters of ideas that constitute them. These sets of ideas can, 
in turn, be identified through the core ideas that have been derived from the textual 
analysis. 
 
The relationship between ideas and discourses is also highlighted by the way that 
different actors express different ideas. Even the independent ideas of actors are partly 
constituted by existing discursive structures, which they can never fully ‘escape’. In 
the textual analysis, it is clear that different actors largely remain within certain pre-
existing discursive boundaries. For instance, civil society actors clearly draw upon a 
range of ideas that relate to humanitarianism in all the texts. In turn, these ideas 
clustered together constitute the humanitarian discourse in the field, which represents 
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a particular worldview. Below I will discuss the dominant discourses in the field with 
reference to the collective ideas that take part in constituting them. 
 
4.7.2. The humanitarian discourse  
The humanitarian discourse draws upon international ideas and norms embedded in 
international humanitarian law and the human rights framework, as well as more 
recently developed principles including PoC and human security. In the Norwegian 
context specifically, the humanitarian discourse is deeply rooted in the idea of 
Norway’s heritage as a humanitarian nation. Fridtjof Nansen is a concrete reference 
point in this regard. As the League of Nation’s first High Commissioner for Refugees, 
who was also awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work with refugees, Nansen is an 
important example of Norway’s active role in humanitarian work, specifically in the 
refugee field. For instance, Pål Nesse (2015 [interview]) notes that:  
 
Norway is a country one looks to internationally in the refugee context (…) Out in the world (...) 
“everybody” knows that Nansen was the first High Commissioner (...) Norway has an international 
reputation when it comes to refugee work.  
 
Hence, the Norwegian humanitarian discourse is partly constituted by domestic 
actor’s specific perception of Norway’s identity as one that strongly values 
humanitarian principles, and who act upon these principles at home and abroad. 
According to this socially constructed identity, Norway should always be in the 
forefront internationally when it comes to humanitarian action. Further, in the 
humanitarian discourse the UN plays a strong role, having significant moral authority 
and legitimacy. The humanist values that the UN system is founded upon are 
inherently good and beneficial for humanity as a whole, despite its arguably imperfect 
practice. Consequently, the discourse emphasises that UN policy and 
recommendations, and the international norms and principles it promotes must be 
guiding Norwegian domestic politics independently of whether domestic actors 
perceive these recommendations as being inconvenient or undesirable for Norway’s 
‘self-interest’. In general, the humanitarian discourse has as one of its defining 
features that international norms and principles must have a powerful place in 
domestic politics.  
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“Solidarity” is a significant nodal point in the humanitarian discourse, and provides 
the core argument for burden-sharing. Like in the international sphere, solidarity is 
understood in this discourse in two ways. Firstly, solidarity is directed towards the 
refugees themselves. This is based on traditional humanitarian values, including the 
need to protect civilians and vulnerable persons independently of who they are. The 
refugees are victims of war, and it is our moral duty as fellow humans to help them. 
Secondly, the concept of solidarity refers to states in the region and who are hosting a 
very large share of the refugee population. This concern is founded upon the 
conception that the whole international community has a responsibility for displaced 
populations, and that it is inherently unfair that some countries are this heavily 
affected by the crisis. These conceptualisations of solidarity are important reasons for 
burden-sharing action in the humanitarian discourse, which was apparent during the 
Syria negotiations. 
 
Since the “European crisis”, the humanitarian discourse has first and foremost applied 
the notion of solidarity in the European context. The most prominent issue is perhaps 
the role that Norway should play in European burden-sharing initiatives. Some actors 
largely identified by the humanitarian discourse, including most of civil society and 
certain political parties, compare Norway’s engagement explicitly to that of Sweden 
and Germany, which have been leading in the European refugee protection response. 
Hence, the discourse promotes a pro-active humanitarian role for Norway in Europe. 
Interestingly, this notion of European solidarity has seemingly nothing to do with EU 
membership, trade agreements, or other more technical EU-related issues. Instead, it 
promotes a notion of European solidarity that Norway must contribute to simply 
because it is a European country and thus take part in a community based upon a 
notion of shared commitments and responsibilities. Arguably, these notions are at 
least supposed to be reflected in the Dublin regulations. However, since the 
“European crisis”, European solidarity and internal burden-sharing in the refugee field 
has seemingly become the central reference with regards to solving the refugee crisis 
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and finding new solutions. Consequently, the humanitarian discourse has put 
gradually less focus on physical protection initiatives directed at the nearby region. 
 
Each of the different discourses promote a specific perception of morality. In the 
humanitarian discourse, morality is first and foremost embedded in the international. 
Norway has a moral responsibility towards affected states and the refugees 
themselves. This moral responsibility can only be fulfilled if Norway provides 
financial aid abroad and protection to vulnerable refugees at home. Hence, with 
regards to the “helping them here versus helping them where they are”- debate, which 
has been prominent in the Norwegian debate following the Syrian crisis, the answer is 
that both aspects are necessary. In particular, the humanitarian discourse emphasises 
the need to provide protection in Norway to the most vulnerable who cannot be 
protected in the nearby area. Protecting the vulnerable is a core humanitarian principle 
(Meyer 2015  [interview]).  
 
“Dugnad” can be understood as another nodal point in the humanitarian discourse on 
burden-sharing. It is applied in relation to both international and national refugee 
protection initiatives, and encourages a joint voluntary effort on all levels of society 
because it is for the common ‘good’. This concept can therefore be explicitly tied to 
burden-sharing. Everyone is encouraged to do what he or she can so that Norway can 
take its share of the international “burden”. In this regard, the discourse emphasises 
‘innovation’, ‘improvisation’, and a need to ‘use all the tools in the toolbox’. 
Therefore, many of its adherents have criticised the lack of political will among the 
political leadership to undertake innovative measures. Simultaneously, the discourse 
suppresses concerns for capacities and costs. These are things that will ‘work 
themselves out’ eventually. The most important thing is that we act now to help those 
in need.  
 
The humanitarian discourse is also influenced by a strong rights discourse in the 
political field. Still, this perspective affects different actors in different ways, which 
causes certain fractions within the humanitarian discourse. Certain civil society 
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organisations, such as Amnesty and NOAS, draw heavily upon the rights discourse. 
They refer to the need to take individual rights and concerns into careful consideration 
in all refugee protection initiatives. Although human rights and humanitarian 
discourses often support each other, they also have certain differences that can lead to 
differences in potential policy outcomes. For instance, Meyer (2015 [interview]) notes 
that the dominance of the human rights perspective in the humanitarian field risks 
preventing the development of more innovative and efficient protection initiatives, 
which encompass the needs and interests of all stakeholders, including the population 
inside Syria and the host communities in the neighboring countries. 
 
4.7.3. The ”cost-and-capacity” discourse  
A mix of political and economic ideas constitutes the “cost-and-capacity” discourse. 
Although it addresses a deeply political issue, the discourse also draws heavily upon 
economic concepts, ideas and arguments. In particular, the cost-and-capacity 
discourse rests upon a notion of rationality, and a priority of costs and benefits-
considerations in all refugee protection and burden-sharing initiatives.  
 
‘Efficiency’ can be considered as a nodal point in the costs-and-capacity discourse. In 
particular, ‘efficiency’ is used as a “normative-political concept” that often justifies 
financial burden-sharing over physical protection initiatives (Betts 2006: 151). Betts 
(2006: 152; 167) notes that this justification is largely based on the principles of the 
“optimum allocation of resources” and comparative advantage, derived mainly from 
economic theory. In particular, comparative advantage in the burden-sharing field is 
based upon states’ comparative capacities for physical or financial forms of 
protection. Consequently, wealthy developed states such as Norway normally has a 
comparative advantage in terms of financial burden-sharing, especially as Norway 
often lies relatively far away from the crises areas. This argumentation has 
characterised much of the political debate on burden-sharing after the Syrian crisis. In 
the “helping them here or helping them where they are” debate, the proponents of the 
cost-and-capacity discourse have continuously stressed that it is more efficient and 
effective to provide financial aid because you can then help more people with the 
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same resources. Interestingly, they simultaneously suppress the humanitarian aspect of 
the discussion, which emphasises the need to helping the most vulnerable by 
providing them protection in Norway if they cannot be provided sufficient protection 
in the nearby region.  
 
Regarding the relationship between the national and international, the cost-and-
capacity discourse promotes a rather balanced view. In the cost-and-capacity 
discourse, the UN still is an important and legitimate institution whose 
recommendations are of value in the domestic political context. However, these must 
always be weighed against the concerns of national actors, institutions and capacities. 
In particular, the economic perspective is important in this regard. Since refugee 
protection is a costly process that demands great resources, this is a typical area where 
the cost-and-capacity discourse promotes a careful approach to the implementation of 
international norms and principles. In the textual analysis, it is clear that the 
perception that Norway lacks resource capacity regarding integration and settlement 
processes, especially at the municipality-level, has dominated much of the official 
government discourse on resettlement. This argumentation is derived from the cost-
and-capacity discourse, and draws heavily upon an economic analysis of costs and 
benefits for Norwegian society. In turn, it suppresses moral values and concerns 
embedded in the humanitarian discourse. The apparent preference of the current 
government to resettle refugees that are more easily integrated, and thus often 
resourceful, rather than the most vulnerable, is a further example of the ideational 
frames of cost-and-capacity discourse. In this way, the interests of Norwegian society 
are prioritised above, or at least level with, the needs of the refugees.  
 
The cost-and-capacity discourse also promotes a particular perception of morality. 
However, in contrast to the morality-notion conceptualised in the humanitarian 
discourse, this discourse promotes a form of ‘rational political morality’. Nesvik’s 
opinion piece presents a particularly good example of this way of thinking. He argues 
that it is morally right to conduct a rational and effective refugee policy that relies on 
the consideration of numbers, rather than conducting policies that are driven by 
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emotions and naivety. These policies hold symbolic value, but are not worth much 
when they do not result in effective protection. Again, the economic perspective at 
least partly constitutes the discursive frames of the discussion. However, this also 
implies that the cost-and-capacity discourse includes an element of the humanitarian 
discourse. The question of burden-sharing in refugee protection in the context of the 
Syrian crisis has an inherently strong humanitarian character. The domestic discursive 
struggle over the best way to help the Syrian refugees will most likely always be 
characterised by a certain humanitarian understanding. However, the reasoning for 
why we must help, how we must help, and the extent to which we must help - and 
consequently the practical policy implications for burden-sharing initiatives that 
follow – are grounded in different ideational perspectives and worldviews.  
 
The economic aspects of the cost-and-capacity discourse matter significantly for the 
way in which this discourse shapes the political space for action in terms of burden-
sharing in refugee protection. The strong focus on costs, combined with a suppression 
of the humanitarian perspective, delimits the political space. In contrast to the 
humanitarian discourse, which focuses on innovative solutions and an attitude that 
says “we can do this”, the cost-and-capacity discourse tends to focus on the 
limitations created by existing systems, institutions and resources.  
 
4.7.4. The nation-state discourse 
The nation-state discourse is characterised by a strong emphasis on the importance of 
internal national affairs, and preserving national culture and togetherness. A defining 
feature of the discourse is therefore its focus on Norway’s role as an independent 
nation-state. Not many actors in the political field are identified by this discourse, and 
it has mainly been represented only by certain Progress Party politicians. In particular, 
Sandberg’s text on the Syria agreement and Hagen’s text on the European crisis have 
been clear examples of texts mainly constituted by the nation-state discourse. 
 
Importantly, the focus of the nation-state discourse on internal affairs diminishes the  
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role of the international community, and international norms and principles, in 
shaping domestic politics. The policies and recommendations from the UN become 
deprioritised, or even irrelevant, to the organisation of national politics. This also 
implies that Norway’s international identity is not an important element in the nation-
state discourse, because the opinions of the international community is not considered 
something of great value. Rather, the nation-state discourse may be understood as 
being in opposition to discourses that emphasise the role of international norms and 
principles, such as the humanitarian discourse. In a sense, the discourse frames a form 
of protest against these worldviews, which are framed to be ‘naïve’, ‘politically 
correct’, and ‘repressive’ towards conflicting views and ideas, in particular those that 
are sceptical towards increased immigration. Indeed, it accentuates difference between 
these worldviews, and emphasises conflict over values, norms and meanings. In this 
way, the nation-state discourse also suppresses the humanitarian discourse because it 
dismisses the core foundations of the humanitarian discourse as simply reflecting 
naivety, gullibility, and as something that can be directly damaging for society. By 
attacking its deeply embedded notions of right and wrong, good and bad, the nation-
state discourse de-legitimises the humanitarian discourse and the values it promotes.  
 
In this context, the nation-state discourse is characterised by a high level of 
interdiscursivity. Hence, it includes significant elements from other discourses. 
Sandberg and Hagen’s texts are examples of creative discursive processes in which 
the nation-state discourse have been mixed with other discourses. Most notably, they 
have drawn upon an anti-immigration discourse, a welfare discourse and an efficiency 
discourse in their texts. The welfare discourse in this context is primarily applied in 
combination with the other discourses in a way that strengthens the overall argument 
that low immigration-, asylum-, and refugee numbers is desirable, because they have a 
negative affect on Norwegian welfare. In this way, the nation-state discourse moves 
the political focus towards the need to protect the welfare state. However, the extent to 
which the nation-state discourse relies upon other discourses varies between the 
different communicative events and consequently creates fractions and tensions within 
the nation-state discourse itself. For instance, the text where Jensen maintains her 
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recommendation to the municipalities to say no to settling the new quota refugees, 
expresses ideational elements from the nation-state discourse. However, there is a 
difference between that communicative event and that of Hagen’s, which explicitly 
diminishes the role of the UN and international refugee protection principles.  
 
Political ‘morality’ is conceptualised by the nation-state discourse in mainly domestic, 
not international, terms. Political morality relates to the responsibility of political 
actors to its own society and its own people. National welfare, culture and 
togetherness are public goods that must be preserved, and it is morally right to do so. 
High levels of immigration, including quota refugees and asylum seekers, are 
damaging for these public goods. In particular, the fraction of the nation-state 
discourse that relies heavily on an anti-immigration discourse perceives non-Western 
immigration as threatening to Norwegian society. These refugees pose a particular 
challenge to Norwegian culture and social togetherness because of their very different 
religious, cultural and historical background. The anti-immigration discourse stresses 
how this will create great difficulties for society. Moreover, the nation-state discourse, 
especially the fractions that are heavily influenced by an anti-immigration discourse, 
mainly represents Syrian refugees as a ‘burden’ for Norwegian society, and growing 
refugee flows as a “pressure” on European states (Hagen, 2015). This arguably 
removes parts of the refugees’ individuality and leads to a form of de-humanisation. 
In consequence, the nation-state discourse marginalises the refugees as social actors, 
and risks excluding them from the political field. 
 
4.7.5. Dominant discourses: overlap and distinction 
From the textual analysis it becomes apparent that it is difficult to set clear boundaries 
for, or distinctions between, the different dominant discourses addressing burden-
sharing in refugee protection in Norway following the Syrian crisis. The ‘cost-and-
capacity’ discourse, for instance, includes an element of the humanitarian discourse 
when it addresses humanitarian issues and how to solve them. The market liberalist 
idea of efficiency that is embedded in this discourse is applied as a normative-political 
argument supporting financial burden-sharing and framing it as superior to physical 
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protection initiatives. But it does so within the frames of the humanitarian discourse, 
because it is in fact addressing the best ways in which to help the refugees. Further, 
the nation-state discourse draws heavily on the cost-and-capacity discourse when it 
emphasises the financial and resource burden that increased immigration will present 
for Norwegian society. Fractions of the humanitarian discourse also includes elements 
of the costs-and-capacity discourse when it stresses the need for new and innovative 
protection measures, such as temporary protection initiatives, also in order to address 
the resource perspective. Still, the outline of the dominant discourses show that there 
clearly is a discursive ‘battle’ taking place in the Norwegian political field regarding 
burden-sharing. This is a battle over conflicting norms, values and meanings, over 
what is right and wrong, desirable and undesirable. Significantly, there is also a 
discursive battle over what role the international aspect should play in domestic 
politics. It is not given that international refugee norms such as burden-sharing, or the 
UNHCR’s recommendations, are always guiding Norwegian refugee politics. 
 
4.8. The discursive ‘battle’: hierarchy and power 
This subchapter aims to address an essential aspect of the research question, namely 
the hierarchical relationship between the dominant discourses in the field. Firstly, it 
will attempt to establish the hierarchical relationship between the three dominant 
discourses, also in relation to Fairclough’s concepts of hegemony and ideological 
effects, within the time period addressed in the empirical material. Secondly, it will 
discuss the issue of discursive reproduction and transformation. It will emphasise the 
role of agents and structures, as well as the effects of changing non-discursive factors 
in transforming discursive structures.  
 
4.8.1. Establishing the hierarchy 
The issue of political power is important in establishing the hierarchical relationship 
between the discourses. Political parties have the most explicit form of power, and the 
discourses that constitute their worldview will consequently hold a certain position of 
power in the field. The textual analysis shows that the official discourse of the current 
Norwegian government is largely constituted by the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse. In 
	 95	
particular, the Conservative Party is most clearly identified by this discourse. In the 
communicative events, Erna Solberg has a pragmatic approach to the refugee issue, 
consistently emphasising the cost element. Further, fractions of the Progress Party, 
including party leader Siv Jensen, are also strongly influenced by this discourse, even 
though the Progress Party is characterised by internal discursive fractions. Hence, the 
cost-and-capacity discourse is arguably the most politically powerful discourse on 
burden-sharing in refugee protection in the Norwegian political field.  
 
The nation-state discourse is seemingly the weakest of the dominant discourses 
because only a few political actors, notably from the Progress Party, belong to this 
discourse. However, it is accorded a stronger role due to the fact that the Progress 
Party is in government. This provides the discourse with more power than what could 
be expected due to the relatively small explicit support from political actors. 
Moreover, as several elements of the discourse are considered controversial, the 
representatives of this discourse receive significant media attention and thus increase 
their ability to contribute to the political debate and shape the discursive field. In 
result, the nation-state discourse still contributes significantly to shaping the political 
space for action on burden-sharing.  
 
The humanitarian discourse largely constitutes the views of a large group of actors 
within the political field. Civil society actors, researchers such as Vevstad, and 
political parties including the Socialist Left party, can clearly be identified by this 
discourse. Moreover, other smaller political parties, including the Christian Democrats 
and the Liberals, also belong to this discourse, even though they also include 
significant elements of the cost-and-capacity discourse in their discursive practice. In 
this way, the humanitarian discourse has significant power in the political field. 
Importantly, it also possesses a form of ‘moral hegemony’ that further increases its 
discursive power. The humanitarian discourse in this specific Norwegian field is 
derived from the wider, international discourse of humanitarianism, drawing heavily 
upon international humanitarian values and principles, especially those related to the 
refugee protection regime. As Barnett (2005: 731) notes, this discourse contains a 
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high level of moral authority, at least from within the boundaries of the discourse 
itself, because “humanitarians see themselves as agents of humanity”. In this view, the 
humanitarian discourse is a source of ‘good’, which provides it with a particular 
legitimacy in the political field. However, the discourse is simultaneously 
marginalised by the “costs-and-capacity” discourse and the nation-state discourse on 
this very basis. When these discourses frame the humanitarian discourse as ‘symbolic, 
‘naïve’, and ‘unrealistic’, it de-legitimises the humanitarian discourse and the 
arguments that are applied in the political debate. Consequently, there is on the one 
hand a discursive battle for hegemony in the political field between the humanitarian 
discourse and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse. On the other hand, the nation-state 
discourse attacks the humanitarian discourse from below, by questioning and de-
legitimising the core of the moral value basis of the humanitarian discourse. The 
outcome of this political discursive ‘battle’ determines the scope for political action 
on burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway.  
 
4.8.1.1. Ideological effects 
The dominant ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse has ideological effects that contribute to 
creating and maintaining specific power relations. For instance,‘efficiency’ is a nodal 
point in this discourse. Importantly, Betts (2006: 152) argues that in the context of 
refugee protection, the concept of  “‘efficiency’ provides a legitimating discourse” 
that supports and sustains a specific normative worldview. This is because ‘efficiency’ 
is only “meaningful from a particular standpoint”, which means that it may “implicitly 
privilege a specific set of interests or a specific normative perspective” (Betts 
2006:152). However, by framing this particular notion of efficiency as a universal 
value that is inherently good, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse legitimises and 
sustains a refugee protection system that relies upon an inherently economic 
understanding of efficiency as a criteria for burden-sharing measures. In turn, this 
discourse limits the possibilities for developing a “more substantial conceptualisation 
of efficiency in the context of refugee protection” (Betts 2006: 168). This also has 
concrete implications for burden-sharing, as such a specific normative conception 
narrows the space for legitimate burden-sharing initiatives.  
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In particular, Betts notes that this particular use of the ‘efficiency’ concept in refugee 
protection represent a state-centric perspective of efficiency maximising. In turn, it 
“may exclude refugee perceptions” (Betts 2006: 153). This also applies for the nation-
state discourse, which represents a similar, state-centric perspective. Hence, it is only 
the humanitarian discourse that includes the role of the Syrian refugees as social 
actors, and gives a real voice to their concerns. The humanitarian discourse is thus the 
only dominant discourse that may empower the refugees themselves. The exclusion of 
refugee perspectives from the political debate can have significant and negative policy 
implications for refugee protection initiatives, because it excludes the views of the 
very people that are most affected by these policies. In result, policy makers might 
ignore potentially negative policy consequences. 
 
4.8.2. Discursive transformation: the role of agents and structures  
The discursive frames that define the boundaries of the political field have arguably 
changed from the Syria agreement and during the recent “European crisis”. Dramatic 
non-discursive events have contributed to the rapid change in actors’ perspectives of 
the situation and what needs to be done. In consequence, non-discursive factors have 
contributed to transforming the discursive boundaries that characterise the political 
field. However, social actors have been the main drivers behind this change. Indeed, 
actors in the political field are constituted by the dominant discourses discussed 
above, and the discursive structures they create. Yet, social actors also have the 
creative power to challenge and transform these structures. The non-discursive 
developments of the crisis have initiated this transformation. 
 
The growing civic engagement and grassroots activities have been a notable change 
since the Syria negotiations. This civic engagement is constituted by a humanitarian 
discourse that goes beyond traditional political divisions, and is simply aiming to help 
refugees that arrive in Norway, independently of political affiliation. This grassroots 
engagement has developed first and foremost as a response to the change in non-
discursive social factors. Since the beginning of the ‘European crisis’, the public have 
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been faced with emotional pictures, videos and stories of people fleeing from war who 
are risking their lives at the borders of Europe. These images have made many 
Norwegians feel useless, and sparked a desire to ‘do something’. Arguably, these 
social changes have also led to an increasing perception among the public that the 
political leadership is not doing enough, and people therefore feeling the need to 
address this protection gap themselves. The actions and communicative events 
produced by the grassroots movements have been produced in new and creative ways 
that have pushed, and consequently contributed to transforming, the discursive 
boundaries of the political field. In particular, the movement’s politically ‘neutral' 
discursive framework has broken down the separation between traditional ‘left’ and 
‘right’ in Norwegian politics. The humanitarian concern for refugee protection and 
international solidarity has traditionally been the ‘property’ of the political left, and 
specific civil society organisations. This distinction has also been visible in the case of 
the Syrian refugee crisis, as is exemplified in the textual analysis. However, the 
grassroots movements have attempted to prevent the Syrian refugee question from 
being about party politics, despite it being an inherently political issue. In 
consequence, it has contributed to transforming the traditional political discursive 
boundaries in the refugee field. It has also accorded the humanitarian discourse a 
stronger role in the field.  
 
The developments that have occurred in the time period from the Syria negotiations 
and throughout the ‘European crisis’ (until September 2015) have affected the 
hierarchical relationship between the dominant discourses in the political field. The 
growing grassroots movement has significantly contributed to strengthening the 
humanitarian discourse. The general change in public opinion has seemingly affected 
official government discourse, in particular Progress Party representatives who have 
been identified in part by the nation-state discourse. As Vevstad points out, Siv Jensen 
modified her anti-immigration arguments during the electoral campaign when she was 
faced with the strong Norwegian civic engagement (Vevstad, 2015). Further, actors 
within the political parties have also pushed for discursive transformation. Most 
notably, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats have gradually moved towards 
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a more explicit humanitarian discourse as the ‘European crisis’ has evolved. Indeed, 
these parties have been partly identified by the humanitarian discourse also 
previously, but with stronger elements of the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse. Now, they 
have both pushed for new and pro-active measures in burden-sharing. This has 
contributed to changing the power relations between the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse 
and the humanitarian discourse, in particular since both parties are support parties for 
the current government 
 
In general, the nation-state discourse gradually was accorded a weaker role in the field 
from the Syria negotiations and throughout the “European crisis” during August-
September 2015, as many political actors have been moving further towards the 
humanitarian discourse. However, as the nation-state discourse in itself constitutes a 
form of protest against the humanitarian perspective, the gradually more hegemonic 
position of the humanitarian discourse might eventually initiate a backlash from the 
nation-state discourse.  	
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5 Social Practice and Political Implications 
	
This chapter addresses social practice, the third dimension of Fairclough’s model. 
Social practice refers to wider social and political practices and dimensions, including 
social relations and power structures, which are constituted by both discursive and 
non-discursive factors. Discourse is in a “dialectical relationship with other social 
dimensions” (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 65). Thus, the social practice dimension 
addresses the relationship between discursive practice and social practice, because 
social practice is partly constituted by discursive practice. The chapter focuses in 
particular on the political consequences of the discursive practice in the political field 
(up until late September 2015) for burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway 
following the Syrian refugee crisis. Consequently, the chapter aims to address the 
second part of the research question posed in this thesis, which is “In what ways does 
the hierarchy between these discourses shape the political space - for action on this 
issue and, in the longer term, for future burden-sharing in refugee protection?” In this 
regard, the chapter will discuss two specific policy aspects: 1) the implications of the 
discursive field for Norwegian burden-sharing policies regarding the Syrian refugee 
crisis specifically; and 2) the long-term consequences for burden-sharing in refugee 
protection, in the Norwegian policy context.  
 
In the analysis of social practice, it is important to investigate how the dominant 
discourses shape the political field in different ways, and thereby enable different 
forms of social practice. Further, an essential question in social practice analysis is 
whether discursive practice reproduces the discursive structure and thereby 
“contribute to the maintenance of the status quo in the social practice”, or if the 
discursive structure has “been transformed, thereby contributing to social change?” 
(Phillips and Jørgensen 2002: 87). The concepts of hegemony and power are also 
central aspects of this part of the analysis. Does discursive practice contribute to the 
maintenance and strengthening of specific hierarchical power relations in society, or 
“does it challenge power positions by representing reality and social relations in a new 
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way?” (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 87). Indeed, as Philip and Jørgensen note (2002: 
87), it is by addressing these types of questions that the research project becomes a 
“critical” project. Consequently, the final part of this chapter will focus on the 
relationship between discursive power and social practice. 
 
Firstly, subchapter 5.1. will present an analysis of social practice. It will discuss how 
the different discourses in the field enable different forms of social practice, and how 
discursive hierarchy and changing power relations have had consequences for social 
practice. It also discusses the implications of the social practice analysis for the 
dynamics between the domestic and the international sphere, especially regarding the 
role of international norms in national politics. Secondly, subchapter 5.2. briefly 
addresses the feedback effects between social practice and discursive practice in 
Fairclough’s model. Subchapter 5.3.and 5.4. will discuss the policy implications of the 
discursive practice in relation to the different burden-sharing initiatives. It touches 
upon both short-term and long-term consequences.  
 
5.1. Analysing social practice 
This subchapter will begin by discussing how the dominant discourses enable 
different forms of social practice. Further, it will present an analysis of social practice 
with explicit reference to discursive hierarchy and power relations. Moreover, Philips 
and Jørgensen (2002: 86) stress that in social practice analysis, it is necessary to draw 
on social theory beyond that of discourse analysis. Therefore, the subchapter will 
discuss the social practice in relation to politics and IR theory on the international-
domestic nexus and the role of international refugee norms in Norwegian politics, the 
theoretical starting point of this thesis.  
 
5.1.1. Enabling social practice 
The different discursive practices – the humanitarian discourse, the ‘cost-and-capacity 
discourse’ and the ‘nation-state’ discourse - vary significantly in terms of the political 
space they create for action, and the extent to which they enable new and different 
political practices by framing them as legitimate and desirable. Moreover, the 
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different discursive practices construct Norway’s identity in inherently different ways. 
This supports the theoretical notion derived from Hopf, claiming that state identity is 
constructed at the domestic level. It also has implications for social practice, as a 
given intersubjective identity generate specific forms of behaviour.  
  
The humanitarian discourse deliberately widens the scope for political action in the 
field. By emphasising the importance of discovering new and innovative measures in 
refugee protection, including within the area of burden-sharing, it pushes the 
discursive boundaries for what has previously been perceived as possible and 
desirable. The discourse expresses an attitude that says ‘we can do this if we all work 
together’. Further, the humanitarian discourse constitutes Norwegian identity as a 
great humanitarian power, and frames this as a special ‘heritage’ within the field of 
refugee protection. It thus follows that Norway will play a central and generous role in 
European and international burden-sharing initiatives. In general, the international 
refugee protection regime will play a powerful role in Norwegian refugee politics. 
However, the humanitarian discourse also dictates that all measures in the refugee 
protection field must meet certain human rights and humanitarian standards. Hence, in 
some ways, the humanitarian discourse also narrows the space for legitimate policy 
alternatives. In particular, these limitations will likely narrow the possibilities for 
efficiency measures and resource saving initiatives as these often, though not 
necessarily, risk affecting such standards. The strong rights perspective embedded in 
the Norwegian humanitarian discourse implies that policy initiatives also will focus 
greatly on individual concerns. Finally, due to its priority of international values and 
refugee concern over national economic considerations, the discourse will likely 
suppress concerns for costs and resource capacities in policy development.  
 
The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse is strongly influenced by a market liberalist 
economic perspective. This significantly affects how the discourse shapes the political 
space for action on burden-sharing. In particular, the ‘efficiency’ nodal point in the 
‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse frames a very limited and specific set of burden-sharing 
policies as possible and desirable. The comparative advantage-principle that follows 
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from this will in a burden-sharing context usually prioritise financial burden-sharing 
over physical protection initiatives. The focus on efficiency, rationality, and costs will 
often take priority over human rights and humanitarian principles. This was arguably 
the case in the Syria agreement where adherents to the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse 
maintained that protection-in-region-of-origin was preferable without making a clear 
exception for the most vulnerable – despite UNHCR’s recommendations. The 
rationalist economic perspective promoted by the ‘cost-and-capacity discourse’ 
creates reluctance to refugee politics that can be considered ‘naïve’, ‘emotional’ or 
‘symbolic’. Further, the discourse tends to focus on the limitations created by existing 
systemic conditions, institutions and resources. This discursive practice promotes a 
way of thinking that carefully balances international norms and values against national 
concerns, with the economic perspective playing a decisive role. It expresses a 
conception of Norway as a rational political actor, which takes it international 
responsibility seriously but at the same time cannot accept demands from the 
international refugee protection regime that will have a perceived, significant negative 
effect on the economy and the Norwegian system.  
 
The explicit value foundations of the ‘nation-state’ discourse limit the political space 
to a greater extent than the other discursive practices. Since the discourse includes a 
strong anti-immigration element, it hinders Norway’s involvement in physical 
protection initiatives because that by definition would pose a challenge to the current 
welfare state, and perhaps even represent a form of immorality due to its 
consequences for the Norwegian people. The discourse will therefore not dictate 
policies that will involve higher levels of non-Western refugees immigration 
(including refugees) in Norway. Instead, it is likely to promote the strengthening of 
border control as a political strategy to prevent higher immigration levels. Hence, 
financial burden-sharing is seemingly deemed to be the only positive burden-sharing 
initiative in this discourse. Financial aid to the nearby region may also be considered 
desirable because it supports a strategy of ‘containment’, and may thus lead to fewer 
asylum arrivals in Europe. The nation-state discourse frames Norwegian state identity 
as that of a sovereign nation-state, which is not ‘bullied’ by other states or external 
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actors to implement certain policies. Norway must not be a ‘naïve’ player in the 
international sphere. Hence, it follows from this discursive practice that international 
institutions, norms and principles will play a diminished role in Norwegian politics.  
 
5.1.2. Shaping the political space: hierarchy and changing power relations 
The Syrian refugee crisis has highlighted examples of both discursive reproduction 
and change in the Norwegian political field. This has consequences for social practice. 
The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse has in many ways contributed to maintaining the 
status quo when it comes to substantive burden-sharing politics. Norway has generally 
had a restrictive refugee- and asylum system, and this has been reflected also in the 
response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Indeed, Norway has contributed significantly in 
the area of resettlement compared to other Western states, and has been an important 
contributor of financial aid. However, there have been few attempts by the political 
leadership to develop new or innovative policy alternatives, such as complementary 
forms of protection. The discursive practice of the political leadership also limited 
Norway’s resettlement contribution.  
 
Due to its place at the ‘top’ of the discursive hegemony, the “cost-and-capacity” 
discourse can be characterised as the provider of the core premises of the Norwegian 
refugee protection debate. The ‘nodal points’ embedded in this discourse, including 
efficiency, costs and benefits-analysis, and resource constraints have contributed to 
shaping the frames for the discursive political debate, and consequently also the 
political space for action. All political actors have had to relate to these nodal points in 
their engagement in the debate, and cannot escape this discourse – in discursive 
practice nor in social practice. Of course, this is partly due to the fact that funds and 
resources are not inexhaustible. All political actors must deal with this material 
reality. However, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse is founded upon a normative-
political conception of the role of market liberal economics and economic rationality 
in refugee protection that arguably goes beyond that of actual existing resources. In 
consequence, the hegemonic role of the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse amongst 
political leadership has limited the possibilities for presenting policy alternatives that 
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lie outside of this discursive practice. In this way, the Norwegian political field creates 
a limited political space for burden-sharing in refugee protection following the Syrian 
crisis, which is founded upon a narrow normative and political framework 
determining what is possible and impossible.  
 
The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse’s role as the provider of premises for the policy 
debate has, however, also been challenged as the situation has developed within the 
time frame addressed in the empirical material. That the humanitarian discourse has 
been accorded a gradually stronger role, in particular as the grassroots movement have 
contributed to transforming the discursive space through creative language use, has 
represented the most notable aspect of discursive change in this time period. This has 
significantly strengthened the position of the humanitarian discourse in the 
hierarchical discursive structure, and arguably provided it with a form of ‘moral 
hegemony’ in the field. In turn, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse – and the actors 
largely identified by it – has been forced to seriously engage with the ideas and policy 
implications embedded in the humanitarian discourse, at least to some extent. For 
instance, Erna Solberg’s explicit reference to the need for a national ‘dugnad’ in order 
to implement the Syria Agreement (Hillestad, 2015), implies that she is engaging 
directly with the core concepts and nodal points embedded in the humanitarian 
discourse, even though she applies it in a slightly less ambitious manner. In general, 
the Syria Agreement is a form of compromise between the ‘cost-and-capacity’ 
discourse and the humanitarian discourse, as the cost-and-capacity discourse is 
inherently sceptical to the use of resettlement as a burden-sharing strategy. Moreover, 
as the ‘European crisis’ has evolved, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse and related 
actors have gradually had to justify their social practice also in humanitarian terms. 
The government’s decision in September to host a donor conference for states to raise 
money for UN programmes in the nearby region can be seen as a way to meet the 
challenge of the humanitarian discourse. Solberg herself explained the reasons for the 
initiative by referring to the need to “mobilise an international dugnad” (Hillestad 
2015, emphasis added). In this way, the humanitarian discourse has increasingly 
challenged the premises provided by the cost-and-capacity’ discourse. It has thus 
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pushed the boundaries for what can be defined as legitimate political practice in terms 
of burden-sharing in refugee protection. It is attempting to transform and redefine the 
political space for action.  
 
So why has there not been a more substantive change in social practice following this 
discursive battle? In some ways it is striking how the political leadership has 
continuously suppressed the policy alternatives of the humanitarian discourse as the 
discursive field has changed. There is seemingly little desire amongst the political 
leadership to ‘use all the tools in the toolbox’ or develop more ambitious burden-
sharing initiatives beyond the intent to participate in the European relocation scheme 
in some way. The donor conference initiative still primarily encourages financial 
burden-sharing, and thus remains within the broader boundaries of the status quo 
discursive practice. Part of the explanation to this may be found in the nation-state 
discourse. Despite its relatively limited outreach in the political field, the nation-state 
discourse has disproportional discursive power due to the fact that the Progress Party 
currently is in government. Moreover, although there has been a strong humanitarian 
engagement in large parts of the population, others have also experienced increasing 
fear during the growing ‘crisis’. This has added to the Progress Party’s political clout. 
Thus, since the nation-state discourse is in stark opposition to the humanitarian 
discourse in terms of norms, values and meanings, the important political role of the 
nation-state discourse creates a further distance between the humanitarian discourse 
that defines civil society, several opposition parties and grassroots movements, and 
the discursive practices that constitute the political leadership. In consequence, a 
discursive conflict has arguably emerged between the political leadership and the rest 
of the political field, including the grassroots movements. This also highlights the 
dialectic role of domestic actors and structures. Which actors have political power 
clearly matters for the outcomes of social practice. The fact that the Progress Party is 
represented in government at this exact time has significant policy consequences. At 
the same time, the political actors within the field still act largely within the political 
space created by the current discursive structure. The Progress Party can thus not act 
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completely independent of the discursive frames created by the humanitarian 
discourse.  
 
5.1.3. International norms, national discourses: shaping social practice  
The Syrian crisis highlights several important aspects regarding the relationship 
between the national and the international, in particular regarding the ‘downloading’ 
process of international norms in domestic political processes. From the analysis, it 
becomes clear that the hierarchy between the dominant discourses in the political field 
largely shape the political space for burden-sharing in refugee protection, especially 
the extent to which Norway is willing to participate in physical protection initiatives. 
However, it is also clear that the hierarchical relationship between the different 
discourses determine the role of international refugee norms and principles in 
Norwegian politics. The analysis of discursive practice has highlighted how the 
international norm of burden-sharing and other refugee norms have contributed to 
shaping domestic discourses and practices. The Syria Agreement is a clear example of 
this. The negotiations were initiated by a combination of two ideational factors: 1) 
UNHCR’s call for increased burden-sharing with the nearby region; and 2) Norway’s 
desire to do something, whereby international burden-sharing was perceived to be the 
most appropriate and desirable form of action. Indeed, there was a domestic discursive 
‘battle’ over the agreement and its scope, but the initial frames of the debate were 
created by international norms. The Syrian refugee crisis has thus exemplified how 
international norms - European norms in particular – contribute to shaping Norwegian 
politics.  
 
However, the case of the Syrian crisis has simultaneously highlighted the importance 
of national factors, including domestic discourses, discursive interpretations and 
domestic political contestation in shaping the outcome of the ‘downloading’ process 
of the burden-sharing norm. The nation-state discourse presents a particularly 
interesting case in this regard. This discourse has emerged in direct relation to the 
international refugee protection regime, and as a response to the humanitarian 
discourse in the political field. However, it has developed in opposition to, or in 
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conflict with, the norms and values promoted by this regime. Hence, the international 
sphere has contributed to shaping the nation-state discourse, but this discourse in fact 
promotes a way of thinking that suppresses the role of the international in domestic 
politics. Domestic discursive interpretations of international norms are therefore 
essential for the outcome of the ‘downloading’ process. Further, the analysis of text 
and discursive practice also sheds light upon the discursive ‘battle’ that has occurred 
between domestic actors regarding burden-sharing. The discursive practices have 
differed greatly in their perceptions of international norms and values, and which 
concerns should weigh more heavily in the context of refugee protection more 
generally. It is not a given that Norwegian policy will be guided first and foremost by 
norms, principles and actors in the international refugee protection regime. 
 
5.1.3.1. Effects of the discursive hierarchy 
Since the different discourses vary in the way in which they frame the role of the 
international sphere in domestic politics, the hierarchical relationship between the 
dominant discourses in the field matters for the outcome of the ‘downloading’ 
process. The humanitarian discourse promotes a way of thinking that prioritises 
international solidarity over national concerns in the context of a refugee crisis. 
Hence, its status as ‘moral hegemon’ will contribute to strengthening the political 
awareness of the importance of international norms. However, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ 
discourse remains the political hegemon, largely constituting the ideas and beliefs of 
the political leadership. This discourse always balances international demands with 
national concerns. Further, the disproportionally powerful political role of the nation-
state discourse undermines the legitimacy of international refugee norms shaping 
domestic policy. In consequence, the international norm of burden-sharing has 
contributed to shaping Norwegian politics in terms of responding to the Syrian 
refugee crisis. However, it has only been one of several factors that have determined 
the space for political action. The current hierarchical system between the dominant 
discourses has created some, yet limited, space for international norms. Consequently, 
discursive practice has created a somewhat limited political space for burden-sharing 
initiatives in refugee protection in Norway. In future situations of mass influx, these 
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dynamics between the national and international will still apply. The hierarchical 
relationship between the domestic discourses that characterise the political field will 
largely determine the outcome of the ‘downloading’ process and thus the implications 
for burden-sharing in practice.  
 
5.2. Addressing the feedback-effects of Fairclough’s model 
Fairclough’s model emphasises the mutually constituting relationship between text, 
discursive practice and social practice. Changes in social practice may therefore also 
constitute changes in discursive practice, which in turn is expressed through text 
(Bratberg 2014: 46). Thus, specific forms of political practice also affect the different 
discursive practices and how they frame what constitutes legitimate political practice. 
This implies that the continuation of certain forms of burden-sharing over time, for 
instance, may lead to discursive practice shaping the political space in a way that 
promotes this specific political practice. Resettlement is an example of this. Norway 
has traditionally been a prominent actor within resettlement initiatives. Hence, this has 
been a dominant form of social practice in the Norwegian field. When the Syrian 
crisis emerged, the first response by the (then Labour party-led) political leadership 
was to contribute to burden-sharing through resettlement. As Meyer notes: 
 
We suggested resettlement before the UNHCR did (…) Norwegian discourse in this case was not 
driven by the UNHCR, but by wanting to do more, something concrete (…)  
 
Norway’s experience with resettlement has seemingly caused it to de-prioritise 
alternative measures. For instance, Meyer refers to letters that High Commissioner 
Gueterres sent to the Norwegian Mission in Geneva in the early phases of the crisis:  
 
(ref: Gueterres) encourages not only resettlement, but other instruments as well, i.e. temporary 
permissions, student visa, family reunification (…) Norway has never responded to these other 
instruments (….) (ref: this shows) an inability to think out of the box, at least in the short run.  
 
That the alternative measures Gueterres suggested were never seriously considered 
implies that the discursive practice has largely evolved around the scope and scale of 
the Syrian resettlement programme, consequently neglecting other forms of ‘new’ and 
‘untested’ forms of physical burden-sharing. Further, social practice is constituted by 
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both discursive and non-discursive factors. This means that changes in non-discursive 
factors that belong to the wider social practice also have a constitutive effect on 
discursive practice. Hence, non-discursive changes, such as the rapid increase in 
asylum seekers in Norway, will in turn affect the discursive practice and the hierarchy 
and power relations between the discourses in the field. 
 
5.3. Policy implications: the Syrian crisis 
This subchapter will elaborate on the policy implications of the hierarchical discursive 
practice as discussed in chapter 4, with regards to policy implications for burden-
sharing in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis specifically. In particular it will 
address more closely the policy implications that were touched upon in the textual 
analysis. It will focus on implications for the different burden-sharing measures 
introduced in chapter 2: financial burden-sharing; resettlement; temporary (collective) 
protection; and other complementary forms of protection, as well as broader 
implications for Norway’s role in European and international initiatives.  
 
5.3.1. Resettlement 
Resettlement is traditionally the most prominent form of burden-sharing in physical 
protection in the Norwegian context. Several key informants emphasised Norway’s 
special role in resettlement. For instance, Vevstad (2015b [interview]) notes that 
Norway potentially could contribute significantly at the European level with its 
knowledge and expertise regarding refugee quota schemes. In this view, resettlement 
may become Norway’s pre-eminent contribution in the international burden-sharing 
debate. Still, the discussion on resettlement touches upon fractions of disagreement 
within the humanitarian discourse itself. Meyer (2015 [interview]) criticises the strong 
focus on resettlement in the Norwegian discourse on humanitarian policy vis a vis 
Syria, noting that it is difficult to justify from a purely humanitarian viewpoint this 
very differentiated treatment between refugees, when you could help many more with 
the same resources in the nearby region. Yet, most civil society actors identified by 
the humanitarian discourse stress that resettlement is an effective and necessary 
protection tool for the most vulnerable. This also has to do with the strong individual 
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rights-perspective characterising many actors identified by the humanitarian 
discourse. However, resettlement is a resource-draining and costly protection tool. 
Therefore, this is a policy area where fractions of the humanitarian discourse and the 
‘cost-and-capacity’ conflict with one another. The hegemonic role of the ‘cost-and-
capacity discourse’ thus has significant implications for the role of resettlement policy 
addressing the Syrian refugee crisis. Further, there is also a fear among certain 
political actors largely identified by this discourse, and the nation-state discourse, that 
resettlement will further promote Norway as an asylum country (Ministry of Justice 
official, 2015 [interview]).  
 
The analysis of the empirical material has implied a discursive change since the Syria 
negotiations. In turn, this may also lead to a change in social practice, that is, a change 
in the Syria agreement. Lysbakken, Vevstad, Skei Grande and other actors identified 
more or less by the humanitarian discourse have argued for a more ambitious 
agreement in the light of the new situation. However, the political leadership has 
remained reluctant to this also throughout the discursive changes, and apparently 
remain within the premises of the ‘cost-and-capacity discourse’. Further, fast-
changing non-discursive structures are also likely to affect actors’ perceptions of 
resettlement. At the time of writing, Norway is experiencing a great increase in 
asylum arrivals on a weekly basis. These developments have continued since late 
August 2015, and will impact actors’ views of Norway’s participation in resettlement 
initiatives. In particular, the political hegemony of the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse 
likely results in the priority of ordinary asylum processes  - which Norway in the end 
cannot strictly control – over new resettlement initiatives. The discursive practice may 
deem the combination of the two as too costly. In result, hegemonic discursive 
practice is likely to contribute to a status quo in social practice regarding resettlement. 
However, resettlement lies in the breakpoint between the ‘cost-and-capacity’ 
discourse and the humanitarian discourse. The humanitarian discourse is likely to aim 
to transform and re-constitute hegemonic discursive practice on this issue, but may not 
be able to do so if the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse gains increasing discursive power 
as a result of the changing asylum situation. On the other hand, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ 
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discourse will de-legitimise enhanced resettlement as a policy alternative. The 
outcome of this discursive battle is naturally unknown, but is likely to be something 
similar to the status quo. As Ministry of Justice and Public Security official (2015 
[interview]) put it:  
 
“There is no question of not accepting any refugees for resettlement, but of how to prioritise different 
ways to help.” 
 
5.3.2. Financial Burden-sharing  
The hierarchy between the dominant discourses implies that financial burden-sharing 
will be the most important burden-sharing initiative for Norway during the 
continuation of the Syrian refugee crisis. Financial burden-sharing is dictated as a 
necessary policy by all the dominant discourses in the field. Thus, discursive practice 
will likely guarantee continued financial burden-sharing with Syria’s neighbouring 
region. The question is therefore not whether Norway will participate in financial 
burden-sharing, but the extent to which it will contribute. The different discourses 
enable different forms of social practice in this regard. Norway is a significant 
financial contributor in the region. However, actors belonging to the humanitarian 
discourse continuously argue that Norway can and should do more financially: 
 
“We have increased the support to Syria, but not much to the UNHCR. The international donor 
community has not kept up with UNHCR’s financial needs. UNHCR’s budget is now less than 50% 
financed. In 2010 Norway was the 5th largest donor (…) in 2014 Norway was the 9th largest.” (Meyer, 
2015 [interview]). 
 
The Syria Platform also held as one of its main demands that Norway increases its 
financial support to the region to a total of 3 billion NOK. However, the ‘cost-and-
capacity’ discourse promotes a much more modest financial contribution, which also 
must be seen in context with asylum costs at home, the negative effects of the oil 
crisis on the Norwegian economy, and so on. Perceptions of existing resource 
structures thus contribute to determining the level of financial aid that will go to 
UNHCR’s programmes and the affected states. The nation-state discourse will further 
strengthen this discursive practice, due to it support among some actors within the 
government and its emphasis on the need to spend financial resources first and 
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foremost on national welfare policies. In consequence, Norway will certainly remain a 
significant actor in financial burden-sharing with the region. However, the financial 
contributions are unlikely to experience a dramatic increase due to the current 
discursive structure.  
 
5.3.3. Temporary (collective) forms of protection 
The empirical material highlights that temporary protection programmes is a 
specifically sensitive political issue. During the interviews, most of the key informants 
drew explicitly upon historical experiences with temporary collective protection when 
asked about why this has not been implemented as a response to the Syrian crisis. In 
particular, the temporary protection scheme granted to Bosnian refugees in Norway 
during the 1990s was a strong reference point across the spectre of actors, including 
many civil society actors, representatives from ministries, and the research 
community. The main lessons learned from the Bosnian case was that the ‘temporary’ 
aspect of such protection may have deeply problematic consequences for the 
individuals that are affected (Austenå, 2015 [interview]; Igesund, 2015 [interview]). 
For instance, Austenå stresses the complex difficulties these programmes may have 
for individual asylum applicants:  
 
It is about the lives of individuals. (…) People become rooted and have children. 
 
The discussion, or lack of discussion, on temporary protection thus highlights the 
powerful rights perspective that is embedded in large fractions of the humanitarian 
discourse. Most of the informants noted that temporary protection is extremely 
challenging for the political leadership because they will be responsible for returning 
these refugees in the future. This is particularly difficult due to the strong individual 
rights-perspective in the political field. In particular, the representative for the 
Ministry of Justice (2015 [interview]) stressed that the “child perspective” is dominant 
in the Norwegian debate. Temporary protection measures become increasingly 
challenging when those who stay on a temporary basis have children in Norway. This 
leads to a range of difficult questions relating to the child’s rights and belonging.  
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Temporary protection is challenging for the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse and the 
nation-state discourse also for other reasons. A notable distinction between the Balkan 
crisis in the 1990s and the Syrian crisis today is the cultural and religious differences 
between the refugees. Although the Bosnian refugees were also Muslims, they were 
still European, and thus were similar to Norwegians in many cultural aspects. The 
nation-state discourse is especially negative to non-Western immigration. Hence, the 
ethnic and cultural distinctions between the Bosnians and the Syrians matter greatly 
for the way in which the discourse frames temporary protection as a policy alternative. 
Further, it is important to note the integration aspect. That the Bosnians were 
Europeans also made them generally more easily integrated in other European states 
like Norway, especially in the labour market (Koser and Black 1999: 533; 535). The 
‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse wishes to prioritise refugees who are easily integrated in 
all burden-sharing initiatives. Hence, although this discourse is not founded upon 
explicit anti-immigration sentiments, the cultural and religious background of the 
Syrian refugees still matters in the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse. Similarly, the same 
discursive structures may explain why the experience with large-scale burden-sharing 
in Europe as a response to the massive group of Hungarian refugees in the 1950s has 
not been more present in political memory. Hungarians are also Europeans, and the 
effects of a mass influx on Norwegian society were thus considered by dominant 
discursive practice to be more easily manageable.  
 
However, the issue of temporary protection also underlines certain fractions within the 
humanitarian discourse itself – mainly between the rights perspective and the basic 
humanitarian value of providing humanitarian relief to as many as possible. Whilst 
several civil society actors highlight the problems related to temporary protection, 
other actors belonging to the humanitarian discourse, including Vevstad and Meyer, 
stress the necessity of implementing these schemes despite the challenges. This is 
because temporary protection will “provide more people protection more quickly” 
(Vevstad, 2015b [interview]). Interestingly, Nesse (2015 [interview]) also notes that 
temporary protection represents a protection solution that in some way compromises 
between humanitarian discourse and the cost-and-capacity discourse: 
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(ref: the lack of debate on temporary protection) (…) “has to do with the absence of discussion about 
how we can solve this situation. (…) it will force its way into the cost debate (…) we will not have to 
take all the economic consequences at once.  
 
Still, the empirical analysis shows that so far, temporary protection has not been on 
the agenda of the political leadership. Moreover, Norway is not alone in being hesitant 
towards temporary protection as a response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Most Western 
countries have been sceptical to implementing HAP. Due to the scepticism among 
many actors in the political field towards this protection initiative and the challenges it 
presents for the political leadership, it seems unlikely that Norway will take the 
initiative in this area before a larger group of EU states does so.  
 
5.3.4. Other forms of complementary protection 
The empirical material shows that actors largely identified by the humanitarian 
discourse, have provided several policy suggestions that can foster alternative ways of 
providing protection to Syrian refugees. The most prominent suggestion is enabling 
the provision of humanitarian visas. Other proposals include enhanced possibilities for 
family reunification, and the provision of student visas to Syrian refugees who were 
not able to finish their higher education. Further, actors largely identified with the 
humanitarian discourse have argued for several policy developments that represents a 
form of indirect burden-sharing. These include providing refugees with the possibility 
to process their asylum applications directly at Norwegian embassies abroad, 
changing perceptions towards legal migration, and ensuring safe travel paths from the 
region into Europe and Norway. The latter policy suggestions do not represent explicit 
burden-sharing initiatives as such, but arguably contribute indirectly to burden-sharing 
by enabling more refugees to seek asylum in Norway more easily. Finally, the 
humanitarian discourse also promotes improvements in integration policies directed at 
the refugees that have been granted permission to stay. Humanitarian actors have 
emphasised the need to start the integration process earlier, and the need for increased 
focus on the competencies of the refugees and what they can contribute with in the 
labour market. These policy initiatives do not constitute burden-sharing, but are still 
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essential elements of Norwegian policy in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis. 
However, alternative forms of complementary protection have not been suggested by 
actors who are identified with the other discourses. The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse 
will likely oppose most new policy initiatives that increase state costs. In addition, this 
discourse’s focus on existing problems, and lack of will to pursue new solutions, will 
challenge the development of complementary protection initiatives.  
 
5.3.5. Norway and Europe  
The debate on burden-sharing following the Syrian refugee crisis, at least in the time 
period addressed here, has highlighted issues concerning Norway’s European identity 
and the extent to which Norway wants to play a prominent and pro-active role in 
Europe in this field. As the situation has evolved, there has seemingly been a 
discursive change on this issue. More actors are recognising that Norway must play a 
role in new European initiatives due to its European identity. There is arguably a 
growing recognition that Norway would benefit from taking part in such schemes, and 
that it is desirable from a normative perspective. Igesund 2015 [interview]) 
characterises the Norwegian debate as “changing” because there is a growing 
consensus among political actors that Norway must contribute at the European level in 
particular. This is exemplified by Minister of Justice Anders Anundsen’s expressed 
intention to participate in European relocation initiatives despite the Progress Party 
being strongly influenced by the nation-state discourse (Johnsen and Johnsen, 2015 
(VG). However, there are still significant differences in discursive practice regarding 
the level of ambition. Should Norway be in the lead on this issue, or be satisfied with 
levelling with the European “average”? How much should Norway contribute with in 
terms of costs, resources, and resettlement and relocation places? The humanitarian 
discourse dictates a very ambitious level of commitment, whilst the ‘cost-and-
capacity’ discourse calls for a more cautious approach. 
 
Further, the empirical material reveals that an increasing number of actors in the 
political field believe that the Dublin regulations, at least in the way they are currently 
practiced, have failed to uphold a system of control, solidarity and burden-sharing in 
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Europe. Since Norway is bound to the Dublin regulations, changes in this system will 
affect Norwegian policy. Norway also has the ability to impact Dublin-related policy 
on the European level. It is still highly uncertain which direction the Dublin-
regulations is headed, and whether it will result in improved or more limited systems 
for European burden-sharing. Several actors in the political field largely identified by 
the humanitarian discourse demand that the exemption rules of Dublin are applied, or 
that a new system is developed all together. However, the Norwegian government has 
still been reluctant to declare the failure of Dublin as it is practiced today. In light of 
the dominant discourses, there seems to be a conflict between the humanitarian 
discourse and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse over what are the legitimate systems 
of governance within the European refugee protection regime. Still, it has become 
increasingly clear that Norway will be part of future European burden-sharing 
initiatives, including potentially permanent initiatives. This implies that the 
increasingly strong role of the humanitarian discourse have had implications for the 
government’s social practice.  
 
5.4. Policy implications: burden-sharing in the long-term 
The Syrian refugee crisis is an exceptional case in the area of refugee protection, 
especially in terms of the massive scale of the crisis and its wide-ranging geographical 
impact, which includes Northern states. Therefore it is not unreasonable to expect that 
the experiences from this crisis will have consequences for the way in which the 
international refugee protection system as a whole, and individual countries such as 
Norway, approach the issue of refugee protection in general. The Syrian crisis has 
highlighted numerous shortcomings in international and national refugee protection 
systems. This subchapter will discuss the implications of this for the long-term 
consequences for burden-sharing in refugee protection, beyond this particular crisis. It 
thus touches upon two different elements of burden-sharing: 1) burden-sharing 
measures in particular situations of mass influx; and 2) permanent burden-sharing 
measures. The section is concerned with Norwegian policy specifically. However, 
since the Syrian refugee crisis has had significant consequences for the European 
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system as a whole, and Norway’s refugee policies are closely tied with the rest of 
Europe, the section will also touch upon implications for the wider European system.  
 
5.4.1. National burden-sharing initiatives 
It is not easy, or necessarily possible, to predict future policy developments. However, 
certain tentative implications for Norwegian burden-sharing initiatives can be drawn 
from the experiences from the Syrian refugee crisis and the discursive practices that 
have characterised the Norwegian response, in particular regarding the policy 
response to future situations of mass influx. It is clear that there is no real challenge to 
financial burden-sharing in the discursive field, and financial burden-sharing will thus 
remain the least controversial form of burden-sharing in refugee crises in the future. 
Also in non-crises, Norway is generally a significant provider of humanitarian aid, 
including to the UNHCR. However, the level of financial aid at a given time will 
depend on the hegemonic discursive practice. In addition, the prioritisation of 
financial burden-sharing over physical forms of protection is not a given. The 
humanitarian discourse questions this way of thinking. Moreover, the level of 
ambition will depend on non-discursive factors, especially those related to the 
economy. If the oil crisis continues, for instance, Norway is likely to experience 
another economic reality during future crises. This change in non-discursive structures 
is likely to change the perceptions of actors in the political field. This may in turn 
accord the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse with an even stronger role. 
 
Regarding physical protection initiatives, the question of implications is more 
challenging. Traditionally, resettlement is Norway’s most valuable contribution to 
physical burden-sharing initiatives. The Syrian crisis exemplifies that special 
resettlement schemes are likely to be established in times of crises. However, 
discursive practice set out by the nation-state discourse and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ 
discourse also shows that cultural and religious factors will matter in terms of the 
extent to which Norway will take part in physical burden-sharing as a response to a 
particular crisis. This implies that the scale of physical burden-sharing initiatives in 
situations of mass influx to a certain degree will depend on where the refugee crisis 
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takes place and who the refugees are. To what extent will depend on the hierarchy 
between the dominant discourses. With regards to temporary protection, the Syrian 
refugee crisis highlights that each of the different discursive practices find this 
difficult for different reasons. Temporary protection is framed as an extremely 
sensitive issue by the whole political field. In particular, this issue highlights the 
strong discursive role of the rights perspective in the political field. It thus seems 
unlikely that Norway will implement a temporary protection programme as a response 
to a situation of mass influx, unless a significant number of European states set the 
standard first.  
 
5.4.2. Norway and the international refugee protection regime 
In the case of the Syrian crisis, Norwegian actors have responded differently to 
European discussions on burden-sharing initiatives than to the calls of UNHCR and 
other global actors. Of course, this may have something to do with the fact that, by 
being a member of the EEC and the Schengen area, Norway has a higher level of 
‘legal’ commitment to European practices. However, the empirical material generally 
shows a different level of commitment to European notions of solidarity than to global 
notions of solidarity. This is to an extent related to the hierarchy in the discursive 
field. The humanitarian discourse promotes a strong adherence to all international 
norms, global as well as European. Hence, the prioritised commitment to European 
solidarity is likely derived from the political hegemony of the ‘cost-and-capacity’ 
discourse, which has a more balanced and cautious approach to burden-sharing. There 
has generally been a gradual change in the discursive field regarding European 
solidarity, which has gained increasing support also from the ‘cost-and-capacity’ 
discourse. In consequence, the extent of Norway’s participation in international 
burden-sharing initiatives seemingly depends upon the particular crisis’ impact on the 
European continent, and the European response. The political space for action is likely 
to be greater in the context of European solidarity and burden-sharing than in terms of 
global initiatives.  
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6 Conclusions 
 
The unprecedented consequences of the Syrian refugee crisis for individuals and for 
societies, and the inability of the international community to handle the crisis in a 
satisfactory manner, have highlighted the need for developing improved ways to 
provide effective refugee protection. Moreover, the Syrian crisis is accompanied by 
several other large-scale refugee crises around the world. In result, the international 
refugee protection regime is facing an enormous challenge when it comes to handling 
situations of mass displacement. Greater burden-sharing is likely to be a necessary 
component of improved refugee protection strategies in future refugee situations.  
 
6.1. Main Findings 
The thesis has addressed the following research question: 
 
"What are the dominant discourses addressing burden-sharing in refugee protection 
in Norway following the Syrian crisis? In what ways does the hierarchy between these 
discourses shape the political space - for action on this issue and, in the longer term, 
for burden-sharing in refugee protection?  
 
It has argued that the dominant discourses addressing burden-sharing in the 
Norwegian field following the Syrian crisis are the humanitarian discourse, the ‘cost 
and capacity’ discourse and the ‘nation-state’ discourse. These discourses take part in 
discursive ‘battles’ in the political field, in which they compete and conflict with each 
other. The outcome of these battles, in turn, shapes the political space for legitimate 
action for burden-sharing in practice in Norway. In particular, the thesis has argued 
that the hierarchical relationship between the different dominant discourses has 
significant implications for Norwegian burden-sharing policy. The ‘cost-and-capacity’ 
discourse maintains political hegemony in the field, and thus provides the premises for 
the debate on burden-sharing, which none of the actors in the field can ignore. 
However, the time period from the Syria Agreement and throughout the European 
crisis up until September 2015 highlighted aspects of discursive transformation as 
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well as reproduction. As the humanitarian discourse has been accorded a stronger role, 
and arguably achieved a form of ‘moral hegemony’ in the political field, actors largely 
identified by this discourse have attempted to transform the discursive boundaries and 
consequently widen the political space for legitimate action in terms of burden-
sharing.  
 
Regarding the political implications of discursive practice for Norwegian burden-
sharing, the thesis has addressed four specific forms of burden-sharing: resettlement, 
financial burden-sharing, temporary (collective) protection, and complementary forms 
of protection. In terms of the Syrian crisis specifically, it has argued that the current 
hierarchical relationship results in the priority of financial burden-sharing over 
physical burden-sharing initiatives, as well as a lack of political will to develop and 
implement different forms of complementary protection and other innovative 
protection measures. Regarding future situations of mass influx, the findings imply 
that the Norwegian level of commitment to burden-sharing and solidarity is likely to 
be greater when it comes to European initiatives than global initiatives, at least if the 
humanitarian discourse does not have discursive hegemony.  
 
In the thesis, burden-sharing has been conceptualised as a norm in the international 
refugee protection regime. The theoretical starting point of the thesis has been the role 
of international norms in politics, in particular the complex relationship between 
international norms and domestic politics. I have criticised norm theory in 
constructivist IR for remaining at the inter-state level of analysis, and consequently 
neglecting the crucial role of domestic political actors, institutions and discursive 
interpretations in processing and implementing international norms. Therefore I have 
drawn upon three different strands of constructivist theory in an attempt to ‘bring the 
social back into social constructivism’ and address the ‘downloading process’ through 
which international norms and policies are processed in a domestic context. The 
analysis has showed that domestic political processes, in particular the domestic 
discursive field, are essential in determining if, how, and to what extent international 
norms are implemented. The ‘nation-state’ discourse is an interesting example in this 
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regard. The nation-state discourse has developed in response to the international 
refugee protection regime, but it has developed largely in opposition to this regime 
and the values it promotes. In consequence, the powerful role of this discourse in the 
political field will have significant implications for Norway’s adherence to 
international refugee protection norms. This supports the argument that international 
norm theory in constructivist IR is unable to provide an adequate explanation for the 
development and implementation of international norms due to its lack of focus on the 
‘black box’ of the state.  
 
Critical discourse analysis has been a useful analytical framework for addressing this 
‘black box’ in depth. CDA highlights the importance of power relations and 
ideological effects in discursive practice. This theoretical emphasis on power has been 
particularly relevant, as it has helped explain how and why the hierarchical 
relationship between the dominant discourses in the field have shaped the political 
space for burden-sharing. It has also been useful in explaining how this hierarchy has 
been challenged and to an extent, transformed, during the course of the two cases, and 
what the implications of this are for the political space. Further, the concept of power 
also highlights that possibilities for Norwegian burden-sharing in the future will 
largely depend on the specific hierarchical discursive structure in the field. In 
addition, Fairclough’s concept of ideological effects has contributed to revealing some 
of the deeply embedded power structures within the different discursive practices. For 
instance, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse embraces a specific normative-political 
perspective of market liberalist economic rationality as inherently good, which in turn 
suppresses discursive orientations that are not founded upon this particular notion. 
Hence, CDA can be deemed a very relevant and appropriate analytical framework for 
the analysis of domestic political processes, also in combination with a broader social 
constructivist IR approach such as international norm theory.  
 
6.2. Implications for further research  
In terms of implications for further research, the thesis has touched upon two 
different, yet interrelated aspects of the research agenda in political science and IR. 
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They include 1) a more policy-focused research agenda, looking specifically at the 
concept of burden-sharing in refugee protection; and 2) a theory-driven research 
agenda, which aims to improve the theoretical understanding of the relationship 
between the international political sphere and the national political sphere in general, 
and a deeper understanding of the specific circumstances concerning the development 
and implementation of international norms in particular.  
 
In terms of the first aspect, the thesis has highlighted the importance of burden-
sharing as a political response to the enormous global displacement challenge. 
However, I argue that this has not been sufficiently matched in scholarly literature. 
Thus, increased academic focus – in several disciplines – on burden-sharing in refugee 
protection could be beneficial also from a policy perspective. Moreover, the main 
findings of the thesis imply that in-depth analyses of different domestic political 
contexts are crucial in order to understand the possibilities for burden-sharing, both in 
terms of the Syrian refugee crisis and future situations of mass influx. Hence, future 
research on this issue could involve applying a similar analytical framework of 
different national contexts, or involve conducting comparative studies. CDA has 
proven to be a useful analytical framework in this regard. However, a combination of 
different research methodologies addressing this issue would likely provide new 
insights in the field. Moreover, the analytical findings of the thesis imply that the 
extraordinary character of the Syrian refugee crisis has enabled possible new policies 
and practices in the field of refugee protection. In turn, this implies that the Syrian 
crisis represents a fruitful starting point for new research within the refugee protection 
field.  
 
In terms of the second aspect, my findings imply that there is a need in IR to develop 
more nuanced theoretical approaches that address the role of norms in international 
politics, which better capture the complex relationship between the domestic and the 
international sphere. The ‘bottom-up’ approach developed by Hopf, and the 
‘downloading’ process as theorised in the ‘Europeanization’ literature, could provide a 
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fruitful foundation in this regard. In this way, this thesis has also provided a theory-
generating starting point for further research.  
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Afterword 
 
In this thesis I have addressed a very relevant and extremely fast-changing political 
field. Due to the current dramatic political situation in Europe and in Norway for 
refugees and migrants, I have simply been unable to address the most recent empirical 
developments, as I had to remain within the scope and time frame of a master’s thesis. 
I had to delimit my empirical material somehow, and I was able to capture a very 
interesting period in the Norwegian field. However, there have been some drastic 
changes in the field since September. The humanitarian discourse has gone from a 
position in the discursive hierarchy through which it could push for a transformation 
of the existing discursive structure to a diminished role in the political field. The 
nation-state discourse, on the other hand, has been accorded a significantly stronger 
discursive position. Still, these changes also highlight the relevance of my findings. 
Firstly, I would argue that the current political dynamics show that the three 
discourses I have identified in the thesis still characterise the field. Even though the 
power structures between them have changed, it is clear that the nation-state 
discourse, the humanitarian discourse and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse still 
constitute the frames of the debate. Secondly, the political developments also show 
that the analytical insights and dynamics highlighted in the thesis still apply. The 
hierarchy between the dominant discourses in the field clearly matters for Norwegian 
refugee and asylum policy. Now that the nation-state discourse has a stronger position 
in the discursive hierarchy, this has had concrete implications for Norwegian refugee 
politics, which has become more restrictive. Moreover, further changes in non-
discursive factors have also contributed to changing the political field. A great 
increase in the number of asylum seekers in Norway over a longer period of time has 
resulted in a change in public opinion and many political actors’ perception of the 
situation. Hence, despite that the empirical material in the thesis reflects an “out-
dated” political situation, I will argue that my findings have analytical value also 
beyond this specific empirical context. 
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Appendix 
 
Intervjuguide 
 
 
Normer/prinsipper i flyktningebeskyttelse 
 
- Hvilke (normer og) prinsipper oppfatter du som viktige i flyktningebeskyttelse, sett 
fra et norsk ståsted? Hvordan har de endret seg over tid, og hvorfor? 
- Kan byrdefordeling forstås som en slags norm i internasjonal flyktningebeskyttelse?  
 
Syria som ”definerende case”? 
 
- Har Syriakrisen endret måten det internasjonale samfunnet, deriblant Norge, tenker og 
handler i forhold til flyktningebeskyttelse?  
 
Den politiske debatten i Norge 
 
- Hva mener du er de viktigste skillelinjene i den norske debatten om 
flyktningebeskyttelse? 
- Har byrdefordeling i flyktningebeskyttelse vært et prinsipp som norske aktører har 
forholdt seg til tidligere?  
- Hvordan mener du at den norske debatten om byrdefordeling har endret seg som følge 
av Syriakrisen? Hvordan har valgkampen har spilt inn her? 
- Tror du flyktningkrisen vi har opplevd de siste par månedene vil ha en innvirkning på 
Syria-avtalen? 
 
Norge og det internasjonale 
 
- Byrdefordelingsinitiativer som en respons til den syriske flyktningkrisen har vært 
fremhevet av UNHCR som praktisk og moralsk nødvendig. Har norske aktører har 
blitt påvirket av dette? 
- Hvordan blir Norge etter din oppfatning påvirket av den europeiske debatten om 
byrdefordeling?  
- Mer generelt - hva mener du Norge kan og bør gjøre når det kommer til internasjonal 
byrdefordeling, og hvorfor? 
- En rekke ulike byrdefordelingsinitiativer – humanitarian admissions, 
kvoteflyktninger, finansiell byrdefordeling med nærområdende osv. Kan du si noe om 
forholdet mellom disse? 
 
Langtidsperspektiv – implikasjoner 
 - Hva tenker du om langtidskonsekvensene av det vi ser skjer i forbindelse med 
flyktningkrisen i Syria nå, når det gjelder flyktningebeskyttelse i Norge generelt, og 
byrdefordeling spesielt?  - Hva er de eventuelle hindringene for å etablere byrdefordeling som en norm i 
flyktningebeskyttelse?  
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Historisk perspektiv 
 
- Byrdefordelingsinitiativer i stor skala har også blitt implementert i forbindelse med 
tidligere flyktningkriser – mest kjent under Yugoslaviakrisen på 90-tallet, men også 
etter andre verdenskrig og Vietnamkrigen. Hvordan har tidligere erfaringer med 
byrdefordeling i flyktningebeskyttelse påvirket den politiske responsen til Syriakrisen 
i dag?  
 
